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THE REVIVAL OF FACT PLEADING UNDER THE
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
Richard L. Marcus*
Unfortunately by a kind of Gresham's Law, the bad, or harsh,
procedural decisions drive out the good, so that in time a rule
becomes entirely obscured by its interpretive barnacles.
Charles E. Clark'
As Dean of Yale Law School and reporter of the committee that
drafted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Charles Clark2 was the
principal architect of the Rules and leading proponent of the liberal
ethos that underlies them. His pessimism about procedural reform
therefore deserves attention. This Article examines the fate of the centerpiece of Clark's new system-simplified pleading under Rule 8(a)(2),
which requires only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief." This Rule was designed to escape the complexities of fact pleading under the codes, which had generated great confusion about how to allege the required "ultimate
facts" while avoiding forbidden "conclusions" and "mere evidence."
There were pockets of resistance against the new pleading rules in the
years after 1938, 4 but in 1957 the Supreme Court threw its weight decisively behind the new liberal ethos in Conley v. Gibson:5 "[A] complaint
should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears
* Professor of Law, University of Illinois. B.A. 1969, Pomona; J.D. 1972, University of California, Berkeley. I received numerous helpful suggestions from the partici-

pants in an Illinois Faculty Workshop that discussed some of these ideas. In addition, I
am indebted to United States District Judge Milton Shadur (N.D. Ill.) and Jan Vetter,

who reviewed earlier drafts of this Article and made numerous helpful comments, and to
Ed Wilhoite who provided valuable research assistance. All errors that remain are mine

alone.
1. Clark, Special Problems in Drafting and Interpreting Procedural Codes and
Rules, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 493, 498 (1950).

2. Charles Clark graduated from Yale Law School in 1913, and began to teach there
in 1919. From 1929 to 1939 he was Dean. In 1939, he was appointed a judge of the
Second Circuit, of which he served as Chief Judge from 1954 to 1959. From 1935 to

1956 he served as Reporter of the Supreme Court's Committee on the Rules of Civil
Procedure, which drafted the rules. See 4 Who Was Who in America 174 (1968).
3. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); see also 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice & Pro-

cedure § 1202, at 59 (1969) ("Rule 8 is the keystone of the system of pleading embodied
in the federal rules."); Smith, Judge Charles E. Clark and The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 85 Yale L.J. 914, 917-18 (1976) (general pleading was one of Clark's three

basic goals for new procedural rules).
4. See infra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
5. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
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beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of
his claim that would entitle him to relief."6 Clark could hardly have put
it more forcefully himself.
Although Conley v. Gibson put the Supreme Court on record as
clearly favoring the liberal view, the actual application of its admonition
in subsequent cases was more problematic. Taken literally, it might
have precluded dismissal in any case where the plaintiff invoked a valid
legal theory. How can a court ever be certain that a plaintiff will prove
no set of facts entitling him to relief? The case itself provided little
help. Plaintiffs were black union members who accused their union of
racial discrimination. Defendants argued that the complaint failed to
state a claim because it lacked particulars about their allegedly discriminatory activities. The lower courts did not accept that argument, 7 and
the Supreme Court rejected it with the broad statement quoted above.
But the complaint did contain particulars, and the case could have been
decided without such sweeping language. 8 The Court's broad language was intended for other cases, not this one. Pleadings were intended only to give general notice, it seemed, and pleading practice
was to shrivel and die.
One seeming impact of Conley v. Gibson was that commentators lost
interest in pleading. For years before and after the adoption of the
Federal Rules in 1938, pleading had been the subject of intense academic discussion.9 After the decision, this discussion stopped abruptly.
Perhaps that was because some viewed the battle about detailed pleadings as irretrievably over,' 0 or because they understood that Conley authorized a "fishing expedition" to determine whether plaintiff actually
had a claim." Whatever the reason, for more than twenty years after
Conley, there was virtually no academic recognition that pleading practice had not vanished; defendants continued to make motions to dismiss and courts continued to grant them. Only recently have
commentators begun to acknowledge this reality. 12
6. Id. at 45-46 (citations omitted).
7. The lower courts had dismissed on the ground that the claim was subject to the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Railroad Adjustment Board. The Supreme Court rejected
that argument. See id. at 43-44.
8. Plaintiffs alleged, for example, that the defendant union maintained two separate
locals, one for whites and the other for blacks, providing inferior representation to the
black local, see Complaint
VI, VII, Transcript of Record at 8-11, Conley, and that in
May, 1954, with the connivance of the union, the railroad had fired 45 blacks and replaced them with whites, see Complaint
VIII, X, Transcript of Record at 11-13.
9. For a collection of such authorities, see Weinstein & Distler, Drafting Pleading
Rules, 57 Colum. L. Rev. 518, 524-25 (1957).
10. See, e.g., Friedenthal, A Divided Supreme Court Adopts Discovery Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 69 Calif. L. Rev. 806, 816 (1981) ("Once
it became clear that the battle for a return to the code formulation was irretrievably lost,
other devices were utilized to raise the same issue in different contexts.").
I1. F.James & G. Hazard, Civil Procedure § 3.11, at 153-54 (3d ed. 1985).
12. This commentary tends to focus on narrow problems rather than the more gen-
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Not only has pleading practice survived, but fact pleading, the bate
noir of the codes, seems to be enjoying a revival in a number of areas in
which courts refuse to accept "conclusory" allegations as sufficient
under the Federal Rules. Consider, for example, Heart Disease Research
Foundation v. General Motors Corp.,13 which the Guinness Book of World
Records listed as the suit with the largest damage claim in the history of
litigation, $375 trillion. 14 Plaintiff sued on behalf of a class of 125"million American urban dwellers alleging that the defendant Big Four
automakers had conspired in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act to
restrain the development of automobile air pollution mechanisms,
thereby polluting the atmosphere of North America. The Second Circuit affirmed the trial court's dismissal for failure to state a claim' 5 because "it was well within the district court's discretion to dismiss the
claim since no facts are alleged supporting an antitrust conspiracy.
Although the Federal Rules permit statement of ultimate facts, a bare
bones statement of conspiracy or of injury under the antitrust laws
without any supporting facts permits dismissal."' 6 This attitude appears worlds away from the approach articulated in Conley. The result
becomes more remarkable when one considers that the United States
had also sued the Big Four alleging the same conspiracy, and ultimately
obtained a consent decree in that litigation for "essentially all" the relief it had sought.' 7 The dismissal upheld by the Second Circuit was
certainly correct on other grounds,' 8 but it illustrates that Conley is not
eral question of the role of pleadings in the modem litigation system. See, e.g., Roberts,
Fact Pleading, Notice Pleading, and Standing, 65 Cornell L. Rev. 390, 399-400, 415
(1980); Saveri & Saved, Pleading Fraudulent Concealment in an Antitrust Price Fixing
Case: Rule 9(b) v. Rule 8, 17 U.S.F.L. Rev. 631, 639-40 (1983); Sovern, Reconsidering
Federal Civil Rule 9(b): Do We Need Particularized Pleading Requirements in Fraud
Cases?, 104 F.R.D. 143, 150 (1985); Wingate, A Special Pleading Rule for Civil Rights
Complaints: A Step Forward or a Step Back?, 49 Mo. L. Rev. 677, 680-83 (1984); Note,
Pleading Securties Fraud Claims With Particularity Under Rule 9(b), 97 Harv. L. Rev.
1432 (1984).
13. 463 F.2d 98 (2d Cir. 1972).
14. N. McWhirter & R. McWhirter, Guinness Book of World Records 387 (12th ed.
1973). The case has since been eclipsed by more ambitious litigation. See Windsor v.
Pan American Airways, 744 F.2d 1187 (5th Cir. 1984) (suit for $400 trillion).
15. The district court had relied in the alternative on Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. See Heart
Disease Research Found. v. General Motors Corp., 15 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan)
1517, 1519 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). The Second Circuit chose not to rely on that ground. See
463 F.2d at 100.
16. 463 F.2d at 100.
17. This litigation was filed, along with the massive antitrust suit against I.B.M., in
the last days of the Johnson Administration. See R. Harris, Justice 128 (1970). The
government suit charged a conspiracy beginning at least as early as 1953 to retard competition in the development of air pollution control equipment. After negotiations, the
government and the automakers agreed to a consent judgment in October, 1969, which
"granted essentially all of the relief which the government had sought." United States v.
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n, 643 F.2d 644, 645 (9th Cir. 1981).
18. As a nonprofit foundation, the plaintiff had no standing to sue for damages
under the antitrust laws. Cf. In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution, 481 F.2d 122 (9th
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taken literally. This case, moreover, is not an anomaly. Although they
rarely acknowledge the shift,' 9 federal courts are insisting on detailed
factual allegations more and more often, particularly in securities fraud
20
and civil rights cases.
Does the revival of fact pleading show that Clark was right to expect the courts to undermine his liberal reforms with restrictive barnacles? Using this question as a starting point for an analysis of the
proper role of pleadings under the Federal Rules, this Article concludes that reality is more complicated. The new fact pleading is an
effort to cope with the pressures of the litigation boom, itself caused in
part by the innovations of the Federal Rules. Contrary to the conventional wisdom that the sole purpose of pleadings is to give notice, this
Article suggests that their role should be to enable courts to decide
cases on their merits. The important question then is how pleading
rules can be used to accomplish that purpose. Unfortunately, operating in the shadow of Conley v. Gibson and caught up in the vocabulary of
notice pleading, the courts have not given that question much
attention.
This Article finds that the answer is to look for cases in which the
plaintiff's legal conclusions can be profitably evaluated. It identifies
two broad categories of such cases-those in which more specificity is
likely to disclose a fatal defect in a plaintiff's case, and those in which
sufficient detail will enable the court to make a reliable determination
that the defendant did not violate the plaintiff's rights. Used in this
fashion, pleading practice is an important tool, but not a panacea. In
other kinds of cases, whether purportedly justified as providing "notice" or otherwise, pleading motions are largely a waste of time.
The new fact pleading does not stop with these two kinds of cases,
however. Courts now regularly use it, as in Heart Disease Research Foundation, to probe and reject plaintiff's factual conclusions. Although this
practice is understandable in view of the breadth of modern discovery
and the limits on summary judgment, it does not provide a reliable
method for determining whether a defendant has violated the plaintiff's rights because it requires the plaintiff to marshall evidence before
conducting discovery. Neither can it be justified as a special way of
handling certain "suspicious" claims or as a step toward discretionary
dismissals. Instead, the preferable route for probing plaintiff's factual
conclusions should be to rely on more flexible use of summary judgment. Under this approach, the principal focus would often be on the
Cir.) (holding that state governments and crop farmers lacked standing to seek damages
in litigation over same conspiracy), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973).
19. See Roberts, supra note 12, at 420 ("What is most noteworthy about this slow
erosion of federal notice pleading ... is the utter silence in which the process is taking
place."). For a review of the new fact pleading cases, see infra notes 84-104 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 84-101 and accompanying text.
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amount of discovery to be allowed a plaintiff under Rule 56(f) before
ruling on summary judgment, thereby controlling the risk of abuse of
discovery. Such flexible use of summary judgment would be particularly effective if done in conjuction with more active case management
by judges. Combined with selective cost-shifting in cases of proven litigation abuse, this evidentiary scrutiny would provide a better system
for pretrial disposition.
I.

THE EVOLUTION AND CORRUPTION OF SIMPLIFIED PLEADING

A. The Sins of the Past
In pleading, they studiously avoid entering into the Merits of
the Cause; but are loud, violent and tedious in dwelling upon
Circumstances which are not to the Purpose.
21
Jonathan Swift

Common law pleading, which was originally oral, evolved over centuries into an increasingly detailed written exercise. During the same
period, the forms of action were developing, and their limitations reinforced pleading difficulties. In order to prevail, the common law plaintiff had to choose the correct form of action. He and his lawyer then
embarked on an exchange of pleadings with the defendant that was
designed ultimately to produce a single issue for resolution by a judge
or trial by a jury, 22 with
trial itself as something of an afterthought to
23
the pleading process.
Whatever the wisdom of the common law approach as an abstract
system, it proved extremely susceptible to Gresham's Law. Over time,
it became necessary to use highly stylized verbal formulations to present even simple grievances. These expressions-known as "color"24
often had little relation to the underlying facts of the particular case.
They certainly told the defendant little or nothing about the plaintiff's
claims, and the defendant would remain in the dark until trial because
discovery was limited or nonexistent. Nevertheless, the defendant
could take comfort in the prospect that the plaintiff could ultimately
lose because his lawyer bungled the pleading war. As pleading practice
25
prospered, decisions on the merits became increasingly infrequent.
21. J. Swift, Gulliver's Travels 352-53 (H. Williams ed. 1926) (1st ed. London
1726).

22. For a description of this ritual, see A. Harding, The Law Courts of Medieval

England 78-79 (1973).
23. R. Palmer, The County Courts of Medieval England 90 (1982); see also A. Harding, supra note 22, at 78 ("Cases were often decided by the pleading-contest rather
than by jury or the other methods of trial.") (citation omitted).
24. On the growth of legal fictions, see Sutherland, Legal Reasoning in the Fourteenth Century: The Invention of "Color" in Pleading, in On the Laws and Customs of
England, Essays in Honor of Samuel Thorne 182 (M. Arnold, T. Green, S. Scully & S.
White eds. 1981).
25. See F. James & G. Hazard, supra note 11, § 3.2, at 132.
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Popular dissatisfaction with this situation in England led, in the
late nineteenth century, to abandonment of the forms of action and
simplification of pleading. 26 A movement for similar reforms in this
country was spearheaded by David Dudley Field, the drafter of the New
York code adopted in 1848. While one may question whether Ameri27
can judges were really so formalistic as the reformers suggested, it
was clear that the Field Code reforms were intended to eliminate decisions based on technicalities. In place of stylized verbiage, the Code
directed that the complaint contain "[a] statement of the facts constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language, without repea person of common
tition, and in such a manner as to enable
28
understanding to know what is intended."
The high hopes for the Field Code were not realized. In part, one
may attribute this failure to judicial sabotage. 2 9 No doubt the Code's
fate was what Clark had in mind when he spoke of Gresham's Law. But
there were real problems with the codifier's reformulation of pleading
rules in that they invited unresolvable disputes about whether certain

assertions were allegations of ultimate fact (proper), mere evidence
(improper), or conclusions (improper).3 In particular, there was great
difficulty distinguishing ultimate facts from conclusions since so many
concepts, like agreement, ownership and execution, contain a mixture

of historical fact and legal conclusion. Pleading decisions caused increasing difficulty for even the most common claims. For example, the

detail needed to allege negligence was regularly recalibrated.31 Such
fencing among lawyers led to stagnation that interfered with resolution
of disputes on their merits.

26. See generally 15 W. Holdsworth, A History of English Law 128-32 (A.
Goodhard & H. Hanbury ed. 1965) (describing theJudicature Act of 1873, which simplified pleading in England).
27. Indeed, the Field Code itself may be viewed as an example of 19th century
formalism. See M. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law 265-66 (1977).
28. An Act to simplify and abridge the Practice, Pleadings and Proceedings of the
Courts of this State, ch. 379, § 120(2), 1848 N.Y. Laws 521.
29. See McArthur v. Moffet, 143 Wis. 564, 567, 128 N.W. 445, 446 (1910) (referring to "[t]he cold, not to say inhuman, treatment which the infant Code received from
the New York judges").
30. See Cook, Statements of Fact in Pleading Under the Codes, 21 Colum. L,Rev.
416,417 (1921), for an argument that these distinctions are ultimately meaningless. But
cf. McCaskill, Actions and Causes of Action, 34 Yale LJ. 614, 620 (1925) (arguing that
cause of action concept must be retained because pleadings will otherwise be "half
baked and undigestible").
31. See, e.g., Gillispie v. Goodyear Serv. Stores, 258 N.C. 487,490, 128 S.E.2d 762,
765 (1963) (" '[Nlegligence is not a fact in itself, but is the legal result of certain
facts.' ") (quoting Shives v. Sample, 238 N.C. 724, 726, 79 S.E.2d 193, 195 (1953)); cf.
C. Clark, Handbook of the Law of Code Pleading § 47, at 300-03 (2d ed. 1947) (noting
that requirements for pleading negligence under code pleading were actually more demanding than under common law).
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B. The Federal Rules: The Liberal Ethos Triumphant
Ancestor worship in the form of ritualistic pleadings has no
more disciples. The time when the slip of a sergeant's quill
pen could spell death for a plaintiff's cause of action is past.
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint is not
an anagrammatic exercise in which the pleader must find just
exactly the prescribed combination of words and phrases.
32
Judge John Minor Wisdom

Sobered by the fate of the Field Code, Dean Clark and the other
drafters of the Federal Rules set out to devise a procedural system that
would install what may be labelled the "liberal ethos," in which the
preferred disposition is on the merits, by jury trial, after full disclosure
through discovery.3 3 At first, Clark favored eliminating pleading motions altogether.3 4 Ultimately other voices held sway, but Rule 8(a)(2)
was drafted carefully to avoid use of the charged phrases "fact," "conclusion," and "cause of action." To make the point clearer, the drafters
prepared a series of form complaints that were by definition sufficient
to satisfy the new standard.3 5 These forms were startlingly brief. For
example, Form 9 preempted decades of pleading litigation by declaring
sufficient the allegation that "defendant negligently drove a motor vehicle against plaintiff."'3 6 No longer would the objection that negligence was a legal conclusion hold sway.
Clark did not expect that most complaints would be as abbreviated
as the form complaints, and he hoped that most pleaders would continue to do their pleading carefully.3 7 Nonetheless, he had little pa32. Thompson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 476 F.2d 746, 749 (5th Cir. 1973).
33. See Clark, The Handmaid ofJustice, 23 Wash. U.L.Q. 297, 318-19 (1938) (denouncing attempts to resolve cases on pleadings and asserting that "in the case of a real
dispute, there is no substitute anywhere for a trial"); see also infra text accompanying
note 343.
This is not to say that all the framers of the rules were enthusiastic about jury trial.
To the contrary, some have characterized the attitude of the rules' framers as mistrusting juries and preferring resolutions by judges (presumably on summary judgment).
See 21 C. Wright & K. Graham, Federal Practice & Procedure, § 5025, at 146-51 (1977)
(describing "Progressive Procedural Paradigm"). But their hopes for summary judgment were not vindicated by subsequent events, which made summary judgment difficult
to obtain. See infra notes 297-303 and accompanying text; cf. Clark, supra, at 318 (summary judgment "is adapted only for rather simple issues where the facts are on the surface"). Instead, under the influence of Conley v. Gibson, the customary decision-making
method became jury trial, as was desired by Conley's authorJustice Black. See Kaufman,
The Federal Civil Rules and the Pursuit of Justice, in Hugo Black and the Supreme
Court; A Symposium 221, 224-25 (S.Strickland ed. 1967) (Black was the most vigorous
champion ofjury trial in Supreme Court history.).
34. Smith, supra note 3, at 927-28.
35. Fed. R. Civ. P. 84 declares that "[t]he forms contained in the Appendix of
Forms are sufficient under the rules and are intended to indicate the simplicity and brcvity of statement which the rules contemplate."
36. Form 9, Appendix of Forms, Fed. R. Civ. P.
37. See C. Clark, supra note 31, § 39, at 245.
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tience with the use of a "mere formal motion" 3 8 to challenge the
sufficiency of the pleadings because it "really decides nothing of substance." 3 9 Clark's proteg6, Professor Moore, emphasized in his treatise
that pleadings need "do little more than indicate generally the type of
litigation that is involved."'40 Rather than dwell on pleading niceties,
under the new system litigants were to use the expanded discovery
mechanisms provided by the Federal Rules to get to the merits of the
case. Armed with that information, they could in appropriate cases
move for summary judgment, allowing the court to decide the merits.
Normally, however, the proper method for resolving them was trial by
41

jury.

The liberality of the pleading requirements is reflected throughout
the Federal Rules. Thus, amendment of pleadings is freely granted,
even after trial, 42 and the court is admonished in any event to grant the
parties whatever relief they are entitled to after trial, whether they have
requested it or not.4 3 By the time Conley v. Gibson was decided, the

stage seemed set for assuring litigants decisions on the merits.
C. The Sins of the Present. The Catharsis of the Liberal Ethos
The history of procedure is a series of attempts to solve the
problems created by the preceding generation's procedural
reforms.
Professor Judith Resnik 4 4
Whatever their internal symmetry, the Federal Rules contributed
to a number of developments that have dismayed a considerable portion of the federal judiciary. Much ink has already been spilled on the
litigation "boom" and the crisis in the adversary system, 45 but dramatic
increases in litigation are hardly unprecedented. 46 The reader none38. Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774, 775 (2d Cir. 1944); cf. Gottreich v. San
Francisco Inv. Corp., 552 F.2d 866, 867 (9th Cir. 1977) ("We had thought that this kind
of nit-picking had disappeared in 1938 .... ").
39. Proceedings of the Institute at Washington, D.C. and of the Symposium at New
York City 54 (1938). These proceedings were held to publicize the new federal rules.
40. 2AJ. Moore &J. Lucas, Moore's Federal Practice 8.03, at 8-10 (2d ed. 1985)
[hereinafter cited as Moore's Federal Practice]; see Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495,
501 (1947) ("The new rules, however, restrict the pleadings to the task of general notice-giving .. ").
41. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
42. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(b) (amendment to be allowed unless the objecting party
shows prejudice).
43. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(c).
44. Resnik, Tiers, 57 S.Cal. L. Rev. 837, 1030 (1984).
45. See, e.g., R. Marcus & E. Sherman, Complex Litigation: Cases and Materials on
Advanced Civil Procedure 1-22 (1985).
46. One researcher has found the conditions of 1946 to 1980 in the federal courts
similar to those in 1876, when civil cases were more important than criminal. See Clark,
Adjudication to Administration: A Statistical Analysis of Federal District Courts in the
Twentieth Century, 55 S.Cal. L. Rev. 65, 123 (1981); see also id. at 99-105 (noting
HeinOnline -- 86 Colum. L. Rev. 440 1986
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theless intuits that the existing pressures on the federal judicial system
arose, somewhat unexpectedly, within the last twenty years. Things
were not actually so tranquil during the Federal Rules' first quarter century, however. Ten years after the Rules were adopted, concern about
protracted litigation caused the Judicial Conference of the United
States to appoint a committee headed by Judge E. Barrett Prettyman to
examine the peculiar problems caused by such litigation. 4 7 In 1955,
ChiefJustice Warren commissioned a special panel of federal judges to
study the handling of complicated cases, 48 a process leading ultimately
to the promulgation of the Manualfor Complex Litigation. So the pressures of managing litigation were sensed soon after the Federal Rules
came into effect. Undeniably, however, these concerns did escalate
with the rapid rise in federal court filings during the 1960s and 1970s.
Peering out from behind this mountain of litigation, federal judges
also perceived a pro-plaintiff shift in the balance of power in litigation
resulting largely from the breadth of discovery, which could impose
very substantial costs on defendants. 4 9 Moreover, at least some courts
said that once the plaintiff had obtained information through discovery
he could do anything he wanted with it; discovery could even become
the principal objective of a lawsuit, rather than merely a device for helping resolve it.5° Other procedural innovations, particularly the 1966
amendment of Rule 23 on class actions, seemed to load the dice in
burst of growth in civil filings between 1900 and 1907). England experienced a litigation boom in the 16th and 17th centuries. See Brooks, Litigants and Attorneys in the
King's Bench and Common Pleas, 1560-1640, in Legal Records and the Historian 41 (1.
Baker ed. 1978). Nor is the duration and magnitude of the current "boom" undisputed.
See Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know
(And Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31
UCLA L. Rev. 4, 9 (1983) (In 1960, there was concern about a decline in litigation.).
47. The committee's report, entitled Procedure in Anti-trust and Other Protracted
Cases, appears at 13 F.R.D. 62 (1951). The report anticipates much of the debate that
would develop over the following three decades. Consider the following: "Pleadings
will not serve to particularize issues sufficiently in these cases, and motions for particulars will not serve that purpose. Such particularization must be achieved by informal
conferences between judge and counsel well in advance of a possible trial date." Id. at
67. This approach was ultimately adopted by the 1983 amendments to the Federal
Rules. See infra note 61 and accompanying text.
48. The panel's proposal, entitled Handbook of Recommended Procedures for the
Trial of Protracted Cases, appears at 25 F.R.D. 351 (1960).
49. See, e.g., In re Commonwealth Oil/Tesoro Petroleum Corp. Sec. Litig., 467 F.
Supp. 227, 250 (W.D. Tex. 1979) ("unchecked access to the in ten'orem power of the
federal discovery mechanism"). Such arguments echo the debate about pleading specificity during the 1950s. See infra notes 69-71 and accompanying text; New Dyckman
Theatre Corp. v. Radio-Keith-Orpheum Corp., 16 F.R.D. 203, 206 (S.D.N.Y. 1954)
(Vague pleading becomes "a springboard ... into an almost bottomless sea" of discovery in an antitrust case.).
50. See Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 258 (7th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976); accord, In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 187 (D.C. Cir.
1979). For a criticism of this view, see Marcus, Myth and Reality in Protective Order
Litigation, 69 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 29-41 (1983).
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favor of plaintiffs by greatly increasing the stakes and actually impeding
disposition on the merits. 5 1 Together with pro-plaintiff substantive
changes, 52 themselves fueled by successful discovery forays,5 3 the
Rules' procedural innovations appeared to some to leave defendants

little meaningful opportunity to prove their innocence on the merits.

54

The result of this synergy was a litigation industry55 in which the value
51. Milton Handler, for example, charged that the amended Rule 23 "utilizes the
threat of unmanageable and expensive litigation to compel settlement ... it is a form of
legalized blackmail." Handler, The Shift from Substantive to Procedural Innovations in
Antitrust Suits-The Twenty-third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 9
(1971). For a time, there was considerable reason to take this view. By relaxing requirements for rule 23(b)(3) class actions for damages, the 1966 amendments certainly increased the stakes of litigation, and an action arguably was a class action from the date it
was filed. Meanwhile, Eisen v. Carlisle &Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974), could be read
to forbid consideration of the merits until the court had decided whether to certify a
class, a process that could take months or years. But cf. Berry, Ending Substance's Indenture to Procedure: The Imperative for Comprehensive Revision of the Class Damage Action, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 299, 314 (1980) ("Despite [Eisen,] there is pervasive
sentiment [among judges and lawyers] favoring some sort of preliminary hearing on the
merits."). It should be noted that strictures on precertification merits decisions have
been relaxed. See, e.g., Wright v. Schock, 742 F.2d 541 (9th Cir. 1984) (upholding
precertification grant of defendant's motion for summary judgment). But class certification is still thought to give plaintiffs a bargaining edge in settlement negotiations. See
Note, Certifying Classes and Subclasses in Title VII Suits, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 619, 626-27
(1986).
52. Examples abound. Bad faith tort claims caused a variety of contract and other
commercial disputes to take on new aspects. See, e.g., W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton
& D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts 11 (5th ed. 1984) (growth in punitive damages claims for bad faith by insurance companies) [hereinafter cited as Prosser
& Keeton]; Farber, Reassessing the Economic Efficiency of Compensatory Damages for
Breach of Contract, 66 Va. L. Rev. 1443, 1468-77 (1980) (arguing for supercompensatory damages in certain situations); Galane, Proving Punitive Damages in Business
Tort Litigation, 2 Litig., Spring 1976, at 24, 24 (listing eight business torts in which
punitive damages are available). Both compensatory and punitive awards have skyrocketed. See Friedman, The Six Million Dollar Man: Litigation and Rights Consciousness
in Modem America, 39 Md. L Rev. 661, 664-65 (1980).
53. See Friedenthal, supra note 10, at 818-19 & n.59 (discovery serves to stimulate
growth of substantive remedies).
54. See, e.g., infra notes 58-60, 134 and accompanying text. This view is not universal. To the contrary, empirical investigation suggests that the current preoccupation
with the litigation "boom" may be an overreaction. See Galanter, supra note 46, at
61-69. Nevertheless, courts have seen a number of suits that seemed to have no value
except as vexation or recreation. See, e.g., Hailes v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 729
F.2d 1037, 1037 (5th Cir. 1984) (employment discrimination claim "the product of a
project to obtain a lawsuit-not a secretarial position"); Beachboard v. United States,
727 F.2d 1092, 1095 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ("The unescapable conclusion is that Beachboard
is engaged on this appeal in 'recreational' litigation, misusing precious and limited resources better spent on meritorious claims of his fellow citizens .... "); Norman v.
Reagan, 95 F.R.D. 476, 477 (D. Or. 1982) ("It is possible, of course, that this is not
intended as a claim at all, but as a literary artifact.").
55. Cf. In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 98 F.R.D. 48, 72 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (quoting a
letter from counsel for plaintiff class referring to "plaintiffs' antitrust industry"), rev'd in
part, 751 F.2d 562 (3d Cir. 1984).
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of litigation appeared only slightly connected to the merits of claims
being asserted-a "gigantic slot machine" approach to litigation 56 in
a defendant overshadowed the merits of the
which the status of 5being
7
dispute.
underlying
The Supreme Court increasingly has voiced concern about abuse
of the litigation process by plaintiffs with groundless claims. In 1975,
for example, in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,58 the Court restricted standing to sue for securities fraud because "the liberal discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure" give plaintiff
"an in terrorem increment of the settlement value," 5 9 so that "even a
complaint which by objective standards may have very little chance of
success at trial has a settlement value to the plaintiff out of any proportion to its prospect of success at trial so long as he may prevent the suit
60
from being resolved against him by dismissal or summary judgment.
The same concerns led to pressures to change the Federal Rules
56. Friedenthal, supra note 10, at 818 (referring to "plaintiffs who sometimes treat
the judicial system as if it were a gigantic slot machine").
57. Symptomatic of this trend is the suggestion that the settlement value of meritless litigation is protected by the Sherman Antitrust Act against "conspiracy" by the
defendants not to settle. In Lemelson v. United States, 3 Ct. Cl. 161 (1983), aff'd in
part, vacated in part, 752 F.2d 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1985), for example, plaintiff sued the
United States and two third party defendants for violating plaintiff's patent. After settlement negotiations were unsuccessful, the infringement case went to trial and defendants
won. Id. By that time, however, plaintiff had sued the defendants again, alleging that
they had violated the antitrust laws by agreeing not to settle the infringement case separately in order to present a common front. See Lemelson v. Bendix Corp., 104 F.R.D.
13 (D. Del. 1984) (discovery motion in same case). The partial vacation and remand of
the decision in the infringement case, see Lemelson v. United States, 752 F.2d 1538
(Fed. Cir. 1985), may make the antitrust case seem less extraordinary, but plaintiff's
claim was not premised on that. Instead, his premise was that the Sherman Act protected his opportunity to parlay his invalid patent claim into the best possible settlement
by playing the defendants off against one another. Eventually, after three years of litigation, the court granted summary judgment to defendants in the antitrust case on the
ground plaintiff had insufficient evidence of an illegal conspiracy. See Lemelson v. Bendix Corp., 621 F. Supp. 1122 (D. Del. 1985).
In other contexts, the litigation value of an invalid claim has also been given protection. Thus, in Aloy v. Mash, 38 Cal. 3d 413, 696 P.2d 656, 212 Cal. Rptr. 162 (1985),
the court held that failure to assert a claim which was shown by later decisions to be
invalid could nonetheless be actionable malpractice. The defendant lawyer had represented plaintiff in her divorce in 1971 and had not then asserted a claim that the husband's military pension was community property. In 1981, the United States Supreme
Court decided that states could not award interests in such pensions as community
property, so the claim would not have been meritorious. But the California court was
unmoved by this fact, reasoning that given the uncertainty of the pre-1981 law, the
claim, though now known to be meritless, could then have had litigation value, so that
the lawyer could be liable for failure to assert it.
58. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
59. Id. at 741.
60. Id. at 740; see also Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 345 (1979) (Courts
"must be especially alert to identify frivolous claims brought to extort nuisance
settlements.").
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themselves. After extensive debate, the Rules were amended in 1980
and 1983 to promote active case management through pretrial conferences that could "formulate issues" and eliminate "frivolous claims and
defenses" and control the conduct and content of discovery. 6' No
longer does Rule 26(a) invite unlimited discovery; the judge is now explicitly authorized to limit discovery that is duplicative or "unduly burdensome or expensive" to protect the parties' right to a reasonably
economical decision on the merits. 62 The amended Rules also place
greater emphasis on the duty of lawyers to avoid abuse of litigation by
requiring an attorney to investigate both the legal and factual basis of a
claim before filing suit, and by promoting increased use of sanctions for
violation of various rules. 63 Courts have begun using sanctions energetically, perhaps too energetically, 64 to punish those who bring or
maintain groundless suits, 65 an effort that may deter some groundless

litigation. 66 The recent amendments do not, however, abandon the
premise that lawsuits should be decided on their merits rather than
technicalities.
D. The Revival of Fact Pleading
Oh, you might say, we have motions to dismiss-rule 12(b)(6),
the vaunted motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. It is a wonderful tool on paper,
but have you ever looked at the batting average of rule
61. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(1), 26(b), (0. For a review of the 1983 amendments, see
Marcus, Reducing Court Costs and Delay: The Potential Impact of the Proposed
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 66 Judicature 363 (1983). See
generally Elliott, Mangerial Judging and the Evolution of Procedure, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev,
(forthcoming 1986) (managerial judging as an ad hoc method for narrowing issues). For
an example of the emphasis on this approach, see United Food & Commercial Workers
v. Armour & Co., 106 F.R.D. 345, 349 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (endorsing telephone conference to establish baselessness of complaint); cf. Portsmouth Square, Inc. v. Shareholders
Protective Comm., 770 F.2d 866, 869 (9th Cir. 1985) (sua sponte grant of summary
judgment at final pretrial conference).
62. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
63. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, 16(0, 2 6(g); Marcus, supra note 61, at 369-70.
64. Cf. Curtin, Chairman's Comer, 10 Litig. News, Winter 1985, at 2 (reporting
views of Professor Arthur Miller that, with respect to sanctions, "the pendulum might
swing too far in the other direction" because "judges might impose too many sanctions
rather than too few."). In his annual report to the judiciary, however, ChiefJustice Burger urged more frequent use of sanctions. Burger Says Vacancies Add to Judicial Deficit, N.Y. Times, Dec. 30, 1985, at 12, col. 1.
65. See, e.g., Olympia Co. v. Celotex Corp., 771 F.2d 888, 892-94 (5th Cir. 1985);
Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 251-54 (2d Cir. 1985):
Huettig & Schromm, Inc. v. Landscape Contractors Council, 582 F. Supp. 1519 (N.D.
Cal. 1984); Van Berkel v. Fox Farm & Road Mach., 581 F. Supp. 1248 (D. Minn. 1984).
66. See, e.g., Conard, Winnowing Derivative Suits Through Attorneys Fees, 47 Law
& Contemp. Probs., Winter 1984, at 269, 284-85; Rowe, Predicting the Eilcts of Attorncy Fee Shifting, 47 Law & Contemp. Probs., Winter 1984, at 139, 161.
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12(b)(6) motions? I think it was last effectively used during
the McKinley administration.
Professor Arthur R. Miller 67
Amidst the tumult surrounding the litigation boom, there has been
almost no talk of changing the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governing pleading. 68 The last serious proposal was in the early 1950s,
when the Ninth Circuit, in what has been described as a "guerrilla attack" 6 9 on simplified pleading, urged that Rule 8(a)(2) be amended to
revive code pleading by requiring the plaintiff to allege "the facts constituting a cause of action."' 70 During the same period, several district
judges in the Southern District of New York were engaged in what
Clark himself characterized as "something bordering on a revolt"
against the existing rule. 7 1 The Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules
rejected the proposed change, 7 2 and Conley v. Gibson seemed to scotch
the effort to revert to code practice.
Undoubtedly, lax pleading has, like the procedural and substantive
changes discussed above, 73 benefitted plaintiffs. Plaintiffs have an incentive to plead vaguely in hopes that discovery will turn up material on
67. A. Miller, The August 1983 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Promoting Effective Case Management and Lawyer Responsibility 7-8 (1984).
68. E.g., National Commission Staff Paper, The Early Narrowing and Resolution of
Issues, 48 Antitrust L.J. 1041, 1056 (1980) ("There has been little testimony or comment presented to the [National] Commission [for Review of the Antitrust Laws] favoring increased specificity in antitrust pleadings.") (footnote omitted).
69. R. Field, B. Kaplan & K. Clermont, Materials For a Basic Course in Civil Procedure 439 (5th ed. 1984).
70. See Claim or Cause of Action: A Discussion on the Need for Amendment of
Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 13 F.R.D. 253, 253 (1952).
71. Clark, Special Pleading in the "Big Case," 21 F.R.D. 45, 49 (1957). These
judges began in the early 1950s to insist on more specific pleadings in large cases, particularly antitrust cases. See Baim & Blank, Inc. v. Warren-Connelly Co., 19 F.R.D. 108,
109-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). In Nagler v. Admiral Corp., 248 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1957), the
Second Circuit, speaking through Chief Judge Clark, rejected this movement: "lit is
quite clear that the federal rules contain no special exceptions for antitrust cases." Id. at
322-23.
Coupled with the Supreme Court's pronouncement the same year in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957), Nagler ended the debate in the courts, but the participants
continued it elsewhere. Thus, Judge Dawson, the author of Bairn & Blank, hic., later
commented: "The anti-trust bar was beginning to understand the necessity for this type
of pleading in those cases . . . until Judge Clark made his speech at the Seminar [on
Protracted Cases] last year and then followed it up with his decision in Nagler v. Admiral
Coiporation ...... Dawson, The Place of the Pleading in the Proper Definition of the
Issues in the "Big Case," 23 F.R.D. 430, 434 (1958). Clark responded to "Judge
Dawson's slashing attack" in Clark, Comment on Judge Dawson's Paper on the Place of
the Pleading in the Proper Definition of the Issues in the "Big Case," 23 F.R.D. 435
(1958).
72. See Report of Proposed Amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure for the
United States District Courts 18-19 (1955) (explaining decision not to modify Rule
8(a)(2)).
73. See supra notes 49-54 and accompanying text.
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which to base a more specific charge.7 4 Indeed, it has even been suggested that specificity inherently favors defendants. 7 5 Moreover, under
Conley v. Gibson courts may be inclined to deny motions to dismiss precisely because they cannot tell enough about a plaintiff's claim from the
pleadings to decide whether the plaintiff has a chance of prevailing at
trial. As the Supreme Court noted in Blue Chip Stamps, 76 plaintiffs with
weak claims have good reason to want to stave off dismissal in hopes of
a settlement.
A natural antidote to pro-plaintiff biases and the impulse toward
vagueness is to promote pleadings decisions, and the courts have
adopted this solution in areas that were viewed as particularly troubling. The Supreme Court itself, while approaching pleading issues with
what has been called "appalling casualness" 77 and continuing outwardly to adhere to Conley, 78 has nevertheless provided some support
for such creativity. It has suggested that "insubstantial" cases can be
dismissed despite "artful pleading" 79 and appeared receptive to using
pleading motions to weed out meritless cases. In a 1983 decision reversing dismissal of an antitrust case, for example, it exhorted the district court to require plaintiff to plead with particularity, concluding
that "in a case of this magnitude, a district court must retain the power
to insist upon some specificity in pleading before allowing a potentially
80
massive factual controversy to proceed."
*Perhaps taking its own advice about the value of specificity, the
Court has relied increasingly on fact pleading to resolve standing issues. In a 1975 decision, for example, the Court rejected plaintiffs'
standing allegations as "conjectural" and "conclusory." 8' Such allega74. Judges are not oblivious to this tendency toward vagueness. See, e.g., Levitch
v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 94 F.R.D. 292, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (dismissing
amended complaint characterized as "an effort [by plaintiffs] to keep their claim as ambiguous as possible"), affid, 697 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1983); Weinstein, Proposed Revision
of New York Civil Practice, 60 Colum. L. Rev. 50, 72 (1960) ("[T]he federal rules provide no protection against the unskilled and the skillful obscurers."). Clark certainly had
no intention of fostering a shift to vagueness. See C. Clark, supra note 31, § 41, at 253
("[W]e should not put a premium upon ignorance, so that the pleader who knows the
least about his case will be the most protected by his pleading.").
75. See Friedenthal, supra note 10, at 815. On the other hand, it may be that defendants resist more vigorously when plaintiffs allegations are vague. See Kingdon,
The "Big Antitrust Case": Thoughts on Procedural Reform, 37 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 25,
38 (1980); cf. Brazil, Kahn, Newman & Gold, Early Neutral Evaluation: An Experimental Effort to Expedite Dispute Resolution, 69Judicature 279, 279 (1986) (notice pleading makes early settlement difficult because true center of dispute cannot be identified).
76. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975); see supra notes
58-60 and accompanying text.
77. Roberts, supra note 12, at 399.
78. See, e.g., Hishon v. King & Spalding, 104 S. Ct. 2229, 2233 (1984).
79. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507 (1978) (dictum).
80. Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters,
459 U.S. 519, 528 n.17 (1983) (dictum).
81. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 503, 509 (1975).

HeinOnline -- 86 Colum. L. Rev. 446 1986

19861

FACT PLEADING

447

tions were insufficient, the Court explained without reference to Conley
v. Gibson, because they were not supported by "particularized allegations of 2fact" and "specific, concrete facts" showing harm to
plaintiffs.S
Many lower courts have been even more vigorous in insisting on
fact pleading. Although special pleading rules are sometimes used to
accomplish a narrow policy objective, 8 3 these decisions generally fit
into one of three categories.
1. Securities Fraud. - Virtually unknown when the Federal Rules
were adopted,8 4 securities fraud cases have since proliferated. Many
courts have responded by requiring plaintiffs to plead detailed facts.
To some extent this insistence can be justified by the special pleading
requirements of Rule 9(b), which requires that in fraud cases "the cir'85
cumstances constituting fraud. . . shall be stated with particularity.
Clark, who viewed this Rule as a compromise with judges' habits, said it
"probably states only what courts would do anyhow."'8 6 The Rule does
not overturn the general thrust of the Federal Rules to avoid pleading
87
battles and promote decisions on the merits in their place.
82. Id. at 501, 508. Two years earlier, the Court had shown a preference for deferring standing decisions until the summary judgment stage. See United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 689-90
(1973). For a criticism of the use of pleading to resolve standing issues, see Roberts,
supra note 12.
83. The Ninth Circuit adopted a special pleading rule in cases involving activity
arguably protected by the first amendment. See Franchise Realty Interstate Corp. v. San
Francisco Local Joint Executive Board of Culinary Workers, 542 F.2d 1076, 1083 (9th
Cir. 1976) ("[T]he danger that the mere pendency of the action will chill the exercise of
First Amendment rights requires more specific allegations than would otherwise be required."), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 940 (1977). Arguably, this insistence on greater specificity in pleading to protect first amendment interests should be reexamined in light of
Calder v.Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790-91 (1984) (rejecting argument that first amendment
concerns should limit scope of personal jurisdiction), and Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S.
153 (1979) (rejecting argument that first amendment provides basis for privilege against
discovery into editorial process in libel action).
84. The first case recognizing a private cause of action for damages under rule lOb5 was Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
85. Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
86. Clark, Simplified Pleading, 2 F.R.D. 456, 463 (1943).
87. The commentators have roundly rejected the formalistic argument that rule
9(b) erects a special regime immune to the liberal pleading approach of rule 8. E.g., 5
C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 3, § 1298, at 406 (rule 9(b) must be read in conjunction with rule 8); 2A Moore's Federal Practice, supra note 40, 9.03, at 9-28 (same).
Even the Second Circuit, most active in expansive use of rule 9(b), has on occasion
recognized this. See Felton v. Walston & Co., 508 F.2d 577, 581 (2d Cir. 1974) ("[I]n
applying rule 9(b) we must not lose sight of the fact that it must be reconciled with rule 8
.... "). Moreover, the actual emphasis in many cases on detailed evidence supporting
allegations about the defendant's state of mind, see infra notes 90-93 and accompanying
text, is forbidden by the second sentence of rule 9(b), which explicitly permits general
pleadings to state of mind. See infra note 216 and accompanying text.
Nor is the use of rule 9(b) to permit expansive pleadings decisions justified on policy grounds. First, the disfavored claims idea, which is one historical antecedent of rule
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Consistent with the general purposes of the Rules, some courts
find that Rule 9(b) is designed to provide somewhat more specific notice and that it requires only "slightly more" detail than Rule 8(a)(2). a8
However, other courts, particularly the Second Circuit, find that Rule
9(b) serves a much more substantive purpose-to protect defendants'
reputations from unfounded claims of fraud and to assure that such
malodorous claims are not filed as a pretext for discovery: " 'It is a
serious matter to charge a person with fraud and hence no one is permitted to do so unless he is in a position and is willing to put himself on
o89
record as to what the alleged fraud consists of specifically.'
The stricter courts pay great attention to "conclusory" allegations
about defendants' knowledge or intent. Some hold that plaintiffs may
not rely on allegations based on information and belief.90 Some insist
that the plaintiff provide specific details that support factual conclusions. For example, in Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 9 1 plaintiff shareholders
sued the company and its senior officers. Plaintiffs claimed that the defendants had knowingly or recklessly failed to disclose the health risks
caused by use of the Dalkon Shield intrauterine device that eventually
resulted in the filing of hundreds of lawsuits against Robins, with total
claims far exeeding Robins' net worth.9 2 In their complaint, plaintiffs,
who bought their shares in 1973, alleged that Robins had then touted
the device as a boost to the company's financial health even though in
9(b), see 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 3, § 1296, at 400, simply fails to justify the

new fact pleading. See infra notes 228-38 and accompanying text. Second, the courts'
effort to erect special protections against charges of fraud, see infra note 89 and accompanying text, does not explain why fraud should be treated differently from other claims
such as racketeering, racial discrimination, price-fixing, and environmental pollution, for
which there are no special pleading rules. See infra notes 237-38 and accompanying
text. Finally, and most importantly, in many cases fact pleading provides no reliable

mechanism for evaluating a plaintiffs factual conclusions. Fact pleading therefore
threatens the objectives of promoting reliable decisions on the merits and avoiding
pleading battles. See infra notes 196-227 and accompanying text. Both from the perspective of the rules governing pleading and more generally in terms of the overall purpose of the rules, then, the presence of special pleading provisions does not justify the
new fact pleading even in the area of fraud.
88. See, e.g., Tomera v. Galt, 511 F.2d 504, 508 (7th Cir. 1975); cf. Walling v.
Beverly Enter., 476 F.2d 393, 397 (9th Cir. 1973) (Rule 9(b) only requires that circumstances constituting fraud be pleaded with sufficient particularity so that defendant can
prepare an answer, and does not require pleading of detailed evidentiary matters.).
89. Segal v. Gordon, 467 F.2d 602, 607 (2d Cir. 1972) (quoting IA W. Barron & A.

Hotzhoff, Federal Practice and Procedure § 302, at 215-16 (Wright rev. 1960)); see also
Billard v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 683 F.2d 51, 57 (2d Cir. 1982) (Rule 9(b) construed

strictly to minimize strike suits). For criticism of this use of Rule 9(b), see Sovern, supra
note 12, at 165-71; Note, supra note 12, at 1439-47.
90. See, e.g., Wayne Inv., Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 739 F.2d 11, 13-14 (1st Cir. 1984);
Duane v. Altenburg, 297 F.2d 515, 518-19 (7th Cir. 1962).
91. 607 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 946 (1980).

92. In fact, Robins has recently sought protection from these suits by filing a petition under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. See Robins Files for Protection of'
Chapter 11, Wall St.J., Aug. 22, 1985, at 3, col. 1.
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May, 1974, the company wrote 120,000 doctors across the country
warning them of health hazards associated with the use of the device.
To bolster their claim that defendants had known or recklessly disregarded these risks prior to plaintiffs' purchase of their shares in 1973,
plaintiffs pointed to an unpublished 1972 study detailing the health
hazards associated with the Dalkon Shield. Because plaintiffs did not
allege Robins was aware of the study, however, the Second Circuit
found the complaint inadequate for failure to "specifically plead those
events which they assert give9rise
to a strong inference that defendants
3
had knowledge of the facts."
2. Civil Rights Cases. - Like securities fraud cases, civil rights suits
have since 1938 become a staple of the federal courts' civil docket. Unlike securities fraud cases, however, there is no special provision of the
Federal Rules applicable to civil rights claims. Many lower federal
courts have nevertheless revived fact pleading requirements in such
cases.
The leader in this movement has been the Third Circuit, which is
forthright about its motivation: " 'In recent years there has been an
increasingly large volume of cases brought under the Civil Rights
Act. . . . It is an important public policy to weed out the frivolous and
insubstantial cases at an early stage in the litigation . . . .
4 To

achieve this objective most courts now declare that conclusory allegations are inadequate to state a civil rights claim. They require specific
delineation of the facts claimed to show a violation of plaintiff's civil
rights 95 and, as in securities fraud cases, focus particularly on plaintiff's
allegations about intent. 96
These requirements have been applied with remarkable enthusiasm. In United States v. City of Philadelphia,9 7 for example, the Department of Justice filed a complaint alleging in part that the Philadelphia
police department systematically violated the civil rights of minority
persons by abusing them physically. The complaint was signed by several government lawyers, including the Attorney General. 98 Citing,
among other things, the potential that such a claim could be vexatious
to local police officials, the trial court dismissed. 9 9 Although it specifically disavowed any need to determine whether the claim was frivo93. 607 F.2d at 558.
94. Rotolo v. Borough of Charleroi, 532 F.2d 920, 922 (3d Cir. 1976) (quoting
Valley v. Maule, 297 F. Supp. 958, 960 (D. Conn. 1968)).
95. See, e.g., Jones v. Community Redevelopment Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th
Cir. 1984). See generally Roberts, supra note 12, at 417-19 (canvassing civil rights

pleading cases).
96. See, e.g., Albany Welfare Rights Org. Day Care Center, Inc. v. Schreck, 463
F.2d 620, 623 (2d Cir. 1972) (upholding dismissal for failure adequately to allege defendant's motivation), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 944 (1973).
97. 644 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1980).

98. Id. at 205.
99. 482 F. Supp. 1274, 1278 (E.D. Pa. 1979), aff'd, 644 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1980).
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lous, 0 0 the Third Circuit affirmed on the ground that the complaint

did not satisfy the specificity requirement for civil rights cases, which it
said was necessary to provide "fair notice" and to dispose of frivolous
cases.101

3. Conspiracy. - Concerns about conspiracy seem pervasive today,
and many plaintiffs include conspiracy allegations in their complaints.
As Heart Disease Research Foundation v. General Motors Corp. 102 shows, the
lower courts also scrutinize conspiracy allegations with care. In general, they say that broad, vague charges of conspiracy do not suffice.' 0 3
Some require, at a minimum, that the plaintiff0 4enumerate the overt acts
alleged to show that the conspiracy existed.'
4. Summary: The Persistent Themes. - The situations in which the
new fact pleading has been applied possess significant common characteristics. For one, they represent important segments of activity in the
litigation boom, each type of claim having experienced enormous
growth since the Federal Rules were adopted. 10 5 More significantly,
however, these situations present particularly difficult problems involving the potential abuse of litigation because they often involve outwardly innocent or admitted behavior that can, depending on the
defendant's state of mind, result in very substantial liability. In a typical
securities case, for example, the dispute is not over the content of the
representations made by the defendants, but rather whether those representations were inaccurate and, if inaccurate, whether defendants
knew or should have known of such inaccuracy. In the paradigmatic
employee's civil rights suit, the dispute is not over whether defendants
have fired the plaintiff, but rather their motivation for doing so. In
many antitrust cases, the dispute is not over what happened to the
100. 644 F.2d at 205 n.28; cf. P. Marcus, The Big Antitrust Case in the Trial

Courts, 37 Ind. L.J. 51, 61 (1961) ("The writer is not aware of the filing of a government
antitrust suit where there was not sufficient knowledge of facts to warrant an honest
belief that a violation of the Sherman Act existed.") (emphasis added).
101. Id. at 205-06. In view of the change of administration in Philadelphia (Mayor
Rizzo was replaced) and the imminent change of administrations in Washington, the
Carter administration decided not to seek Supreme Court review. See 0. Fiss & D.
Rendleman, Injunctions 56 (2d ed. 1984).

102. 463 F.2d 98 (2d Cir. 1972); see supra text accompanying notes 13-18.
103. See, e.g., Fullman v. Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 557 (11th Cir. 1984); California
Dump Truck Owners Assoc., Inc. v. Associated Gen. Contractors, 562 F.2d 607, 615

(9th Cir. 1977); Burnett v. Short, 441 F.2d 405, 406 (5th Cir. 1971). But see Quinones
v. Szorc, 771 F.2d 289, 291 (7th Cir. 1985); Hoffman v. Halden, 268 F.2d 280, 294-95
(9th Cir. 1959) ("Hoffman also alleges the 'defendants conspired.' In what other way

can plaintiff plead conspiracy? . . . He should not be required here to plead his
evidence.").
104. See Powell v. Workmen's Compensation Bd., 327 F.2d 131, 137 (2d Cir.
1964), and cases cited therein.

105. This is not to say that strict fact pleading requirements were unknown in such
cases before the 1960s. See, e.g., Dunn v. Gazzola, 216 F.2d 709, 711 (1st Cir. 1954)
(rejecting allegation of conspiracy not supported by facts); Connor v. Real Title Corp.,
165 F.2d 291, 294 (4th Cir. 1947) (same).

HeinOnline -- 86 Colum. L. Rev. 450 1986

1986]

FACT PLEADING

plaintiff, but rather whether whatever happened resulted from an
agreement or conspiracy among the defendants. Given the breadth of
potential discovery on issues like intention and knowledge, it is understandable that some courts have attempted to weed out groundless
cases at the outset.
II.

NOTICE PLEADING

Whatever the earlier function of pleadings, the stated modern justification is limited to notice. Conley v. Gibson 0 6 itself appeared to endorse the notice pleading idea,10 7 which the Supreme Court had
previously suggested was the sole purpose of pleadings.' 0 8 Since
Conley, the received learning has been that the function of pleadings is
to give notice. 10 9 Even where Rule 9(b)'s particularity requirement applies, some courts routinely deny pleading motions if they believe defendant has sufficient notice to prepare an answer, 10 sometimes even
though the complaint itself fails to provide notice.' 1 ' According to this
approach, defendant's desire for further information about plaintiff's
claims should be handled later through discovery and other pretrial
12
procedures.1
But notice pleading is a chimera. Within a year after Conley, Clark
himself described it as "something like the Golden Rule, which is a nice
hopeful thing; but . . . isn't anything that we can use with any precision." 1 13 More fundamentally, one may ask why it should be used at
106. 355 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1957).

107. See id. (referring to "simplified 'notice pleading' [that] is made possible by the
liberal opportunity for discovery and the other pretrial procedures established by the
Rules to disclose more precisely the basis of both claim and defense and to define more
narrowly the disputed facts and issues") (footnote omitted).
108. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947) (Federal Rules "restrict the
pleadings to the task of general notice-giving.").
109. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.

110. See, e.g., Bosse v. Crowell, Collier & Macmillan, 565 F.2d 602, 611 (9th Cir.
1977) ("Rule 9(b) . . .only requires the identification of the circumstances constituting
fraud so that the defendant can prepare an adequate answer from the allegations
111. See, e.g., In re Commonwealth Oil/Tesoro Petroleum Corp. Sec. Litig., 467
F. Supp. 227, 251 (W.D. Tex. 1979) (Rule 9(b) does not "require plaintiffs repeatedly to

redraft pleadings" when the defendants have "pre-existing full knowledge of the matters
which plaintiffs' pleading addresses. Therefore, . . . even though plaintiffs' pleadings
are vague, [where] the defendants do in fact have notice of the matters of which plaintiffs
complain, a strict application of Rule 9(b) can serve no purpose."); cf. Whittier, Notice
Pleading, 31 Harv. L. Rev. 501, 505 (1918) ("[I]f the opponent does understand the
pleader's claim, whether that be the result of the pleading itself or partly due to the
opponent's own knowledge, he is obviously not entitled to particulars."). How the court
is to determine whether the defendant has sufficient knowledge indepedent of the pleadings, however, is something of a mystery.

112. See C. Wright, The Law of the Federal Courts § 68, at 439 (4th ed. 1983);
supra note 107.
113. Clark, Pleading Under the Federal Rules, 12 Wyo. LJ. 177, 181 (1958). Some
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all. Providing notice would seem, after all, to be the function of a motion for a more definite statement under Rule 12(e), which is allowed
when a pleading "is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading."' 14 But a defendant
hardly needs specificity to deny a vague allegation," 15 and will rarely be
unable to raise a legitimate affirmative defense due to vagueness of the
pleadings. To take a common example, defendants can preserve statute of limitations defenses by alleging in their answers that plaintiffs'
claims are barred, in whole or in part, by limitations. 1 6 Moreover, if
ambiguity of pleadings has obscured an affirmative defense, courts will
rarely refuse an amendment to add the defense once discovery has
shown it to be applicable.' 1 7 Accordingly, it would seem that the defendant always has enough notice to be able to prepare an answer.
More detailed pleadings are similarly unimportant in relation to
other pretrial activities. Although they may pinpoint an opposing
party's view of the facts somewhat, they are hardly substitutes for examination by deposition. Moreover, as the opposing party obtains more
information through discovery, his view of the facts is likely to evolve.
In practice, discovery itself is often difficult to limit to specific factual
allegations, and the liberal amendment provisions of the Rules would
be undermined by efforts to imprison the plaintiff within detailed initial
assertions.
Balanced against the marginal utility of more detailed notice 1 8 is
have suggested, however, that these views represent something of a political retreat by
Clark, not a modification of his basic view. See Smith, supra note 3, at 925-26.
114. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e).
115. It is true that Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b) imposes a good faith requirement not to
deny matters known to be true, but it also says that where the pleader "is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of an averment, he shall so
state and this has the effect of a denial." As a general matter, then, where the defendant
is uncertain about the law or the facts on which the plaintiff relies, it may deny. See
Shultz v. Manor House of Madison, Inc., 51 F.R.D. 16, 17-18 (W.D. Wis. 1970).
116. See 2A Moore's Federal Practice, supra note 40, 12.18, at 12-145 to 12-146.
117. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) directs that leave to amend be "freely given." The
Supreme Court has indicated this means amendment should be allowed in the absence
of bad faith or undue delay by the moving party. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182
(1962); see also supra note 42 and accompanying text. This same liberality applies to
amendments of answers to add affirmative defenses. See, e.g., Glater v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
712 F.2d 735, 738-39 (1st Cir. 1983).
118. For a recent example of the minimal importance the Supreme Court attaches
to notice in other contexts, consider Brandon v. Holt, 105 S.Ct. 873 (1985), Plaintiffs,
injured by a policeman, sued the director of the police department for failure to fire the
officer for previous misconduct. Although plaintiffs obtained a judgment, the court of
appeals reversed on the ground that the director was protected by qualified immunity
because he was not personally aware of the officer's tendencies and thus was acting in
good faith.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a judgment against a public servant in
his official capacity imposes liability on the entity he represents. The Court held that
judgment should be entered against the city itself because even though the city had
never been named as a defendant it could be added under Rule 15(b) as an amendment
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the substantial cost of pleading practice designed to elicit additional
details. Dilatory motions remain a problem, " 9 and motions seeking an
emendation of the complaint seem peculiarly susceptible to abuse due
20
to their potential for delay. For example, in Ross v. A. H. Robins Co.,'
while the Second Circuit faulted plaintiff's pending complaint for lacking facts "strongly supporting" the inference defendants knew about
the dangers of the Dalkon Shield, it also remanded to give them another chance to do so. They evidently succeeded, and the case re12
mained on the district court's docket for at least another four years.
Neither the early motion practice nor the appeal seem to have advanced
the case meaningfully toward ultimate resolution.
This is not to say either that specifics and precision are undesirable, or that no complaints are so opaque that redrafting is necessary in
order to apprise the defendant of the nature of the plaintiff's grievance.1 2 2 In general, however, pleading motions are unlikely to advance
the litigation process in a meaningful way unless they provide some
hope of leading to a resolution of the case on the merits. Early resolution on the merits is the objective of the Rule 12(b) (6) motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim. The 12(b)(6) motion should not be diluted
into a variant of the motion for a more definite statement.' 23 Indeed,
some courts use the more definite statement to expose defects in the
claim that would permit dismissal.' 24 To require the courts to approach this objective indirectly, using the language of notice pleadto conform to proof. Id. at 877-78. Justice Rehnquist dissented on the ground that
Rule 15(b) had not been satisfied by plaintiffs' one-sentence reference to amendment in
their reply brief to the Supreme Court. Id. at 879. Chief Justice Burger concurred in
the judgment, noting: "[M]odern pleading is less rigid than in an earlier day, but it is
not too much to ask that if a person or entity is to be subject to suit, the person or entity
should be named. I agree with Justice Rehnquist that it is a dubious business to encourage such shoddy pleading practices, but the courts have crossed that bridge." Id.
119. See Edelstein, The Ethics of Dilatory Motion Prctice: Time for Change, 44
Fordham L. Rev. 1069 (1976).
120. 607 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 946 (1980); see supra
notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
121. See Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., [1982-83 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 99,095 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 1983).
122. See, e.g., Mountain View Pharmacy v. Abbott Laboratories, 630 F.2d 1383,
1386-87 (10th Cir. 1980) (In a complex case, more details are necessary.).
123. See 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 3, § 1376, at 732-34 (motion for more
definite statement is limited to a "quite small" class of cases in which court can discern a
viable claim but the complaint is still "so vague or ambiguous that the opposing party
cannot respond, even with a simple denial, in good faith and without prejudice to himself") (footnote omitted). As indicated supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text, it is
doubtful any such cases really exist. At most, as Professors Wright and Miller conclude,
the motion for a more definite statement "should be strictly limited to those few instances in which a significant advancement of the litigation will result." 5 C. Wright & A.
Miller, supra note 3, § 1376, at 747.
124. See 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 3, § 1376, at 743-44 (discussing use
of more definite statement to permit disposition on grounds of statute of limitations or
Statute of Frauds); id. § 1217, at 131 ("[Clourts often will use a motion directed at the
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ing,' 25 either obscures or deflects the proper inquiry. Moreover, once
sufficient details are included to show that a legitimate claim has been
stated, any notice objective should also have been satisfied. 1 26 Notice
should not be the sole, or even the principal, objective of pleadings
practice. The proper focus should shift to merits dispositions.
III.

MERITS DECISIONS

Under the received tradition, the problem with common law pleading practice was that, while it led to actual decisions, it often did not
lead to merits decisions because cases were frequently resolved on
technicalities. The notice pleading scenario, by way of contrast, eliminates the possibility for even genuine merits decisions at the pleadings
stage. The middle ground is to use pleading practice to make genuine
and reliable merits decisions. Contrary to expectation, this activity is
not dead, though it is often camouflaged in notice pleading language.
This Part examines the contemporary use of pleadings to decide
cases on the merits, which is the ultimate effect of revived fact pleading.
It begins by examining the key question: whether decisions at the
pleading stage are to be preferred to settlements, which occur in most
cases that are not dismissed before trial. Finding that such decisions
are desirable in the abstract to achieve the objectives of the substantive
law, it then explores situations where pleading practice can effectively
resolve the merits-where legal conclusions relied on by the plaintiff
can be shown to be groundless by requiring more factual detail in
pleading. Finally, this Part explores the problem of scrutinzing plaintiff's factual conclusions, which is the focus of much of the new emphasis on fact pleading, and finds that this problem cannot sensibly be
handled at the pleading stage. Accordingly, although merits resolution
by pleading motion may in many cases be possible, it appears ill-suited
for the kinds of cases in which the courts have been using fact pleading
as an antidote to the ills of the litigation boom.
A. Merits Decision Versus Settlement
Most cases are never resolved by a court, on the merits or otherwise, because they are settled. 127 Recently this statistic has kindled a
form of a pleading as a vehicle for considering whether any possible claim for relief
exists.").
125. See, e.g., Hayduk v. Lanna, 775 F.2d 441,444 (1st Cir. 1985) (absence of facts
supporting claim that defendants conspired to defraud plaintiff deprives defendants of
notice of basis of claims against them). See generally 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra
note 3,§ 1217, at 131 (Courts use motions directed to the form of a complaint to determine whether any claim for relief exists.).
126. See supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text. Accordingly, some advocate
eliminating the motion for a more definite statement altogether, leaving discovery to
clarify vague claims. See 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 3, § 1376, at 740 & n.50.
127. This statistic is hardly new. Clark observed in 1935 that only 30% of federal
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debate between the proponents of the "dispute resolution" model of
litigation and the advocates of the "public interest" model. Imported
into the pleading practice area, the debate identifies the underlying
issues.
Proponents of the public interest model oppose viewing the court
system primarily as a lever or facilitator for essentially private dispute
resolution. To some, this means that any resolution of a lawsuit except
by judicial decision represents a failure of the judicial system. Professor Owen Fiss, a leading light in this camp, explains that "[to be
against settlement is only to suggest that when the parties settle, society
gets less than what appears, and for a price it does not know it is paying. Parties might settle while leaving justice undone." 128 Although
the proponents of the public interest view seem generally to have in
mind a decision after a full dress trial, the reasoning appears to apply
equally to pretrial judicial decisions, including pleading dispositions.
Indeed, given the impossibility of actually trying all civil cases, logic
seems to favor pretrial disposition.
The dispute resolution advocates, on the other hand, mistrust judicial resolution. Even judges openly question the desirability of complete resolution after trial as the generally preferred outcome. As one
experienced federal judge put it in a seminar for new judges,
" [o]ptimal justice is usually found somewhere between the polar positions of the litigants. Trial is likely to produce a polar solution, and
often the jury or the judge has no choice except all or nothing. Settlement is usually the avenue that allows a more just result than trial." 1 29
court civil cases then reached a court decision. Clark & Moore, A New Federal Civil
Procedure: Pleadings and Parties (pt. 2), 44 Yale LJ. 1291, 1294 & n.8 (1935); cf.
Galanter, The Emergence of the judge as a Mediator in Civil Cases, 69 Judicature 256,
257 (1986) ("It remains unclear whether the percentage of cases terminated by settlement has increased in recent years.").
128. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 Yale LJ. 1073, 1085 (1984). He explains further:
I do not believe that settlement as a generic practice is preferable to judgment
or should be institutionalized on a wholesale and indiscriminate basis. It
should be treated instead as a highly problematic technique for streamlining
dockets. Settlement is for me the civil analogue of plea bargaining ....
Like
plea bargaining, settlement is a capitulation to the conditions of mass society
and should be neither encouraged nor praised.

Id. at 1075. Professor Fiss is generally opposed to treating courts primarily as dispute
resolution forums. See Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms

ofJustice, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 29 (1979) ("[C]ourts exist to give meaning to our public
values, not to resolve disputes."). Despite Fiss' arguments, all plea bargaining need not
be viewed as a failure of the judicial system. For an argument that the only constitutional concern with plea bargaining is that the innocent will plead guilty, see McCoy &
Mirra, Plea Bargaining as Due Process in Determining Guilt, 32 Stan. L. Rev. 887,

921-22 (1980). Similar concerns bear on the undesireability of settlements in civil cases.
See infra notes 133-39 and accompanying text.
129. Tone, The Role of the Judge in the Settlement Process, in Seminars for Newly
Appointed United States District judges 57, 60 (1975); accord Coons, Approaches to
Court Imposed Compromise-The Uses of Doubt and Reason, 58 Nw. U.L. Rev. 750,
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This view evinces great skepticism about the liberal ethos and its preference for judicial resolution on the merits. Instead, a settlement may
be preferable, whatever the ultimate merits of the claim, 130 so long as
the plaintiff "firmly believes" he has a legitimate grievance against defendant. 3 1 Arguably, then, dismissal on the pleadings would not be a
13 2
desirable alternative.
Thus, the two schools pose the core problem: Are pleadings decisions or settlements better? Denial of a motion to dismiss often means
only that a defendant who will ultimately prevail must litigate longer.
Even the confident defendant may decide to settle, however. To the
extent that decision is made "in the shadow of the law" because it reflects a prediction of the substantive merits of the case,1 3 it accomplishes the objectives of the substantive law, albeit in a modified form
because a settlement is not an "all or nothing" result. Freed of the
burden of deciding the settled case, the court system is able to turn its
attention to other cases, and there apply the substantive law.
The settlement model breaks down, however, when the defendant's payment to the plaintiff is based mainly on factors other than the
substantive merits of the suit.' 3 4 This is the spectre which haunts the
751 (1964) (seeing the 'judicial power to compromise between the often harsh alternatives of all-or-nothing" as promoting a "fair" decision that is unattainable by law).
130. Cf. Marek v. Chesny, 105 S. Ct. 3012, 3018 (1985) ("Rule 68's policy of encouraging settlements is neutral, favoring neither plaintiffs nor defendants; it expresses
a clear policy of favoring settlement of all lawsuits.").
131. The phrase comes from Clark's famous opinion reversing a dismissal in Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774, 775 (2d Cir. 1944).
132. To some extent this preference for a negotiated over a judicial resolution is
confirmed by the handling of prisoner cases, where the courts act because they have to.
"Relatively few prison cases can be settled, primarily because meaningful negotiations
between prisoners acting pro se and states' attorneys are practically impossible. Thus,
unlike other civil litigation, some court action is required on almost all the cases."
Turner, When Prisoners Sue: A Study of Prisoner Section 1983 Suits in the Federal
Courts, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 610, 637 (1979). The dismissal rate in such cases is very high.
Id. at 617-18.
133. See Mnookin & Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case
of Divorce, 88 Yale L.J. 950 (1979) (discussing role of legal rules in negotiation of settlements in divorce cases). Priest and Klein conclude that changes in the legal standard
affect settlements, not outcomes, by shifting the bargaining advantage. Priest & Klein,
The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13J. Legal Stud. 1, 12-30 (1984). For a debate
on the accuracy of their method, see Priest, Reexamining the Selection Hypothesis:
Learning from Wittman's Mistakes, 14J. Legal Stud. 215 (1985); Wittman, Is the Selection of Cases for Trial Biased?, 14J. Legal Stud. 185 (1985); see also Galanter, supra
note 46, at 32-33 (legal decisions radiate and affect settlement value of cases). But cf.
Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. Rev. 754, 790-91 (1984) (definitive rulings deter innovative
settlement packages).
134. See Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional
Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. Rev. 29, 46-47:
[Pirocedure is not being used merely as a more efficient way of enforcing a
substantive claim, but also as an instrument of private policy for the vindication
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liberal ethos. The financial burden of litigation is obviously an important factor,' 3 5 but it is not the only one. The pendency of a lawsuit
imposes other costs that settlement can avert, whether or not the claim
is well founded. In derivative suits, for example, the defendants' desire
to avoid publicity13 6 and to reduce the time drain of litigation 3 7 may
incline them toward settlement. In antitrust cases, the unavailability of
contribution may make the risk of litigation so great that settlement
seems essential.' 3 8 Moreover, the value of a decision by a court deserves some deference; without a body of such decisions the law may
not cast a discernible shadow for those who seek to rely on the law in
fashioning settlements. 13 9 Accordingly, pleadings decisions on the
merits seem justified when they can be made reliably.
The pressure to encourage pleadings decisions is far from overwhelming, however, and there is much dispute about the extent to
which nuisance settlements are in fact extracted. For example,
although the class action procedure has been blamed for breeding vexatious litigation, existing empirical data do not show that the problem
is severe.1 40 Litigation cost, the most-cited villain, has an ambivalent
In the vast
of expectations which are not justified by the substantive law ....
majority of cases which are settled, there is not even a pretense that the result
has been determined by the application of a system of substantive rules to given
factual premises.
See also Eisenberg, The Principles of Consideration, 67 Cornell L. Rev. 640, 645 (1982)
(labelling "trading on the transaction costs of litigation" as "moral extortion").
135. Thus, Judge Tone explains that "candidates for settlement" can easily be recognized: "They are the cases in which the amount involved is small in relation to the
anticipated costs of litigation, or in which relief other than the payment of money is the
plaintiff's principal objective and it is less painful for the defendant to give that relief
than to bear the expense of further litigation." Tone, supra note 129, at 62. The distinguishing feature in these cases, it should be noted, is litigation cost, not strength or
weakness on the merits.
136. SeeJones, An Empirical Examination of the Resolution of Shareholder Derivative and Class Action Lawsuits, 60 B.U.L. Rev. 542, 546 (1980). The existence of such
noneconomic stakes in litigation may, on the other hand, incline defendant againstsettlement. See Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiffs Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86
Colum. L. Rev. (forthcoming May 1986).
137. See Coffee, The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff as Monitor in Shareholder Litigation, 48 Law & Contemp. Probs., Summer 1985, at 5, 15.
138. It is true that the absence of contribution reflects in part an assessment of
Congress' substantive objectives in enacting the antitrust laws. See Texas Indus. v.
Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 639, 645-46 (1981) (court has no authority to
provide for contribution in antitrust cases because Congress made contrary legislative
judgment). But that judgment was hardly intended to leave one alleged conspirator
facing a bankrupting liability to a plaintiff class after all the others have settled, a litigation reality that tends to deprive the defendant of any meaningful opportunity to defend. This reality explains the willingness of defendants to contract with one another
for contribution, thereby reducing this settlement leverage. See Note, Sharing Agreements Among Defendants in Antitrust Cases, 52 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 289 (1984).
139. See supra note 133 (discussing effect of legal rules on settlements).
140. See DuVal, The Class Action as an Antitrust Enforcement Device: The
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effect. When the cost of litigating a meritorious claim is greater than
the expected recovery, a suit filed in hopes of an early settlement may
141
be characterized as a nuisance suit even though the claim has merit.
Moreover, defendants can limit their costs.'

42

Accordingly, there is no

compelling impetus toward radical change, and care is in order before
concluding that a particular case can be reliably decided on the
1 43

pleadings.

Chicago Experience (pt. 2), 1976 Am. B. Found. ResearchJ. 1273, 1344-46 (little indication that class allegations affect settlement value); Note, The Rule 23(b)(3) Class Action: An Empirical Study, 62 Geo. LJ. 1123, 1137 (1974) (even defense counsel label
only a handful of class actions frivolous). But cf. Kennedy, Securities Class and Derivative Actions in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas: An
Empirical Study, 14 Hous. L. Rev. 769, 824-26 (1977) (class allegations give plaintiff
settlement leverage). Thus, concern about abuse of the class action device has abated.
See Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the
"Class Action Problem," 92 Harv. L. Rev. 664 (1979).
141. See Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public
Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 849, 896 n.171 (1984); Rosenberg &
Shavell, A Model in Which Suits Are Brought for Their Nuisance Value, 5 Int'l Rev. L. &
Econ. 3 (1985).
142. Thus Robert Banks, General Counsel of Xerox Corp., reports that "corporate
lawyers are working to decrease costs by focusing in on the net value of every motion,
every pleading, every discovery." AnnualJudicial Conference SecondJudicial Circuit of
the United States, 101 F.R.D. 161, 191 (1983); see also Smith, "Top-Dollar Clients" Can
Limit Expenses, Legal TimesJune 11, 1984, at 22, col. 2 (providing suggestions on how
clients can economize on legal services).
143. One suggested antidote to the cost problem is cost shifting. Because the principal component of litigation expense is attorneys' fees, some urge that we adopt the
English system of routinely awarding the winner his attorneys' fees. Under such a regime, one might argue that litigants should be allowed to make their litigation investment decisions without interference from possibly premature efforts to decide cases on
motions to dismiss, and that such decisions should therefore be discouraged. For several reasons, increased cost shifting is not an alternative to early merits decisions.
First, reliance on economic decisions of litigants unduly devalues judicial decisionmaking as a device for clarifying rules of law. Without adopting Professor Fiss' view, see
supra note 128 and accompanying text, it remains true that litigants seeking to settle
cases in the "shadow of the law" need judicial assistance in discerning the contours of
that shadow. See supra text accompanying notes 133, 139. The small number of cases
that are tried would not be sufficient for this purpose.
Second, despite the existence of a body ofjudicial decisions the law is often uncertain, and litigants must guess as best they can about the outcome of their suit. Denying
them a prompt decision where it can reliably be made simply increases for no good
reason the amount that will ultimately be imposed on the loser. In this connection, it is
unclear whether adopting routine attorneys' fee awards would increase expenditures on
litigation by increasing the stakes. See Braeutigam, Owen & Panzar, An Economic Analysis of Alternative Fee Shifting Systems, 47 Law & Contemp. Probs., Winter 1984, at
173, 180-81.
Third, awarding attorneys' fees does not, in many cases, fully compensate the winning party for noneconomic costs resulting from the suit. See supra notes 135-137 and
accompanying text. Deferring decision would continue for no good reason to impose
these uncompensated costs on a party who ultimately wins.
Fourth, the availability of attorneys' fees awards may stimulate the filing of some
kinds of suits, thus increasing the need to scrutinize the grounds for such suits. See
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B. Legal Conclusions: Implementing the Substantive Law

Both sides of the settlement-dispute resolution controversy wish
ultimately to implement the substantive law. That is, after all, the generally accepted objective of procedure. 144 But the substantive law may
frustrate that goal in the pleading context by relying on rules that can
only be applied with reference to a multitude of factors or factual matters that cannot be adequately assessed at the pleading stage. Whether
or not it is inevitable that legal rules will become more uncertain over
time, 14 5 it is certainly true that the evolution of the law away from pre-

arbitrary) rules has reduced the utility of pleading
cise (and rather
46
decisions.'
A simple example illustrates this difficulty. Before 1938, the detail
required to plead negligence was the subject of much dispute, a past
the Federal Rules sought to bury with Form 9.147 But the underlying
problem with pleading decisions was not really procedural. It was substantive because the negligence determination turned on such a variety
of circumstances that it could not reliably be made on the basis of
Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 555-56 (1984) (Powell, J., dissenting) (asserting that
since enactment of Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act, 42 U.S.C § 1988 (1982),
civil rights suits have "increased geometrically").
In sum, while fee shifting as a sanction may hold some promise, see supra note 66
and accompanying text, the prospect of greater private policing of the decision to file
suit through economic incentives caused by fee shifting provides no reason for abandoning interest in refining the pretrial motion process.
144. The adoption of the Federal Rules was not intended to alter the outcome except to assure that it corresponds to the merits under what is understood to be the
substantive law. Indeed, the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982), precludes
such tampering with substantive law. This Article proceeds on that understanding.
145. See D'Amato, Legal Uncertainty, 71 Calif. L. Rev. 1, 1 (1983) ("Legal certainty
decreases over time. Rules and principles of law become more and more uncertain in
content and in application because legal systems are biased in favor of unravelling those
rules and principles."); Epstein, Settlement and Litigation: Of Vices Individual and Institutional, 30 U. Chi. L. Sch. Rec. 2, 5-7 (1984) (complexity and uncertainty of modern
substantive rules contribute to increase in frequency and severity of litigation). In part,
the development can be seen as a shift from hard-and-fast "rules" to more flexible
"standards." See Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 Harv.
L. Rev. 1685 (1976).
146. See Clark, supra note 71, at 51 (The real problem with pleadings decisions in
antitrust cases is that the Sherman Act is broad.); Epstein, Pleadings and Presumptions,
40 U. Chi. L. Rev. 556, 566 (1973) (referring to "the importance [in evaluating pleadings] of an exact knowledge of the substantive theory in question in order to distinguish
ultimate issues of fact from the questions of proof that they raise"); Kingdon, supra note
75, at 34 (lack of clear standards in antitrust field is one cause of vague pleading); cf.
Miller, supra note 140, at 672-73 (watering down substantive rules increases litigation).
The same phenomenon can be seen at the summary judgment stage. See, e.g., Tunis
Bros. v. Ford Motor Co., 763 F.2d 1482, 1502 (3d Cir. 1985) ("Under the 'rule of reason' standard, there is a greater reluctance to uphold a grant of summary judgment
where the conduct is to be examined for its reasonableness than where it is to be subjected to a per se rule.").
147. See supra notes 31, 36 and accompanying text.
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pleadings, whatever detail they contained. Had negligence law been
atomized into a multitude of concrete subrules, the resulting emphasis
on specific points could have permitted pleading decisions in many
cases. It may be argued that the law has gone too far toward multifactor generality, 148 but that problem is substantive, not procedural.
Nonetheless, the substantive law can provide tools that permit
pleadings dispositions. The courts' handling of such cases falls generally into two categories: Cases in which the substantive law requires a
certain element that is missing and cases in which the court, by carefully
analyzing the totality of the plaintiff's allegations, can sensibly decide
on the basis of the pleadings that the defendant did not violate the law.
1. Using Pleadingsto Identify Missing Elements. - Although it may begin as an amorphous proscription, the substantive law can sharpen over
time so that specific elements of a claim can be identified and applied at
the pleading stage. For example, when the Supreme Court held in Blue
Chip Stamps that securities fraud plaintiffs had to be purchasers or sellers, 14 9 the lower courts had a new substantive tool to use in evaluating
complaints. 150 Similarly, when the Court held that only direct purchasers could sue for price fixing,1 5 ' the lower courts could entertain motions to dismiss suits by indirect purchasers. 15 2 Just this last Term, the
Court confirmed that misrepresentation or nondisclosure is a necessary
element for a claim under the Williams Act, 15 3 and the same process
may be expected there.
The process works more actively in emerging areas of law. Consider, for example, the burgeoning civil litigation under the 1970 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 154 which
epitomizes the litigation boom. The statute, as one court put it, is
"constructed on the model of a treasure hunt."' 155 In a provision little
discussed in Congress, it authorizes a private action for treble damages,
plus an award of attorneys' fees, for "[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation."1 56 The key triggering event
for a violation is a "pattern of racketeering activity."' 15 7 The statute
forbids use of income from such an activity in operation of a business
148. For an argument that specificity in pleading could be useful in negligence
cases, in conjunction with modifications in the substantive law, see Epstein, supra note
146, at 566.
149. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
150. See, e.g., Sacks v. Reynolds Sec., Inc., 593 F.2d 1234, 1239-41 (D.C. Cir.
1978) (dismissal pursuant to Blue Chip Stamps).
151. See Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
152. See, e.g., Merican, Inc. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 713 F.2d 958, 965-69 (3d
Cir. 1983) (dismissal pursuant to Illinois Brick), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1024 (1984).
153. Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2458 (1985).
154. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982).
155. Sutliff, Inc. v. Donovan Cos., 727 F.2d 648, 652 (7th Cir. 1984).
156. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982).
157. Id. § 1962.
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engaged in interstate commerce,' 5 8 acquiring a business through such
activity, 159 or participation in the conduct of the affairs of an enterprise
through such activity.' 60 A "pattern of racketeering activity," in turn,
requires the commission within ten years of two or more "predicate
6
acts," which include violation of one of a series of criminal statutes.' '
Since mail fraud 162 and wire fraud 163 are included in this list, "garden
variety fraud" could be catapulted into a treble damage action with the
addition of the lurid term "racketeering" to the complaint.
For about ten years after RICO was passed, the civil suit provisions
languished. Around 1980, however, a wave of litigation under the statute began. This has caused an uproar in the courts.1 6 4 Some courts
have tried to graft requirements onto the statute and dismiss cases that
do not satisfy those requirements. Most notably, the Second Circuit
decided that a RICO claim could not lie unless the defendant had been
convicted of the predicate acts. 16 5 Courts also dismissed cases for failure to allege links to organized crime,' 66 a special RICO injury,' 67 or
68
an enterprise separate from the person accused of violating the Act.' 69
The Supreme Court has recently rejected certain of these elements,'
158. Id.
159. Id. § 1962(b).
160. Id. § 1962(c).

161. Id. § 1961(1). The pattern requirement has been interpreted to mandate
something more than the predicate acts. See Northern Trust Bank/O'Hare, N.A. v. Inryco, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 828 (N.D. Il. 1985) (predicate acts must show both continuity
and relationship to each other).
162. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982).
163. Id. § 1343.
164. "Congress. . . may well have created a runaway treble damage bonanza for
the already excessively litigious." Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1361 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1002 (1983); see Pickholz, The Firestorm Over Civil RICO,
A.B.A. J., Mar. 1985, at 78. Antitrust plaintiffs with weak claims (but not those with
strong ones) are advised to add RICO claims. See Fricano & Brusca, RICO Route May
Suit Potential Antitrust Plaintiffs, Legal Times, Apr. 8, 1985, at 17, col. I.
165. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd, 105 S. Ct.
3275 (1985).
166. See Barr v. WUI/TAS, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). But see Schacht v.
Brown, 711 F.2d 1343 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1002 (1983); see also Note, Civil
RICO: The Temptation and Impropriety ofJudicial Restriction, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1101,
1106-09 (1982) (disapproving requirement of organized crime link).
167. See Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 741 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1984), vacated, 105
S. Ct. 3550 (1985).
168. See United States v. Computer Sciences Corp., 689 F.2d 1181, 1190-91 (4th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1105 (1983). But see United States v. Hartley, 678
F.2d 961, 987-90 (11 th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1170 (1983); see also Haroco,
Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384, 401 (7th Cir. 1984) ("Discussion
of this person/enterprise problem under RICO can easily slip into a metaphysical or
ontological style of discourse-after all, when is the person truly an entity 'distinct' or
'separate' from the enterprise?"), affd on other grounds, 105 S. Ct. 3291 (1985).
169. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985) (rejecting requirement of conviction for predicate acts); American Nat'l Bank &Trust Co. v. Haroco, Inc.,
105 S. Ct. 3291 (1985) (civil claim under RICO need not allege damages suffered
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so that some opportunities for dismissal have disappeared, although
170
others may arise.
The experience under RICO illustrates how limits imposed by the
substantive law can frustrate efforts to facilitate dismissal of cases. Despite the intensity of the lower courts' attempts to locate grounds for
dismissal, the Supreme Court has suggested that the RICO boom can
only be curtailed by amending the statute. 171 Similar substantive constraints may hamper efforts to develop grounds for dismissal in other
areas as well. Whatever the pressures of the litigation boom, then,
often the substantive law simply will not support development of the
kind of separable issues that can be used to winnow cases at the pleading stages.
Where the substantive law does provide such separable issues, it
will often be necessary, in response to the natural urge towards vagueness in pleading under the Federal Rules,' 7 2 for a court to demand additional particulars to resolve such separable issues. This emphasis on
detail differs significantly from the notice pleading idea because it seeks
to elicit details that will allow resolution of the case at the outset.1 7 3
But the existence of such a severable issue does not mean that making
an early decision will always be easy. Consider, for example, pleadings
dispositions on statute of limitations grounds. Although it is an affirmative defense, limitations can be raised by motion to dismiss, and the
plaintiff can be required to provide details sufficient to evaluate the limitations question. Despite the seemingly automatic application of limitations, however, the law has over time developed equitable doctrines
regulating accrual and tolling that turn on the facts of the particular
case and therefore often preclude pretrial decision.' 74 Even where a
severable issue can be identified, a reliable merits decision at the outset
may be impossible.
2. PleadingsDeterminationsthat Defendant Has Not Violated the Plaintiff's
Rights. - Even without segregating a separable issue a court may, with
sufficient details, be able to decide at the pleading stage that the dethrough violation of predicate offenses). While acknowledging that plaintiffs must allege
each element of a RICO claim, the Court, by a 5-4 vote, held that the Second Circuit's
efforts to construct new elements for a claim were invalid. Sediia, 105 S. Ct. at 3286.
The majority recognized that the dramatic growth in civil RICO cases may not be what
Congress had in mind, but said that if correction is necessary it should come from Congress. Id. at 3287.
170. In Sedima, the Court clearly enunciated four requirements that must be alleged
to state a claim: "(1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity." 105 S. Ct. at 3285 (footnote omitted). It remains to be seen how the lower
courts will apply these elements, particularly the third and fourth, at the pleading stage.
171. See supra note 169.
172. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
173. See supra note 124 and accompanying text (discussing use of motions for a
more definite statement to accomplish this purpose).
174. See Marcus, Fraudulent Concealment in Federal Court: Toward a More Disparate Standard?, 71 Geo. LJ. 829, 902-04 (1983).
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fendant has not violated the plaintiff's rights. For example, in 1976 the
Supreme Court upheld dismissal of a prisoner suit alleging that defendants' denial of medical care constituted cruel and unusual punishment.1 7 5 Although it reaffirmed the policy that pro se complaints
should be liberally construed,1 7 6 the Court rejected this prisoner's
claim because his "complaint provide[d] a detailed factual accounting
of the treatment he received. .

.

. It is apparent from his complaint

that he received extensive177medical care and that the doctors were not
indifferent to his needs."
Such case-specific decisions are possible in a number of contexts,
and the courts' rejection of conclusory allegations often reflects the
sensible belief that more detail may reveal a basis for dismissal. Civil
rights cases provide a good example; it is commonplace now for courts
1 78
to hold that conclusory allegations are insufficient to state a claim.
This is no mere formality. The tendency of litigants to repackage anything that strikes them as unfair as a violation of due process compels
the courts to demand more information about the historical events that
the plaintiff claims occurred. Often these details demonstrate that the
79
incident constituted at most a state law tort, and dismissal follows.'

Merits determinations of this type are not limited to civil rights
cases. The willingness of many courts to find that the facts as pleaded
reveal no legal violation reflects an approach to dispositions on the
merits at the pleading stage that Conley v. Gibson would not appear to
permit. In Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.,' 80 for example, the Seventh Circuit expressly rejected a literal application of the Conley stan175. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
176. Id. at 106 (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972)).
177. Id. at 108 n.16. For a similar dismissal of a prisoner case, see Benson v. Cady,
761 F.2d 335 (7th Cir. 1985).
178. See, e.g., Williams v. Gorton, 529 F.2d 668, 671 (9th Cir. 1976) (Conclusory
allegations, unsupported by facts, are insufficient to state a claim under the Civil Rights
Act.).
179. See, e.g., Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing Serv., 771 F.2d 194 (7th Cir. 1985) (delay in booking suspect due to negligence not a valid civil rights claim); Wright v.
Anthony, 733 F.2d 575, 577 (8th Cir. 1984) (no constitutional violation where plaintiff
was allowed to submit only written statement to congressional committee rather than
full oral statement); Woodard v. Los Fresnos Indep. School Dist., 732 F.2d 1243 (5th
Cir. 1984) (departure from school rules regarding punishment at most a tort, not a violation of constitutional rights); Green v. Maraio, 722 F.2d 1013 (2d Cir. 1983) (prisoner's action against state court judge dismissed because judge did not act with clear
absence ofjurisdiction and was therefore immune).
These cases should be distinguished from other civil rights actions dismissed by the
courts for lack of state action, e.g., Cohen v. Illinois Inst. of Technology, 581 F.2d 658
(7th Cir. 1978) (conclusory allegation that state and federal support to private school
constituted support for specific discriminatory practices insufficient), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1135 (1979), which fits the mold discussed supra notes 149-74 and accompanying
text, of severable elements for which specifics may be demanded.
180. 745 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1758 (1985).
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dard in upholding the dismissal of an antitrust complaint.181 Plaintiffs
had provided car transportation services to Ford Motor Company for a
number of years until Ford terminated the arrangement and contracted
with another company for those services. Plaintiffs sued Ford and the
new transport company, alleging that defendants had entered into a
conspiracy to drive plaintiffs out of business, switched the contract to
provide transport services through a "sham and knowingly predatory
bid," and thereby enabled the competitor to acquire plaintiffs' assets
for less than their true
value.1 8 2 The trial court granted defendants'
83
dismiss.'
to
motion
The Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that "Conley has never
been interpreted literally"' 8 4 and that, in practice, " 'a complaint...
must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the
material elements necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable
legal theory.' "s185 Measured against this standard, the court found the
specific factual allegations to contradict, rather than support, any viable
theory for plaintiffs. To prevail, plaintiffs had to allege either a per se
violation of the antitrust laws or a forbidden effect on competition.
Although plaintiffs used the per se label,' 8 6 they had not alleged that
defendants had terminated plaintiffs' services as retaliation for price
cutting, which is traditionally handled as a per se violation. To the contrary, plaintiffs alleged that they had continually sought to raise their
prices.' 8 7 Further, even if their allegations of a conspiracy were
credited as showing a group boycott, that would constitute a per se violation only if used to implement agreements that themselves constituted per se violations, which the complaint failed to show. 188 The
ominous reference to "sham" and "predatory" behavior, the court concluded, stated no more than a legal conclusion: "it would be improper
for us to attempt to conjure up some sort of tenable antitrust scheme
for these cryptic allusions."' 8 9 Plaintiffs' effort to allege an anticompetitive impact similarly failed: "In considering a motion to dismiss, the
court is not required to don blinders and to ignore commercial reality." 90 Hence, plaintiffs' assertions about "predatory" actions meant
nothing, the court found, because it would be "preposterous" for Ford
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

Id. at 1106.
Id. at 1105.
561 F. Supp. 885, 889 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
745 F.2d at 1106 (citation omitted).
Id. (quoting In re Plywood Antitrust Litig., 655 F.2d 627, 641 (5th Cir. 198 1)).
Id. at 1108.
Id.
Id. at 1109.

189. Id. at 1109 n.5; see also id. at 1107 n.4 ("Standing alone, the boilerplate recitation of a conspiracy in . . . the complaint is insufficient to withstand a motion to
dismiss.").
190. Id. at I110.
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to arrange to be the victim of such activity.' 9 ' To uphold this complaint, the court concluded, would undercut the Sherman Act by under19 2
mining a buyer's right to replace its supplier.

Car Carriersstrains the outer limits of pleading practice. Although

courts can sometimes make such determinations on the basis of detailed pleadings,' 9 3 it will not often be possible to do so. Certainly,

insistence on detailed pleading should not be used to obscure unsettled
issues of substantive law,' 9 4 and using pleadings as an opportunity to
evaluate the whole of the plaintiff's allegations may tempt courts to
question the factual conclusions on which the plaintiff has rested his
claim, 195 a temptation that courts should resist.
191. Id. The court at two points discounted plaintiffs' allegations as "inherently
implausible." See id. at 1107 n.4, 1109. Although this language suggests that it was
evaluating the persuasiveness of plaintiffs' evidence, a highly questionable course, see
infra notes 196-227 and accompanying text, it should be considered as part of its reference to commercial reality. See supra text accompanying note 190.
192. 745 F.2d at 1110.
193. See, e.g., Sante Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 474 (1977) (affirming dismissal of securities claim because "the transaction, if carried out as alleged in the complaint, was neither deceptive nor manipulative").
194. This seems to be the objection of Professor Roberts in his article on the application of fact pleading to standing cases. See Roberts, supra note 12, at 421-25. But
the root problem there is substantive; as Professor Chayes has observed, the Supreme
Court has a ritual recitation of the "rules" governing standing and, "[t]his ritual recitation having been performed, the Court then chooses up sides and decides the case."
Chayes, The Supreme Court 1981 Term-Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 23 (1982). As Professor Roberts argues, the Court may
be using pleading language to hide its failure to reach consensus on the law of standing.
See Roberts, supra note 12, at 421. Were there such a consensus, however, it might be
that standing questions could often be resolved on the pleadings with sufficient particulars, although Professor Roberts remains dubious owing to the ambiguity of substantive
standing doctrine. See id. at 430. If so, standing is like many other substantive legal
rules that can only be applied with reference to a multitude of factors and are therefore
not readily subject to application at the pleading stage. See supra notes 145-48 and
accompanying text. But cf. Page, The Scope of Liability for Antitrust Violations, 37
Stan. L. Rev. 1445, 1448 (1985) (arguing that antitrust standing rules are well suited to
summary disposition).
195. One way they might do this is by mischaracterizing essentially factual conclusions as legal conclusions. For example, in Strauss v. City of Chicago, 760 F.2d 765 (7th
Cir. 1985), the plaintiff alleged an unprovoked beating by a police officer for which he
claimed the city was liable due to its practice of hiring and retaining brutal police officers. In support of his allegation that the city had such a practice, he submitted statistical summaries of complaints filed about police behavior. Although it claimed to follow
Conley, id. at 767-68, the Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal because it found the statistical material too general, id. at 768 & n.4, a circumstance it held "renders the allegations
mere legal conclusions of Section 1983 liability devoid of any well-pleaded facts," id. at
767. Compare Payne v. City of LaSalle, 1 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (Callaghan) 1116, 1117 (N.D.
Il. 1985) (suggesting Strauss creates a Catch-22 situation for the § 1983 plaintiff suing a
municipality).
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C. The Problem of Factual Conclusions Contrasted
The thrust of many of the new fact pleading cases is to challenge
the plaintiff's "conclusory" factual allegations, often about the defendant's state of mind. Car Carrierscould be criticized as doing so, but it
focuses on the legality of defendants' conduct as alleged rather than
plaintiffs' inability to marshall enough evidence to support their factual
conclusions.
The line between scrutiny of legal conclusions and scrutiny of factual conclusions is often obscure, however. For example, in Decker v.
Massey-Ferguson, Ltd., 196 plaintiff sued on behalf of a class of purchasers
of Massey-Ferguson stock, charging that the company, a producer of
farm machinery, had committed securities fraud by painting too rosy a
picture of itself in its 1975 annual report and other documents. After
ordering plaintiff to amend his complaint to identify the specific state19 7
ments claimed to be false, the district court dismissed.
Citing the Supreme Court's warnings about strike suits in Blue Chip
Stamps, 19 8 the Second Circuit affirmed. It did so by comparing the allegations in plaintiff's "prolix and discursive 69 page complaint"' 199 with
the 1975 annual report and other documents issued by Massey. On the
basis of this comparison, it found plaintiff's allegation that Massey had
falsely claimed record profits "patently false" because the reports were
"replete with facts and figures whose accuracy has not been challenged" that showed just such profits. 20 0 Similarly, it rejected plaintiff's claim that Massey should have announced that it was
undercapitalized because its capitalization and debt structure were fully
disclosed in its financial reports. 20 ' It also held that Massey's 10-K filings with the SEC "substantially satisfied" then-applicable regulations,
202
and that any forecasts contained in the report were not actionable.
Decker seems to further the objectives of the substantive law because it reflects the court's conviction that defendants had not violated
the law. Hence, Decker might be viewed, at least in part, as a legal conclusion case. In particular, the court's conclusions that Massey's 10-K
filings satisfied applicable regulations and that forecasts are not actionable appear to mandate dismissal. But the handling of other claims is
troubling. Undoubtedly, "patently false" charges should not enable a
plaintiff to use broad discovery to bludgeon a nuisance settlement out
of defendants. But where the focus is on factual conclusions, one loses
196. 681 F.2d I11 (2d Cir. 1982).
197. Decker v. Massey-Ferguson, Ltd., 534 F. Supp. 873, 884 (S.D.N.Y. 1981),
aff'd, 681 F.2d 111 (1982).
198. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 740 (1975); see supra

notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
199. 681 F.2d at 114.
200. Id. at 115.
201. Id. at 116.
202. Id. at 116-17.
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the confidence, present in a legal conclusion case, that a decision to
dismiss on the merits is sufficiently reliable.
Decker illustrates the point even though plaintiff's claim there
seems to have been extremely weak. Although the court was able to
cite "facts and figures whose accuracy has not been challenged," there
is at least a nagging doubt about whether plaintiff could have challenged those figures had he been allowed discovery. 20 3 Moreover, the
appellate court seemed to be relying on material that was not contained
in the complaint, 20 4 which would normally convert the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. 20 5 Indeed, evaluation of
certain securities law claims may inherently be unworkable on the
pleadings. 20 6 In Decker, the court might well have concluded that plaintiffs should be afforded little or no discovery before ruling on summary
judgment, 20 7 but handling the motion in the summary judgment format
better accords with the objective of assuring that the outcome accurately reflects the substantive merits.
The difficulties with scrutinizing factual conclusions become manifest in connection with the frequent demand that the plaintiff proffer
sufficient supporting evidence to make conclusory allegations, particu203. See Note, supra note 12, at 1437 (criticizing Decker for denying plaintiff discovery of internal memoranda and projections).
204. For example, the court cited a New York Times story aboutJohn Deere & Co.,
another manufacturer of agricultural implements, to support its conclusion that the period after 1975 was "the type of economic climate in which section 10(b) litigation flourishes." 681 F.2d at 114. The court stated that Massey's 1975 annual report was "in the
record," but it did not say that the document was an exhibit to plaintiff's complaint,
although its citation to pertinent authority under Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c) suggests it may
have been. See 681 F.2d at 113 (citing 5 C. Wright &A. Miller, supra note 3, § 1327, at
491 n.18). In any event, the court appeared to look beyond the 1975 annual report and
referred to Massey's consolidated financial statements, SEC filings, and 1977 annual report. See id. at 117.
205. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b).
206. The Decker court's approach seems quite different from the attitude in
Goldman v. Belden, 754 F.2d 1059 (2d Cir. 1985), in which the court reversed dismissal
of a securities class action, stating:
The court's view that the facts may not really have been problems was not so
much a ruling as to the adequacy of the pleading as it was an evaluation of the
materiality of the nondisclosures. Materiality is a mixed question of law and
fact, and a complaint may not properly be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)
(or even pursuant to Rule 56) on the ground that the alleged misstatements or
omissions are not material unless they are so obviously unimportant to a reasonable investor that reasonable minds could not differ on the question of their
importance.
Id. at 1067 (citation omitted); see also Eichler v. Berner, 105 S. Ct. 2622, 2629 n.21
(1985) ("We note ... the inappropriateness of resolving the question of the respondents' fault solely on the basis of the allegations set forth in the complaint."). Although
there may be a distinction between determining whether a statement is "false" and
whether it is "material," any such distinction seems insufficient to support such a difference in treatment.
207. See infra notes 317-29 and accompanying text.
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larly those relating to state of mind, 20 8 credible. In these cases, unlike
Decker, the court is not affirmatively concluding that plaintiff's charges
are false, but only that they are unsupported. Although the desire to
insist on some underlying evidence is natural, that exercise is materially
different from the substantive scrutiny described above. Requiring
plaintiff to proffer supporting evidence at the pleadings stage cannot be
justified for several reasons.
First, this attack on factual conclusions stands the code distinction
between ultimate facts and evidence on its head. State of mind is undoubtedly a fact, even now sometimes labelled an "ultimate fact."' 209
The insistence on more details is really a demand for an offer of
proof-some specification of evidence that will raise an inference that
the defendant's state of mind was as alleged. This creation of a new
burden of production effects a subtle but real shift in the substantive
law because plaintiff's lack of evidence provides insufficient assurance
2 10
that plaintiff in fact has no valid claim against defendant.
Where the court requires detailed support for a legal conclusion,
analysis of the details may permit the court to conclude confidently that
the plaintiff has no case. 2 11 But where the plaintiff is unable to provide
details because only the defendant possesses such information, no such
confidence is possible. 21 2 To the contrary, it may be that the defendant
has so effectively concealed his wrongdoing that the plaintiff can
unearth it only with discovery. To insist on details as a prerequisite to
discovery is putting the cart before the horse. RICO provides an illustration. Rather than requiring that the defendant be convicted of the
offenses that the plaintiff relied upon as predicate acts, 213 some courts
insisted that, where defendant had not been convicted, plaintiff plead
sufficient facts to provide probable cause to believe that defendant was
guilty of the predicate offenses. 2 14 The Seventh Circuit, however,
properly refused to impose this pleading requirement because plaintiffs
2 15
have no opportunity for discovery before filing suit.

208. See supra notes 90-93, 96 and accompanying text.
209. See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 170 (1979) (defendant's actual malice an
"ultimate fact" in defamation cases); see also Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United
States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 498 (1984) (knowledge a "fact").

210. Cf. Hazard, The Effect of the Class Action Device Upon the Substantive Law,
58 F.R.D. 307, 307 (1973) ("[It seems fair to say that procedure's very function is to

modify the substantive law."). But see supra note 144.
211. See supra notes 175-95 and accompanying text.
212. See Note, supra note 12, at 1435 ("[Ihe inflexible application of the particularity requirement in contemporary securities fraud cases inevitably results in the dismissal of some meritorious claims.").
213. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
214. See Taylor v. Bear Stearns & Co., 572 F. Supp. 667, 682-83 (N.D. Ga. 1983);
Bache Halsey Stuart Shields Inc. v. Tracy Collins Bank &Trust Co., 558 F. Supp. 1042,
1045-46 (D. Utah 1983).

215. See Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384, 404 (7th
Cir. 1984), affd on other grounds, 105 S.Ct. 3291 (1985).
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Second, insistence on detailed evidence regarding state of mind
violates the second sentence of Rule 9(b), which specifies that
"[m]alice, intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind of a person
may be averred generally." 21 6 On its face, this sentence precludes use
of the Rule to require plaintiffs to provide particulars on the very matters for which so many courts say that supporting facts are now
21 7
required.
Third, the new scrutiny of the proof regarding factual conclusions
calls for judgments for which the legal system presently lacks an appropriate standard. How much evidence is enough? Consider Ross v. A.H.
Robins Co. ,218 where the Second Circuit held that plaintiff in a securities
fraud action had failed to allege sufficient facts to support the conclusion that defendants knew by 1973 of the dangers of the Dalkon
Shield. 21 9 Plaintiffs had provided some detail by pointing out that in
1972 an independent researcher had identified and reported on the
risks of the device and that in May, 1974, Robins itself had sent a letter
to 120,000 doctors alerting them to possible health problems resulting
from use of the device. The appellate court held that this showing was
insufficient without some connection between the independent re220
searcher and Robins.
The court's insistence on more evidence is difficult to understand.
Even if there were no connection between the researcher and Robins,
the fact that the researcher could independently assemble data on the
harmful effects of the device by 1972 certainly supports the inference
that Robins could readily have done so itself or at least have learned of
the independent report. Indeed, other cases have shown that Robins
22
made a practice of gathering data on the safety of the Dalkon Shield. '
It had earlier made a number of public statements, presumably based
on the investigations of skilled persons, about the safety of the prod216. Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b); see Wayne Inv., Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 739 F.2d 11, 13
(1st Cir. 1984) (Rule 9(b) does not require particulars from which intent can be inferred)

(citation omitted).
217. See supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.

218. 607 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 946 (1980).
219. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
220. See 607 F.2d at 558.
221. For a detailed review of the efforts actually made by Robins to evaluate the
safety of this new product, see the post-trial findings of fact in Hawkinson v. A.H. Robins
Co., 595 F. Supp. 1290, 1295-1306 (D. Colo. 1984). The Hawkinson court found further

that "Robins could have learned about and warned of such dangers with the application
of the reasonable skill and foresight expected of an established pharmaceutical company," and that "Robins not only failed to disclose its lack of knowledge; it affirmatively
asserted that the Shield was safe." Id. at 1307. This is not to suggest that the outcome
of this personal injury case should affect the decision of a securities fraud suit, given the
different culpability showing required in a securities fraud action, but only to show that
the need for more detailed allegations to get into discovery in Ross is difficult to square
with the results of discovery in other cases.
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UCt. 2 22 By May, 1974, it was sufficiently alarmed about safety to write

over one hundred thousand doctors. The court of appeals felt, how223
ever, that any inference of knowledge was not a "strong" inference.
Whatever this standard requires, it is not defined anywhere in the Federal Rules.
Fourth, this analysis invites weighing of evidence. It is traditionally
said that the likelihood of plaintiff's success on the factual merits is not
a proper subject for evaluation at the pleading stage. 224 Yet the courts
do weigh the likelihood that plaintiff will be able to prove its factual
conclusions. In a recent civil rights suit, for example, the Ninth Circuit
affirmed dismissal because the "factual surroundings" cut against the
plaintiff's conclusion of racial motivation. 2 25 Such a determination at
the pleading stage is highly troubling. The better view was articulated
by the Seventh Circuit in refusing to impose a probable cause standard
in RICO suits: "Even the most specific allegations do not establish
probable cause unless they are reliable. We are, to say the least, perplexed as to how a court might undertake such evaluations of reliability
in deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12."226 To suggest that
courts can do so stands in stark contrast to the standard for grant of
summary judgment, where any reasonable inference favoring the party
opposing summary judgment is said to create an issue of fact preclud2 27
ing pretrial disposition.
In sum, the courts' tendency to scrutinize the proof supporting
222. See S. Englemayer & R. Wagman, Lord'sJustice 39-54 (1985) (detailing statements made by Robins, and contrasting them to evidence available to Robins). Indeed,
Robins even used information from Mary Gabrielson, upon whose report the plaintiff in
Ross relied, see 607 F.2d at 558, in publicity designed to assuage doubts about the safety
of the Dalkon Shield. See S. Englemayer & R. Wagman, supra, at 48-50.
223. Ross, 607 F.2d at 558. Lest it be thought that thejudges of the Second Circuit
can easily apply this kind of demanding standard, consider Albany Welfare Rights Org.
Day Care Center, Inc. v. Schreck, 463 F.2d 620 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S.
944 (1973). Plaintiff claimed that defendant county officials refused to refer children to
its child care facilities in retaliation for plaintiff's organizing activities among welfare
recipients. The majority upheld dismissal because "[t]he complaint in the instant action
presents no facts to support the allegation that the refusal to refer children was in retaliation for [plaintiffs] organizing activities." Id. at 623. Judge Feinberg, dissenting,
agreed that dismissal would be appropriate if the complaint "offered nothing more than
[a] bald assertion," id. at 624, but found that "the complaint is the antithesis of the
typically sparse, bare bones, conclusory pleading that might justify dismissal," id. at 625.
224. See, e.g., Leimer v. State Mut. Life Assurance Co., 108 F.2d 302, 306 (8th Cir.
1940) ("No matter how improbable it may be that [plaintiff] can prove her claim, she is
entitled to an opportunity to make the attempt ....").
225. Jones v. Community Redevelopment Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 650 (9th Cir.
1984). But cf. Wade v.Johnson Controls, Inc., 693 F.2d 19, 22 (2d Cir. 1982) (allegation that employer failed to replace or repair defective air purification system with purpose of harming employees "not beyond the realm of possibility").
226. Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384, 404 (7th Cir.
1984), affd on other grounds, 105 S.Ct. 3291 (1985).
227. See 10A C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2728,
at 178-86 (1983) (although convinced that should verdict be returned against movant at

HeinOnline -- 86 Colum. L. Rev. 470 1986

FACT PLEADING

1986]

factual conclusions appears impossible to justify within the existing
framework for pleadings decisions. As the following discussion demonstrates, the risks associated with heightened scrutiny of factual conclusions are not warranted even when limited to "suspicious" claims nor
are they permissible as part of the trial court's discretion.
IV.

SEGREGATING SUSPICIOUS CLAIMS-TOWARD

DISCRETIONARY DISMISSALS?

Since the new fact pleading cases seem to be limited to certain recurring situations symptomatic of the perceived drawbacks of the litigation boom, the new fact pleading might be cabined to a few limited
categories of cases. A review of the likely categories shows, however,
that none provides an adequate justification for applying stringent
pleading requirements. The alternative of expanded trial court discretion to dismiss also fails. The problems of the litigation boom cannot
so easily be shunted onto a special track.
A. Disfavored Claims
The classic justification for singling out some claims for onerous
pleading requirements is that they are "disfavored. '2 28 Malicious prosecution, for example, has long been viewed with disfavor because of its
tendency to cause litigation to proliferate-making one lawsuit the basis for filing a second lawsuit. 229 The critical point is that the disfavor is
directed at the type of claim being asserted, not the risk that it may
prove baseless. Federal courts adopting stricter scrutiny of factual conclusions often display somewhat similar disfavor for claims falling into
the categories that have experienced the greatest increase in filings during the last twenty years. But the growth in filings provides insufficient
23 0
justification for this treatment.
The most common focus for disapproval are civil rights cases, but
such claims should not be disfavored. To the contrary, they are central
to our concept of liberty, and the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized their importance. 23 ' Private enforcement has played a key
trial court would have to set aside verdict and order new trial, court has no discretion to
grant summary judgment if there is dispute as to facts).
228. See 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 3, § 1296, at 400 (disfavored claim
idea an "old cliche").
229. See Prosser & Keeton, supra note 52, at 876.
230. Cf. Dalton, Taking the Right to Appeal (More or Less) Seriously, 95 Yale L.J.
62, 64 (1985) (caseload concerns alone provide insufficient justification for curtailing

right to appeal); Redish, Book Review, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 1378, 1391 (1985) (increase in
civil rights filings not a reason for limiting liberal interpretation of civil rights laws).
231. See, e.g., Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977) ("the first line of defense
against constitutional violations"). Thus, when Congress authorized the award of attorneys' fees to the prevailing party in civil rights litigation, the Court held that prevailing
plaintiffs could recover almost automatically, see Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390
U.S. 400 (1968) (per curiam), but that defendants could only recover if the action were
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role in accomplishing civil rights goals, 232 so that antagonism toward
assertion of this type of claim by private litigants cannot be justified.
Securities claims, the next most vilified category, are hardly disfavored. Many of the most important claims were implied by the courts
themselves in order to accomplish the objectives of legislation that
might not be enforced without private suits.2 3 3 Although the Supreme

Court has cut back on implication of private remedies, it has also rejected efforts to impose a high burden of proof in actions under rule
lOb-5, 234 the most significant group of securities actions. Whatever
their potential for abuse, securities fraud suits are not disfavored
claims.
Similarly, although overbroad reading of the Sherman Act in favor
of plaintiffs may frustrate its purposes, 23 5 antitrust claims cannot be
viewed as disfavored. Private antitrust suits were intended by Congress
to serve an important function in deterring violation of the Sherman
6
Act.

23

A variant of the disfavored claims approach is the argument that
the potential for harming a person's reputation that fraud claims present justifies heightened scrutiny in those cases.2 3 7 Similar arguments
have been advanced concerning claims under RICO (involving charges
that defendant is a "racketeer"), but it is difficult to say that the opprobrium connected with such claims is really greater than that attached to
brought vexatiously or in bad faith, see Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S.
412 (1978). Marek v. Chesny, 105 S. Ct. 3012 (1985), alters the former result where the
defendant makes a Rule 68 offer to compromise that plaintiff refuses, and plaintiff recovers less than the amount of the Rule 68 offer.
232. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see also Norman,
The Strange Career of the Civil Rights Division's Commitment to Brown, 93 Yale L.J.
983, 984 (1984) (After Brown, the federal government did little to enforce it, leaving
enforcement to private suits.).
233. See, e.g.,J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964) (action implied for
violation of rules governing proxy solicitation because "[p]rivate enforcement of the
proxy rules provides a necessary supplement to [Securties & Exchange] Commission
action").
234. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375 (1983), in which the
Court refused to apply the common law requirement that fraud be proved by clear and
convincing evidence in a private action under Rule lOb-5 because "an important purpose of the federal securities statutes was to rectify perceived deficiencies in the available common-law protections by establishing higher standards of conduct in the
securities industry." Id. at 389; cf. Eichler v. Berner, 105 S. Ct. 2622, 2628-29 (1985)
(Court refuses to apply common law in pari delicto defense in federal securities fraud
action).
235. Thus, the Antitrust Division of the Department ofJustice has recently participated on behalf of defendants in antitrust cases, arguing against broad interpretations of
antitrust law. See Marcus, Conflicts Among Circuits and Transfers Within the Federal
Judicial System, 93 Yale L.J. 677, 707-08 n.187 (1984).
236. See, e.g., Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 751-52
(1947);Javelin Corp. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 546 F.2d 276, 280 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
431 U.S. 938 (1977).
237. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
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others which do not invoke heightened pleading scrutiny. 238 Accordingly, this basis for treating claims as disfavored seems unpersuasive as

well.
It would surely be odd to treat the above claims as less favored

than ordinary automobile torts that find their way into federal court
due to diversity jurisdiction. Yet auto accident cases are clearly, under
Form 9, subject to minimal scrutiny at the pleading stage. The factors
that may give civil rights, securities, or antitrust claims a high settle-

ment value despite lack of merit result from problems endemic to the
litigation system-such as broad discovery-and the fact that the content of the underlying substantive laws provide no easy handles for
early resolution of claims. These difficulties, however, provide no basis
for treating these claims as disfavored.
B. Disfavored Litigants

If the nature of the claim does not justify a hostile reception in the
courts, it may be argued that the identity of the plaintiff or his lawyer
does. But the categories suggested by the cases do not commend
themselves as general standards. To the contrary, a review of these
categories suggests that one should not single out cases for stricter
pleading scrutiny by focusing on the characteristics of the participants.
1. The Repeat Player. - Although Professor Marc Galanter may be
' 23 9
some indicorrect that most private parties are "one shot litigants,

viduals distinguish themselves by suing frequently. 240 The sheer

238. Judge Cardamone made this point well in his dissent in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v.
Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1984) (Cardamone, J., dissenting), rev'd, 105 S. Ct.
3275 (1985):
Today, defendants in civil suits are labelled as violators of environmental laws
when pumping coal byproducts into the atmosphere, despoilers of our rivers
when emptying oil from their tanker's bilges, adulterers in state divorce actions, and killers in vehicular wrongful death actions. The allegations of the
civil complaint do not make these citizens criminals, although their conduct
may well subject them to criminal prosecutions. Why the outcry over RICO?
Id. at 508. In reversing, the Supreme Court appeared to agree with him. See 105 S.Ct.
at 3283 ("As for stigma, a civil RICO proceeding leaves no greater stain than do a
number of other civil proceedings."); see also Herman & McLean v. Huddleston, 459
U.S. 375, 390 (1983) ("The interests of defendants in a securities case do not differ
qualitatively from the interests of defendants sued for violations of other federal statutes
such as the antitrust or civil rights laws ....").
239. See Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits
of Legal Change, 9 Law & Soc'y Rev. 95, 97-114 (1974) (differentiating between litigants who are "one shotters" who have only occasional recourse to the courts, and "repeat players," who are involved in many similar litigations over time).
240. This is hardly a new phenomenon. Consider, for example, the following description of the "serious litigant" in 16th century England: "The serious litigant ....
litigated as a matter of business practice, less with the intention of vindicating his rights
than to obtain advantage over his opponent, bent upon bringing the adversary party to
compromise or ultimately wearing him down to defeat and capitulation." Barnes, Star
Chamber Litigants and Their Counsel, 1596-1641, in Legal Records and the Historian
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weight of past litigation sometimes prompts courts to curtail new filings
by certain plaintiffs, particularly in prisoner suits,

241

and a history of

vexatious litigation is considered pertinent to sanctions for present
abuse of litigation. 2 42 Given the concerns about the litigation boom,
one might argue that courts should ask more of the repeat plaintiff at
the pleading stage.
The fact that the plaintiff is a repeat litigant does not, standing
alone, warrant stricter treatment. Consider, for example, Harry Lewis,
perhaps America's leading corporate gadfly. Without attracting much
public attention, Mr. Lewis, who often files derivative suits, has over the
last decade brought literally dozens of suits, including at least one that
reached the Supreme Court. 2 43 He has not won all the cases, but he
has occasionally obtained relief. While some judges have been suspicious about his litigation activities, 24 4 it seems that in general he has
not been found to have engaged in groundless litigation.2 45 Even
though derivative actions may be viewed as peculiarly susceptible to
abuse, 24 6 the fact that a given plaintiff has filed many such actions does
not necessarily show that he is abusing the litigation process.
There are two basic and related problems with subjecting the
pleadings of repeat litigants to stricter scrutiny. First, the only possible
relevance of a plaintiff's prior litigation activities is to show that he is
7, 22-23 (. Baker ed. 1978). For recent examples see Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d
1221, 1231 n.13 (9th Cir. 1984) (plaintiff had filed over 100 separate actions); Demos v.
Kincheloe, 563 F. Supp. 30 (E.D. Wash. 1982) (184 actions in three years).
241. See, e.g., Abdullah v. Gatto, 773 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1985) (leave of court
needed for future filings); Urban v. United Nations, 768 F.2d 1497 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(injunction against filing suit in any federal court without prior approval of that court).
Regarding the burden of prisoner suits, see infra note 269.
242. See, e.g., Taylor v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 39 Fed. R. Serv. 2d
(Callaghan) 1309 (N.D.N.Y. 1984) (Imposing Rule 11 sanctions on plaintiff said to "embody the paragon of harassing and vexatious litigation" on the basis of"[t]he beleaguering saga of these and other Alan Taylor lawsuits.").
243. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979). Also,
a leading corporate decision is the product of a Lewis lawsuit. See Aronson v. Lewis,
473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).
This author's research revealed that by the end of 1984, Mr. Lewis had been a
named plaintiff in 43 reported federal cases, filed in seven different circuits, as well as
eight reported state cases. The data are on file with the Columbia Law Review.
244. See Lewis v. Curtis, 671 F.2d 779, 782-83 (3d Cir. 1982), in which the district
judge, before dismissing, queried Lewis' lawyer: "So you brought another strike suit,
didn't you?" The appellate court reversed and ordered that another judge handle the
case on remand. See id. at 789.
245. Professor Conard singles out Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 869 (1980), as an example of a sensible decision to terminate a
derivative suit after the challenged action was ratified by shareholders and the shareholders' right to be consulted had thereby been vindicated. Conard, supra note 66, at
274-75.
246. See, e.g., Brown v. Hart, Schaffner & Marx, 96 F.R.D. 64, 67 (N.D. Ill. 1982)
("Such lawsuits are the base work of rapacious jackals whose declared concern for corporate well-being camouflages their unwholesome appetite for corporate dollars.").
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the type of person who indulges in groundless litigation, supporting
the inference that this litigation is also groundless. This is precisely the
sort of relevance reasoning that is forbidden by the general prohibition
against introduction of character evidence. 2 47 Courts usually exclude
evidence of prior litigation activity, in particular, as unduly prejudicial
is not a proper ground for deciding the
because dislike for the litigious
24 8
merits of the current case.
The second problem stems from the first. The inference regarding
the litigant's character is only supportable if the past litigation was in
fact groundless; the fact that plaintiff is a gadfly is not relevant to the
merits of the current case. Accordingly, the court must determine
whether the prior litigation was indeed groundless. Since one would
presumably make such an inference only if there were several earlier
cases, 2 49 that determination could require more effort than deciding
the instant case on its merits, a point that is reinforced by considering
0
the difficulty of evaluating Mr. Lewis' past litigation. 25 Partly to avoid
such collateral issues, even where character evidence is allowed it is
or reputation evidence, rather than evinormally restricted to opinion
251
dence of specific events.
Inviting though it seems, then, the repeat player criterion is neither
a useful nor a fair device for singling out cases for heightened scrutiny
at the pleading stage. Even if it were, it would apply in a very small
number of cases. If litigation abuse is confined to that small number of
cases it is not so significant as many argue.
247. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(a) (excluding evidence of character to prove action in

conformity therewith on a particular occasion).
248. See C. McCormick, McCormick on Evidence § 196 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984); 1
D. Louisell & C. Mueller, Federal Evidence § 99 (1977); cf. Crisafi v. Holland, 655 F.2d
1305, 1309 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("[A] complaint filed in forma pauperis is not subject to
dismissal simply because the plaintiff is litigious. The number of complaints a poor per-

son files does not alone justify peremptory dismissal.").
When prior claims are admitted in evidence, it is generally on the theory that they
are so similar and numerous that they cast a shadow on the truthfulness of the present
claim. For example, San Antonio Traction Co. v. Cox, 184 S.W. 722 (Tex. Civ. App.
1916), a suit for injuries allegedly sustained alighting from one of defendant's streetcars,
involved 15 other claims by relatives of plaintiff for injuries allegedly received during the
same year getting onto or off of defendant's streetcars. The court excluded the evidence
because plaintiff had not been linked to the claims by his relatives, but stated that it
would have allowed them had plaintiff himself made them. See also Mintz v. Premier
Cab Ass'n, 127 F.2d 744 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (evidence admitted that plaintiff had previously made claim for injuries allegedly received while a passenger in a cab).
249. See D. Louisell & C. Mueller, supra note 248, § 99, at 735-36 (impeachment
of claimant with evidence of "many recent, unsuccessful, similar claims" permissible but
not where there is only "a single unsuccessful previous claim, even if it was highly
similar").
250. See supra notes 243-45 and accompanying text.
251. See Fed. R. Evid. 405.
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While most litigants are not repeat

players, lawyers certainly are,2 5 2 and their prior litigation activities

could affect the courts' attitudes toward their cases. Some courts have
2 3
relied on such personal history in making important decisions. 1
While courts have not explicitly based the dismissal of a pleading on a
lawyer's history in prior litigation, this does not dispel the real experience of lawyers that judges view different lawyers differently. Nonetheless, for two important reasons challenges to the plaintiff's lawyer do
not provide an appropriate basis-overt or covert-for stricter scrutiny
of the pleadings.
First, there will be disputes about the lawyer's prior behavior. For
example, consider I. Walton Bader, the attorney for plaintiff in Heart
Disease Research Foundationv. GeneralMotors Corp.2 54 Mr. Bader has had a
number of clashes with judges during his career, 255 and has recently
been sanctioned by a judge who relied in part on this history. 25 6 One
could imagine that defendants might be tempted to attack Mr. Bader as
part of an effort to have cases dismissed. The example of Mr. Bader,
however, proves just how inappropriate a lawyer's prior behavior would
be as a basis for dismissal. As will always be the case, there is another
side: some view Mr. Bader as a vigorous, effective advocate. 25 7 More
252. See Coffee, supra note 137, at 18-19, 22-23 (referring to plaintiff's attorneys
as repeat players and describing a "distinct subspecies" who are said to repeatedly file
strike suits).
253. See, e.g., Eavenson, Auchmuty & Greenwald v. Holtzman, 775 F.2d 535, 543
(3d Cir. 1985) (in imposing sanctions, district court referred to "a lot of harrassment"
that lawyer had used in another case); Rogers v. Kroger Co., 669 F.2d 317, 319 (5th Cir.
1982) (district court dismissed action when plaintiffs attorney was unprepared to proceed, citing a prior case in which she had also been unprepared). It should be noted that
the district court orders in both these cases were reversed.
254. 463 F.2d 98 (2d Cir. 1972); see supra notes 13-19 and accompanying text.
Recall that the district court dismissed the suit as frivolous. See 15 Fed. R. Serv. 2d
(Callaghan) 1517, 1519 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
255. See In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 659 F.2d 1332, 1335 (5th Cir.
1981) (reporting lower court's finding that Bader had tried to disrupt multidistrict proceedings "by filing and threatening to file duplicative and harassing litigation"); Independent Investor Protective League v. Touche Ross & Co., 607 F.2d 530, 534 n.5 (2d
Cir.) (affirming discovery sanctions against Bader and characterizing his conduct as "utterly intolerable and reprehensible"), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 895 (1978); Slumbertogs,
Inc. v.Jiggs, Inc., 353 F.2d 720, 720 (2d Cir. 1965) (affirming sanction of dismissal as
appropriate "[in view of the dilatory and contumacious conduct of plaintiffs and their
counsel in virtual defiance of the rules and orders of at least six judges in the district
court"), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 969 (1969); Jackson v. Bader, 74 A.D.2d 621, 622, 424
N.Y.S.2d 926, 927 (1980) (listing examples of "I. Walton Bader's cavalier attitude towards the spirit and letter of the CPLR").
256. See In re Itel Sec. Litig., 596 F. Supp. 226, 235 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (referring to
"Mr. Bader's history in this type of litigation"). For more background on this case, see
Riley & Galante, Mr. Outside-A Fiasco Over Fees, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 19, 1984, at 1, col. 1.
257. See A Bondholder's Best Friend, Forbes, Dec. 15, 1975, at 41, 43 ("Bader's
career reminds us of a story about Davy Crockett. As he travelled through Tennessee, a
stranger asked why he was going to Texas, where he later fell at the Alamo. 'To fight for
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generally, disputes about the lawyer's pedigree could, like examination
of plaintiff's prior litigation, 25 8 immerse the court in the merits of other
a helpful addition to burdensome motion
lawsuits, hardly
25 9
proceedings.
Second, even assuming that a lawyer's prior bad behavior can be
established in some cases, it is perilous to ascribe that prior behavior to
his current client, and it is that client's case that is subject to dismissal. 260 However true it may be that the client is generally derivatively
responsible for the lawyer's actions on his behalf,26 1 it hardly follows
that the client is responsible for the lawyer's misdeeds in other cases.
3. The Poor. - The Federal Rules were designed, in part, to open
up the federal courts to those of lesser means, and their moderate success in this regard may have caused courts to tighten pleading requirements for the poorest plaintiffs, indigents. Some courts fear such
litigants because indigents seem to have nothing to lose by bringing
groundless suits. 262 Moreover, they often sue pro se, so that insistence

on details may be more likely to reveal a fatal defect than in other cases,
where a lawyer alert to the defect might try to elude detection through
vagueness. The actual fate of most suits brought by the indigent-victories for plaintiffs are extremely rare 2 6 3-seems to justify suspicions
that a particular indigent plaintiff cannot prove facts that merit relief.
Courts animated by such suspicions arguably have a statutory basis
for treating pauper cases differently. The same statute that authorizes
my rights,' said Crockett."); The Numbers Game, Forbes, Apr. 1, 1974, at 54, 54 ("Walton Bader is the scourge of the U.S. accounting profession. A man whose name strikes
fear in the hearts of senior partners in the big certified public accounting firms.").
258. See supra notes 249-51 and accompanying text.
259. Cf. Becker, TheJudge's Perspective, 51 Antitrust LJ.437, 439 (1983) ("Now
we will have Rule 11 hearings, and then we will have discovery on the Rule I1 issue. If
you want to proliferate litigation, if you want to cause further delay, pass these rules
because we will have sanctions hearings coming out of our ears ....").But cf. Fed. R.
Civ. P. I1 advisory committee note (Rule 11 discovery should only be conducted in
"extraordinary circumstances" and a hearing may not be necessary).
260. Thus, when Rule 11 was amended in 1983 to put more teeth into sanctions
against attorneys who abuse litigation, the amendment also deleted the provision authorizing the striking of the pleading. As the advisory committee notes explained, the
power to strike "tended to confuse the issue of attorney honesty with the merits of the
action." Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee note. Cf. Risinger, Honesty in Pleading
and Its Enforcement: Some "Striking" Problems with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
11, 61 Minn. L. Rev. 1 (1976) (criticizing use of former Rule 11 to dismiss cases).
261. See Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 633-34 (1962) ("Petitioner voluntarily
chose this attorney as his representative in the action, and he cannot now avoid the
consequences of the acts or omissions of this freely selected agent.").
262. See, e.g., Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1226 (9th Cir. 1984); Anderson
v. Coughlin, 700 F.2d 37, 42 (2d Cir. 1982).
263. Prisoner suits, which constitute the bulk of pro se filings, result in judgment
for the defendant in a very high proportion of the cases. A 1978 study reported that
more than two-thirds of these suits are dismissed as groundless by the court without any
response from defendant, and that only a very small number go to trial. See Turner,
supra note 132, at 617-18.
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waiver of filing fees in in forma pauperis cases also provides that the
court may dismiss the complaint "if satisfied that the action is frivolous
or malicious. ' 26 4 Some courts feel that this power should not be exercised in any case that would survive a motion to dismiss under Conley v.
Gibson,2 65 but others view the statute as allowing greater latitude in dismissing the action. 26 6 The Supreme Court itself has clamped down on
in forma pauperis petitions for certiorari, 2 6 7 perhaps giving tacit support to the proponents of the more stringent treatment.
Carefully scrutinizing the factual conclusions alleged by the indigent is nevertheless hard to justify, as well as contrary to the objectives
of the Federal Rules. The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized
the need to take a liberal view of pro se pleadings, 2 68 and the indigent
are likely to be least able to ferret out the sort of proof the courts demand to support factual conclusions without first having some discovery. Moreover, despite widespread fear that courts will be inundated
with such cases, their actual impact seems modest. 269 Pleading practice
264. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1982). The statute has so provided since it was enacted
in 1892. Act ofJuly 20, 1892, ch. 209, 27 Stat. 252. On the difficulty of defining frivo.
lous, see Comment, Courts Are No Place for Fun and Frivolity: A Warning to Vexatious
Litigants and Over-Zealous Attorneys, 20 Willamette LJ. 441, 446-48 (1984).
265. See e.g., Phillips v. Mashburn, 746 F.2d 782, 784 (11 th Cir. 1984); Brandon v.
District of Columbia Bd. of Parole, 734 F.2d 56, 59 (D.C. Cir. 1984); see also Turner,
supra note 132, at 649 (arguing that courts should, at a minimum, use Conley v. Gibson
standard).
266. See Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1228 (9th Cir. 1984) (court can dismiss as frivolous although complaint states a claim if it is based on "wholly fanciful"
factual allegations); Anderson v. Coughlin, 700 F.2d 37, 43 (2d Cir. 1983); cf. Spears v.
McCotter, 766 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1985) (court may assign case to magistrate for evidentiary hearing to probe conclusory allegations and determine if case frivolous); Watson v.
Ault, 525 F.2d 886 (5th Cir. 1976) (court may require plaintiff to respond to questionnaire to assist it in deciding if claim frivolous).
There does not appear to be historical support for broader dismissal under the
statute than would be allowed had the plaintiff paid the fees, and very few cases were
decided prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules in 1938. See O'Connell v,Mason,
127 F. 435, 437 (D. Mass. 1903) ("It is possible that extreme cases might arise, where,
looking only at the face of the declaration, the court might determine that the suit was
frivolous or malicious even though the declaration were not demurrable."), aft'd, 132 F.
245 (1st Cir. 1904).
267. See, e.g., Brown v. Herald Co., 464 U.S. 928 (1983) (denying motion for leave
to proceed in forma pauperis). FourJustices dissented because review of such motions
increases the Court's workload. See id. at 929-30 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
268. See, e.g., Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982); Hughes v. Rowe, 449
U.S. 5, 9 (1980). These cases follow Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), which
stated that pro se complaints are subjected to "less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers."
269. See Eisenberg, Section 1983: Doctrinal Foundations and an Empirical Study,
67 Cornell L. Rev. 482, 526-33 (1982) (civil rights cases, including prisoner cases, impose modest burden); Turner, supra note 132, at 637-38, 647-49 (discussing expedited
procedures used to process prisoner petitions); see also C. Seron, The Roles of Magistrates in Federal District Courts 44 (1983) (prisoner cases often assigned to magistrates). But cf. Ford v. Estelle, 740 F.2d 374 (5th Cir. 1984) (prisoner cases cannot be
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in these cases may be more likely to elicit fatal details, but it is unlikely

to provide a method for assessing factual conclusions. Like the repeat

270
player, the poor plaintiff should not be shunted onto another track.

C. The Strike Suit Scenario
Rather than focusing on the type of claim or identity of the plain-

tiff, a court could seek to isolate those cases that might be strike suits.
Certainly the Supreme Court's opinion in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores2 7 1 supports sensitivity to the risk of strike suits, and the concern over strike suits lies close to the heart of the malaise of the liberal

ethos.

2 72

The problem is identifying a strike suit. 2 73 One feature often associated with strike suits is that the burden of litigation is sufficient to
prompt the defendant to settle, despite the weakness of the plaintiff's
claim, in order to avoid litigation expense or other disagreeable side
effects of litigation, such as publicity or interference with an impending
transaction. This concern is, of course, a reason for promoting pretrial

decisions. 2 74 It is of doubtful utility in singling out cases for stricter

pleading treatment, however, because there is no intrinsic relation be-

tween litigation expense or other disagreeable side effects of a lawsuit
and the absence of merit in plaintiff's case. Litigation expense, for ex-

ample, results from the need to do extensive preparation for trial, and
may make a small claim that is assured of success on the merits into a

nuisance suit, that is, one where litigation costs outweigh expected recovery. 275 Similarly, the fact that the suit may delay a transaction pro-

vides no basis for dismissing the suit if the proposed transaction itself is
assigned to magistrates for trial without parties' consent). Moreover, the assertion of
groundless claims may not be cost free for the petitioner. See Tasby v. United States,
504 F.2d 332 (8th Cir. 1974) (prosecution for perjury in connection with prisoner
petition).
270. Except for in forma pauperis situations, there is normally no occasion for
plaintiffs to disclose their financial condition to the court. Even if there were, there is no
standard by which to decide who is sufficiently poor for this unfavorable treatment.
271. 421 U.S. 723 (1975); see supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
272. Such concerns surface in decisions to limit discovery. See, e.g., Aviation Specialties, Inc. v. United Technologies Corp., 568 F.2d 1186, 1190 (5th Cir. 1978)
(describing plaintiff's interrogatories as "nothing more than a thinly veiled attempt to
enhance the strike capability of its suit"). Defendants can play this game also. See Blake
Constr. Co. v. International Harvester Co., 521 F. Supp. 1268, 1270 (N.D. Ill. 1981)
(referring to "Stalingrad defense").
273. See Pennsylvania Gas & Water Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 427 F.2d 568,
576 (D.C. Cir. 1970) ("Much that is sound and prophylactic in corporate law was developed in so-called strike suits ....
"); W. Cary & M. Eisenberg, Cases and Materials on
Corporations 888 (5th ed. 1980) ("The strike suit... may very well be no more than an
over-the-hill dragon, puffed into life to frighten the courts away from deciding substantive issues.").
274. See supra notes 134-42 and accompanying text.
275. See Rosenberg & Shavell, supra note 141, at 4.
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illegal. Moreover, there is no standard by which litigation inconvenience is to be gauged; every defendant finds litigation burdensome.
The key factor, then, is the weakness of the claim. Where the focus
is on a factual conclusion, however, the court is without a reliable way
of identifying cases in which plaintiffs are likely to prevail. 27 6 On balance, the strike suit scenario simply authorizes judges to dismiss cases
they view as weak when it appears to them that the litigation will unduly
27 7
inconvenience the defendant.
D. Discretionary Dismissals
The problems with the strike suit scenario suggest another approach-granting judges discretion to dismiss suits they conclude are
suspicious. The classic approach is that trial judges have no discretion;
any dismissal for failure to state a claim is subject to full review, and the
trial judge's decision is accorded no deference whatsoever. 2 78 Perhaps
this rule should be relaxed, and an abuse of discretion standard of review substituted. 2 79 This approach might allow judges to consider a
variety of factors including those discussed above, and to impose
stricter pleading standards when a case fits an abusive litigation profile.
Such a change in pleading doctrine would be consistent with the
current trend across a spectrum of trial administration issues. The Federal Rules of Evidence, for example, largely rely on the exercise of sen280
sible discretion by the trial court in admitting or excluding evidence.
The case management movement, fueled by the 1983 amendments to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, similarly emphasizes the importance of discretionary decisions on such matters as timing and scope of
276. See supra notes 196-227 and accompanying text.
277. It may even invite unwanted and irrelevant speculation about plaintiff's motives. For example, in Grant v. Smith, 574 F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 1978), the district court
dismissed a housing discrimination action after a trial to the court without ajury, noting
that plaintiffs seemed more interested in a strike suit than in securing accomodations.
Id. at 255. The appellate court reversed because of the district court's emphasis on
plaintiffs' good faith, which it found irrelevant to the question whether there was forbidden discrimination. Id.
278. See, e.g., Kelson v. City of Springfield, 767 F.2d 651, 653 (9th Cir. 1985).
279. The classic analysis of this standard is Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the
Trial Court, Viewed From Above, 22 Syracuse L. Rev. 635 (1971). For a careful examination of the types of treatment that an appellate court can adopt for discretionary trial
court decisions, broadly characterized as delegation and deference, see Post, The Management of Speech: Discretion and Rights, 1984 Sup. Ct. Rev. 169, 208-19.
Interestingly, early advocates of notice pleading seemingly viewed discretion as an
antidote to the tendency of appellate courts of that era to invent new pleading niceties
under the Codes. Thus, Professor Whittier, writing in 1918 to urge adoption of notice
pleading, expressed "hope[] that no law would develop determining what is sufficient
notice of any cause of action or defense. It should be left a question of fact in each case
to be determined by the trial judge ....
" Whittier, supra note 111, at 505.
280. See Waltz, Evidence is Dead, Wigmore Obsolescent: Long Live Judicial Discretion!, 65 Chi. B. Rec. 284 (1984).
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discovery, which can have a very great impact on a party's ability to
prepare and present his case. 28 ' Perhaps most analogous is the handling of the demand on directors requirement for derivative actions
28 2
under Rule 23.1-also governed by an abuse of discretion standard.
Expanded trial court discretion may indeed be the emerging reality
of trial court handling of pleadings motions. In Heart Disease Research
Foundation v. General Motors Corp.,283 for example, the Second Circuit
said the trial court had discretion to dismiss conclusory claims of conspiracy. 28 4 More significantly, trial judges are sometimes allowed to direct plaintiffs to replead even though the case would not be subject to
dismissal, and to enforce this order by dismissing if the plaintiff does
not comply. 285 Other cases suggest that appellate courts are coming to
regard the handling of pleadings motions as such individualized matters that consistency among decisions, the hallmark of an issue of law, is
not critical. Thus, in a 1978 decision affirming the dismissal of a securities fraud shareholders' class action, the Second Circuit was unmoved
by the fact that the same plaintiff, represented by the same lawyer, had
been allowed to proceed with another complaint of virtually identical
specificity. Instead, it disdained any effort to reconcile a welter of dismissal cases: "We see no profit in attempting to analyze these decisions, which may or may not be consistent and each of which
necessarily rests on its particular facts." '2 86 With their emphasis on

early "issue definition" and early disposition of groundless claims and
defenses, the 1983 amendments are likely to accelerate this trend to28 7
ward discretion.
281. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text. But consider Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 Emory LJ. 747, 755 (1982): "If we have been moving
increasingly in the direction of seeking justice in the individual case by more general
rules and grants of dispensing power . . .restrictions upon review of such decisions
made by courts of first instance are increasingly unacceptable."
282. See Lewis v. Graves, 701 F.2d 245, 248 (2d Cir. 1983).
283. 463 F.2d 98 (2d Cir. 1972).
284. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
285. For a recent example, see Friedlander v. Nims, 755 F.2d 810 (11th Cir. 1985),
a class action alleging RICO and securities fraud claims. One defendant moved to dismiss, and the trial court dismissed with leave to amend on the ground that the complaint
failed to plead fraud with particularity as required by Rule 9(b). When plaintiff did not
amend, the trial court dismissed with prejudice. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal as a sanction, but carefully noted that it was not holding that the original complaint was subject to dismissal without leave to amend. See id. at 814 n.6. However
logical this treatment is, it raises the prospect that a trial court could establish a predicate for dismissal with prejudice by ordering plaintiff to provide more specifics to support a claim not subject to dismissal with prejudice as originally pleaded.
286. Denny v. Barber, 576 F.2d 465,470 (2d Cir. 1978). The other case is Denny v.
Carey, 72 F.R.D. 574 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
287. Precisely this possibility has engendered much concern among commentators.
See, e.g., Sherman, Book Review, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 721, 729-32 (1984). Nonetheless,
there is some suggestion that even substantive decisions may be subject to trial court
discretion under RICO. See Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 741 F.2d 511, 518 n.7 (2d
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Although some relaxation of the idea that trial judges have no discretion in connection with pleading decisions may be inevitable, discretion is no panacea for handling the kind of factual conclusions that have
created the problem. First, increased discretion in this area runs
squarely against the grain of the Federal Rules. It is one thing to argue
for expanded power to resolve pleadings matters in order to assure litigants an opportunity for a decision on the merits. It is quite another to
authorize a judge to decide cases on instinct.2 88 That is not what we
mean when we endorse a merits decision.
Second, giving increased discretion to judges would disregard the
very real attitudinal differences amongjudges. With the growth of case
management, there can be little doubt that individual differences
among judges make the assignment of the case very important to the
way it develops in the pretrial stage, but differences in attitude toward
such matters as timing and breadth of discovery do not threaten the
substantive law. It is hard to deny, however, that at least some judges
view certain types of claims, although they are provided for under law,
as unimportant; 28 9 to increase discretion to dismiss could lead to
judge-by-judge "disfavored claims" treatment, surely less desirable
than the disfavored claim theory discussed above. 290 Such action
would threaten to fragment the substantive law by permitting judges to
create their own requirements for various kinds of claims. Present
practice already makes such diversity unavoidable to some extent. To
illustrate, one district judge has suggested that it is practical for litigants in RICO cases to tailor their allegations to the known predilections of the judge to whom the case is assigned.2 9' Although that
Cir. 1984) ("The matter of whether given conduct should be considered one or more
than one 'predicate act' is a matter best left, in the first instance, to the discretion of the
district judge."), vacated, 105 S. Ct. 3550 (1985); cf. Willamette Say. & Loan v. Blake &
Neal Fin. Co., 577 F. Supp. 1415, 1430 (D. Or. 1984) (regarding supposed requirement
of an independent racketeering injury, court observes that "[c]ourts recognize a racketeering injury when they see it," citingJustice Stewart's observation about obscenity that
"I know it when I see it"); Waste Recovery Corp. v. Mahler, 566 F. Supp. 1466, 1468
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (same).
288. Cf. Resnik, supra note 44, at 840-41 (discussing outrage caused by judge's
decision based on a coin flip).
289. Recall, for example, the hearings on the nomination of G. Harrold Carswell to
the Supreme Court, in which it was reported that as a district judge he had regularly
dismissed civil rights actions and been reversed. See 11 R. Mersky &J.Jacobstein. The
Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings and Reports on Successful and Unsuccessful Nominations of Supreme Court Justices by the Senate Judiciary Committee,
1916-1972, at 117-23 (1975) (testimony of Gary Orfield); id. at 139-47 (testimony of
John Lowenthal); id. at 177-82 (testimony of Norman Knopf; id. at 221-33 (testimony
of Leroy Clark); id. at 282-93 (testimony of Joseph Rauh). In particular, Professor
Orfield pointed up one case as an "example of [Judge Carswell's] willingness to use his
discretion as a district judge to even strike out [an] argument on a very important issue
raised by the litigants." Id. at 119.
290. See supra notes 228-38 and accompanying text.
291. Speech by Milton Shadur before the Illinois Institute on Continuing Legal Ed-
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suggestion results in part from the present diversity of interpretations
of RICO, it also shows how individualized "justice" could become if
greater discretion to dismiss on the pleadings were to become accepted
practice.
Third, there is simply no reason to believe that a trial judge is well
equipped for this task, whether experienced or not. One supposed
hallmark of a discretionary decision is that the trial judge is better positioned to decide the matter than appellate judges looking at a cold record. 29 2 That is simply not true in a meaningful way with respect to

factual conclusions in pleadings. At the pleading stage, the judge has
had no exposure to the parties or to evidentiary material. Instead, he
has only seen the pleadings and dealt with the lawyers. On the basis of
this information, it is impossible for him to form reliable conclusions
about whether given defendants have conspired to violate the antitrust
laws, discriminated against the plaintiff on grounds of race, or failed to
make a full disclosure in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. Yet these are precisely the types of issues that trial judges are
resolving using the vehicle of fact pleadings. 29 3 Admittedly judges
must make a similar determination at the summary judgment stage, but
that decision is at least based on evidentiary material. 2 94 At the pleading stage the judge must guess whether the plaintiff, if allowed discovery, will be able to gather evidence to support his claims. Uninformed
judicial speculation is not an adequate means of arriving at correct decisions on the merits.
Finally, enhancing the importance of selection of the judge would
encourage judge shopping. There can be no doubt that there are already incentives for judge shopping and that our courts seek to prevent
it.295 To endorse merits decisions that reflect the individual preferences of the judges involved, however, would tend to undermine the
notion that parties can expect evenhanded, and roughly equal, justice
from any judge. 2 96 However doubtful that assumption may be in realucation (Jan. 30, 1985) (unpublished) (on file at the offices of the Columbia Law
Review):
Once the case is assigned,

. . .

both lawyers should immediately run the

judge's name and the RICO acronym on Lexis or Westlaw. . . . Once you've
taken that judicial research step, unless the judge is such a maverick that you
have to play your case for the Court of Appeals from the beginning, it is obviously judicious on your part to adapt to what our sponsors [of the program]
...call the "judicial perspective."
292. See Rosenberg, supra note 279, at 663-65.
293. See supra notes 84-104 and accompanying text.
294. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) requires that affidavits submitted on summary judgment
motions be made on personal knowledge and set forth facts admissible in evidence. For
a discussion of the alternative of summaryjudgment treatment, see infra notes 297-342
and accompanying text.
295. See Marcus, supra note 235, at 706-07 n.183.
296. Cf. In re Cement Antitrust Litig., 673 F.2d 1020, 1027 (9th Cir. 1982) ("[lit is

difficult for us to think of a question which is more separable from and collateral to the
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ity, it could not be sustained were judges explicitly authorized to indulge their prejudices on the merits. Such a system would overtly tie
the outcome of the case to the assignment, and one could only hypocritically contend that efforts to influence the assignment of the case are
improper.
Accordingly, the solution to the problem of litigation abuse does
not lie in the direction of increasing the discretion of the trial judges to
dismiss cases because they sense misuse of the litigation system. Such a
development could undermine the substantive law just as fully as failure to dismiss meritless suits.
V.

THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT ROUTE

The fact that a case is not dismissed does not mean that it can only
be resolved on the merits by a full dress trial. To the contrary, the
intermediate step of summary judgment exists precisely to enable
courts to examine the factual conclusions of the pleader and determine
whether they are supported by sufficient evidence to warrant the time
and effort of a trial. Moreover, summary judgment works both ways;
plaintiffs can also use it to obtain a merits disposition. Indeed, summary judgment was originally adopted in England to enable plaintiffs to
penetrate groundless defenses. 2 97 Summary judgment was the stage
that Clark himself hoped would flourish as the mechanism for pretrial
disposition of cases, 29 8 but the early experience under Rule 56 failed to
achieve Clark's desire. Clark's own Second Circuit, over his objections,
adopted a "slightest doubt" standard, which resembled the dismissal
standard later articulated in Conley v. Gibson: summaryjudgment should
be denied whenever there is the slightest doubt about the entitlement
of the moving party to judgment. 29 9 Moreover, in 1962 the Supreme
Court cautioned that summary judgment should be "used sparingly in
complex antitrust litigation where motive and intent play leading
merits" than recusal of one judge.), aff'd sub nom. Arizona v. Ash Grove Cement Co.,
459 U.S. 1190 (1983); Hampton v. City of Chicago, 643 F.2d 478, 479 (7th Cir. 1981)
("While plaintiffs have a right to have their claim heard by the district court, they have
no protectable interest in the continued exercise ofjurisdiction by a particular judge.").
297. Louis, Federal SummaryJudgment Doctrine: A Critical Analysis, 83 Yale LJ.
745, 745 (1974).
298. Smith, supra note 3, at 918-19, 929.
299. See, e.g., Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946); Doehlcr Metal
Furniture Co. v. United States, 149 F.2d 130, 135 (2d Cir. 1945). See generally Louis,
supra note 297, at 760-62 (concluding that slightest doubt standard made summary
judgment unavailable on facts where moving party would be entitled to a directed verdict). This standard has been labelled "plainly wrong." Sonenshein, State of Mind and
Credibility in the Summary Judgment Context: A Better Approach, 78 Nw. U.L. Rev.

774, 798 (1983). For a discussion of Clark's opposition to this standard, see Smith,
supra note 3, at 930-31. For a discussion of the contrasting views of Judge Jerome
Frank, the architect of the slightest doubt standard, see R. Glennon, The Iconoclast as
Reformer 156-57 (1958).
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Limitations on summary judgment were particularly troublesome

in the kinds of cases that came to typify the new litigation boom precisely because those cases were often complex and turned on issues of
motive and intent. 30 1 Hence, restrictions on summary judgment may
have acted as a catalyst for the reemergence of fact pleading. Certainly,
the Second Circuit's refusal to credit plaintiffs' allegations that defendants were or should have been aware of the dangers of the Dalkon
Shield in Ross v. A.H. Robins Co.30 2 shows that the "slightest doubt"

standard was not being employed in the pleading context. The juxtaposition of these developments was ironic: at the pleading stage, plaintiffs might be denied discovery altogether unless they could offer facts
giving rise to a "strong inference"3 0 3 supporting their factual conclusions; thereafter, plaintiffs who had access to discovery were indulged
with great laxity at the summary judgment stage under the slightest
doubt view. This seems backwards.
The tendency toward this ironic result has abated over recent years
as limitations on summary judgment have relaxed. 30 4 In 1968, the
Supreme Court signalled greater flexibility in the handling of summary
judgment in antitrust cases, 30 5 and circuit courts have since upheld
300. Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962).
301. See supra text following note 105.
302. 607 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 946 (1980); see supra
notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
303. See supra notes 93, 219-23 and accompanying text.
304. For examples, see infra notes 305-307 and accompanying text. See generally
Louis, SummaryJudgment and the Actual Malice Controversy in Constitutional Defamation Cases, 57 S. Cal. L. Rev. 707, 709-10, 715 n.49 (1984) (discussing shift away from
Poller v. CBS and absence of articulated new rules); Sonenshein, supra note 299, at
778-79 (1963 amendment to Rule 56 expanded availability of summary judgment);
Booker, Summary Judgment Proves Versatile Antitrust Tool, Legal Times, Feb. 14,
1983, at 17, col. 1 (growing availability of summary judgment in antitrust cases). For a
strategy for such decisions see Schwarzer, SummaryJudgment Under the Federal Rules:
Defining Genuine Issues of Material Fact, 99 F.R.D. 465 (1984).
This is not to say that trial judges now have a free hand to grant summary judgment.
See Wechsler v. Steinberg, 733 F.2d 1054, 1058-59 (2d Cir. 1984) (reversing summary
judgment for defendant accountants in securities fraud action because "[i]ssues of motive and intent are usually inappropriate for disposition on summary judgment"); Neubauer, Snyder & Nolan, Judges Compare Courts, 11 Litig., Spring 1985, at 10, 15
(district judge explains that "[w]hat with the track record that district judges have in this
circuit on the subject of summary judgment. . . . [granting summary judgment] is a
high-risk judicial decision, as we all know"). But cf. Schwarzer, supra, at 467 & n.9
(reporting that in fact summary judgments are reversed less frequently than most judgments in Ninth Circuit).
305. See First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-90 (1968). The
Court upheld summary judgment in favor of defendant in an antitrust case, adding:
While we recognize the importance of preserving litigants' rights to a trial on
their claims, we are not prepared to extend those rights to the point of requiring that anyone who files an antitrust complaint setting forth a valid cause of
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summary judgment on the issue of whether there was a conspiracy. 0 ;
The Supreme Court has gone further in civil rights cases and encouraged summary disposition of suits against government officials on
the defense of qualified immunity, 30 7 an issue that turns in part on state
308
of mind.
Rather than indulging all possible doubts in favor of the opponent
to summary judgment, the courts seem to be shifting emphasis toward
ensuring an adequate opportunity for discovery and then scrutinizing
the fruits of that discovery. But the defendant can move for summary
judgment at any time, and may do so at the beginning of the case in
conjunction with a motion to dismiss. 309 At that point, the plaintiff is in
no better position to oppose summary judgment than he is to include
detailed evidence in the complaint in response to stringent fact pleading requirements. The plaintiff can, however, request under Rule 56(f)
that the summary judgment motion be postponed while he obtains discovery necessary to rebut the defendant's showing.3 10 The focus
should shift, then, to application of Rule 56(f).
A plaintiff is not automatically entitled to a Rule 56(f) postponement. Plaintiff must show that by exercising reasonable diligence he
could not have previously obtained evidence to controvert the defendant's showing. 3 1 ' Although this requirement may often be easy for the
action be entitled to a full-dress trial notwithstanding the absence ofany significant probative evidence tending to support the complaint.
Id. at 290. In dissent, Justice Black argued that the decision could not be squared with
Poller v. CBS. Id. at 303-05.
306. See, e.g., Barnes v. Arden Mayfair, Inc., 759 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1985); Products Liab. Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Crum & Forster Ins. Cos., 682 F.2d 660 (7th Cir. 1982);
Parsons v. Ford Motor Co., 669 F.2d 308 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 832 (1982).
Cf. Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 54 U.S.L.W. 4319, 4322-25 (U.S.
Mar. 26, 1985) (where defendants lacked rational economic motive to conspire, defendants entitled to summary judgement unless plaintiffs show unambiguous evidence that
tends to exclude the possibility that defendants acted independently).
307. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 813-19 (1982).
308. Interestingly, the Court's method for promoting summary disposition was to
introduce an objective reasonable person standard in place of a subjective standard
looking to defendant's actual state of mind. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 105 S. Ct. 2806,
2810-11 (1985); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). For criticism of this
approach, see Note, Qualified Immunity for Government Officials: The Problem of Unconstitutional Purpose in Civil Rights Litigation, 95 Yale L.J. 126 (1985).
309. In fact, if on a motion to dismiss the pleadings, the defendant submits and the
court does not exclude matters outside the plaintiff's pleading, the court must convert
the motion to one for summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b).
310. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f):
Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that he
cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the application forjudgment or may order a continuance to permit.

. .

depositions to be taken or discovery to be had .

. ..

311. See, e.g., Pfeil v. Rogers, 757 F.2d 850, 857 (7th Cir. 1985) (upholding rejection of Rule 56(f) request because plaintiffs' claim they could not earlier have obtained
information "strain[ed] credibilty").
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plaintiff to satisfy at the outset of the lawsuit, sometimes it is not. For
example, in a recent securities fraud action the Seventh Circuit upheld
summary judgment against plaintiffs who had been denied access to
discovery because defendants' motion was based on the statute of limitations and the only issue was the date on which plaintiffs were aware of
sufficient facts to put them on notice of the claim. 31 2 Defendants relied
on plaintiffs' depositions, and the court of appeals rejected the argument that summaryjudgment should be deferred pending discovery by
plaintiffs because "[tihe plaintiffs were the only people who would possibly be in possession of information sufficient to counter the infer'31 3
ences of a lack of due diligence found in their depositions.
The plaintiff must also show that the requested discovery is likely
to provide grounds for denying the motion, 3 14 a requirement said to
apply even where the information sought is exclusively in the defendant's possession. 3 15 The court need not credit speculation that some
controverting facts might be discovered. As one court explained, "[i]t
is not enough [for the plaintiff] to rest upon the uncertainty which
broods over all human affairs or to pose philosophic doubts regarding
the conclusiveness of evidentiary facts." 3 1 6 There should be some articulated justification for expecting the discovery to unearth evidence
that will rebut the defendant's showing.
Evaluating the plaintiff's justification may, however, prove extremely difficult. For example, in Decker v. Massey-Ferguson Ltd.,317
where the Second Circuit upheld dismissal of the plaintiff's securities
complaint based on a comparison of plaintiff's allegations with the contents of various reports issued by Massey, it might well be that had the
defendants' motion been treated as one for summary judgment there
would have been no need for discovery. Certainly, the appellate court's
conclusions that Massey's filings showed conclusively that its forecasts
312. See Gieringer v. Silverman, 731 F.2d 1272 (7th Cir. 1984).

313. Id. at 1278.
314. See United States ex. rel. Small Business Admin. v. Light, 766 F.2d 394,
397-98 (8th Cir. 1985); Willmar Poultry Co. v. Morton-Norwich Prods., 520 F.2d 289,
297 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 915 (1976); see also Reasor v. City of
Norfolk, 606 F. Supp. 788, 792 (E.D. Va. 1984) (court granted Rule 56(f) request but
cautioned plaintiffs' attorneys that they might be sanctioned if they did not thereafter
timely comply with Rule 11). If the information that the plaintiff seeks is not relevant to
the motion, the court should proceed to rule. See FirstJersey Nat'l Bank v. Dome Petroleum, Ltd., 723 F.2d 335, 341 & n.4 (3d Cir. 1983); Exxon Corp. v. FTC, 663 F.2d 120,
126-29 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
315. See Weir v. Anaconda Co., 773 F.2d 1073, 1083 (10th Cir. 1985); 6 Moore's
Federal Practice, supra note 40, 56.24, at 56-1432.
316. Robin Constr. Co. v. United States, 345 F.2d 610, 614 (3d Cir. 1965); accord
Neely v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 584 F.2d 341, 344 (9th Cir. 1978) ("An opposing party's mere hope that further evidence may develop prior to trial is an insufficient
basis upon which to justify denial of the motion.").
317. 681 F.2d I l1 (2d Cir. 1982); see supra notes 196-207 and accompanying text.
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were not actionable3 1 8 and that Massey had complied with applicable
SEC requirements3 19 suggest this result. But the court's reliance on
"unchallenged" figures in Massey's reports to show that plaintiff was
wrong in claiming Massey's statements were false ignores the possibility that discovery might have enabled plaintiff to challenge these
figures.3 20 The possibility, however, need not cause the court to pause
unless there were some reasonable prospect that discovery would in
fact provide a basis for challenging the figures, and the plaintiff has the
burden of specifying why that is true. At some point the off chance that
incriminating evidence might surface through discovery is not enough
to shake the court's confidence that, as the Second Circuit held in the
dismissal posture in Decker, there is no legitimate claim against
defendants.
Contrast, however, Ross v. A.H. Robins Co.,321 in which the Second
Circuit rejected the plaintiff's allegations about defendants' awareness
of the risks of the Dalkon Shield. Shifted into the summary judgment
context, that case presents a situation in which a court could not reasonably conclude that the defendants were free of the alleged awareness without allowing some discovery. In fact, discovery is usually
necessary to give plaintiff access to controverting evidence on state of
mind issues.
The proper focus here, as with merits decisions on dismissal motions, 3 22 is on the level of confidence that the defendant has not violated the plaintiff's rights. A court may be more comfortable in
granting summary judgment for the defendant than in deciding dismissal motions in defendant's favor because summary judgment can be
granted, even if the plaintiff makes no showing in opposition, only
where the defendant has affirmatively demonstrated that there are no
disputed issues of fact. 323
Rule 56(f) requests, however, generally should be liberally
318. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
319. See id.
320. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
321. 607 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 946 (1980); see supra
notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
322. See supra notes 144-95 and accompanying text.
323. See, e.g., Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 160 (1970); First Nat'il
Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289 (1968). Thus, in Catrett v. Johns-Manville
Sales Corp., 756 F.2d 181 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
106 S. Ct. 342 (1985), the court reversed the grant of summary judgment to defendant
because defendant had made no showing in support of its motion even though it appeared that plaintiff (who had the burden of proof) had no admissible evidence to oppose the motion. Judge Bork dissented, arguing that summary judgment is permissible
where the plaintiff has no evidence. Id. at 187-91. It is possible the Supreme Court may
use this case as a vehicle for revising the rule on this issue. Cf. Fontenot v. Upjohn Co.,
780 F.2d 1190, 1197 (5th Cir. 1980) (rejecting decision of D.C. Circuit in Cairell).
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granted.3 2 4 Nonetheless, they need not raise the spectre of voluminous
discovery. To the contrary, Rule 56(f) contemplates only limited discovery, 3 25 and the plaintiff's showing under Rule 56(f) should focus
that discovery effort. Moreover, the court could authorize such discovery in stages, reviewing the results of one stage before deciding
whether to authorize another.3 26 Such scrutiny of discovery results is
well adapted to the emerging case management orientation of federal
judges; discovery can be directed toward critical issues and assessed as
it is completed to determine whether summary disposition of part or all
of the case is then possible.3 27 Although excessive limitations may generate unnecessary disputes about the scope of discovery,3 2 8 the court's
power to tailor the discovery to the needs of the case limits the litigation boom risks that apparently prompted courts to adopt stringent fact
pleading requirements in the first place.3 29 In cases like Decker, the de-

cision whether to allow any discovery may be extremely difficult, but if
the Rule 56(f) issue is framed in terms of confidence that the defendant
has not violated the plaintiff's rights, the court will at least be addressing the right basic problem.
Unfortunately, some courts seem instead to take the same approach as the new fact pleading cases and deny Rule 56(f) requests
because the plaintiff presently lacks evidence, even though the issue
seems to call for discovery. In Paul Kadair,Inc. v. Sony Corp.,330 for example, the Fifth Circuit recently upheld summary judgment that defendants had not conspired even though the trial court had unilaterally
stayed discovery before plaintiff had taken any. Plaintiff, a stereo retailer, sued forty-one manufacturers, distributors, and retailers of elec324. See, e.g., Patty Precision, Inc. v. Brown & Sharpe Mfg., 742 F.2d 1260, 1264
(10th Cir. 1984); 10A C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 3, § 2740, at 530-32.

325. See First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 265 (1968) ("comparatively limited discovery"); see also id. at 298 ("discovery obtainable under Rule 56(f)

...would normally be less extensive in scope").
326. For a discussion of such a process in a related context, see Durham &Dibble,
Certification: A Practical Device for Early Screening of Spurious Antitrust Litigation,

1978 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 299. In Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (1979), the Court
cited this article with apparent approval while observing that "[d]istrict courts must be

especially alert to identify frivolous claims brought to extort nuisance settlements
....

" Id. at 345.

Plaintiff's attorneys may have an incentive to screen discovery results in this fashion
by themselves. Professor Coffee suggests that they may lose interest in cases in which
limited discovery does not turn up a "smoking gun." See Coffee, supra note 136. To
the extent he is correct, the courts may feel less need to intervene in the process.

327. For a discussion of such control of discovery, see W. Schwarzer, Managing
Antitrust and Other Complex Litigation § 3-3, at 62-63 (1982). Limitations on discovery can cause problems of their own, however. See Shaklee Corp. v. Gunnell, 748 F.2d

548 (10th Cir. 1984) (limitations on discovery denied defendants due process when matters deemed irrelevant during discovery became relevant during trial).
328. See 10A C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 3, § 2740, at 541.
329. See supra notes 45-105 and accompanying text.
330. 694 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1983).
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tronic equipment, charging that they conspiratorially refused to deal
with plaintiff. A month after the complaint was filed, the trial court sua
sponte stayed all discovery pending a status conference in order to
"protect the plaintiff from a barrage of paper work." '3 3 1 The stay re332
mained in effect, subject to the right to request specified discovery.
After the trial court twice ordered plaintiff to amend its complaint to set
forth specific and detailed allegations as to each defendant, defendants
filed motions for summary judgment supported by affidavits denying
conspiratorial activity and specifying other reasons such as lack of
creditworthiness for refusing to deal with plaintiff. Plaintiff responded
with an affidavit seeking discovery pursuant to Rule 56(f), eventually
identifying fifteen individuals it wanted to depose, and specifying certain subjects it wished to cover in interrogatories. Emphasizing plaintiff's admission that it filed suit with limited evidence, 33 3 the trial court
found Rule 56(f) inapplicable because that Rule "is designed to enable
a party to seek particular facts relevant to an already-established factual
pattern of alleged antitrust activity."'3 34 Since plaintiff could not assure
the court that the proposed discovery would produce evidence sufficient to oppose defendants' motions, the court refused to allow it to
conduct a "fishing expedition, ' 3 3 5 and granted defendants' motions.
While troubled by indications that plaintiff's counsel had not undertaken discovery because he had been busy responding to defendants' motions, 33 6 the Fifth Circuit affirmed. It commended the trial
court's efforts to keep discovery under control,3 3 7 pointing out that
"the expensive and time consuming nature of antitrust litigation along
with the statutory treble damage remedy, may particularly inspire vexatious litigation, an evil which summary judgment may guard
against. '33 8 Noting that plaintiff failed to submit affidavits on matters
within its control, such as creditworthiness, and that its discovery requests "remained vague and peripheral to the key issue of conspiracy,"' 33 9 the appellate court found persuasive the views of the Second

Circuit that "[w]here a plaintiff fails to produce any specific facts whatsoever to support a conspiracy allegation, a district court may, in its
331. See Paul Kadair, Inc. v. Sony Corp., 88 F.R.D. 280, 284 (M.D. La. 1980), amd,
694 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1983).

332. The appellate court stated that the stay was not unequivocal about allowing
discovery. See 694 F.2d at 1031. But it appears that defendants' motions were filed

before the earliest time when the district court's stay order contemplated allowing any
discovery. See id.
333. 88 F.R.D. at 284, 285.

334. Id. at 289.
335. Id. The court explained that "the purpose of discovery ... would be to ascertain whatever information possible in order to set forth specific violations of the Act."
336. See 694 F.2d at 1023 n.12.
337. Id. at 1024 n.18.
338. Id. at 1031.
339. Id. at 1032.
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discretion, refuse to permit discovery and grant summary judgment." 340 Under the peculiar facts of Kadair, the court's refusal to permit plaintiff any discovery may have been justified because the
likelihood that plaintiff would turn up evidence of wrongdoing was so
slight. In general, however, the idea that plaintiffs should be required
to make an evidentiary showing to justify access to discovery raises
using pleadings practice to challenge
most of the same problems as
341
plaintiff's factual conclusions.
Precise or general rules for Rule 56(f) decisions cannot be fashioned; ultimately, courts will have to make sensible decisions on a caseby-case basis. In evaluating the scope of discovery that will be permitted, they are likely to consider many of the factors that have already
been rejected as justifications for heightened pleading standards. They
are also likely to encounter difficult problems in determining whether a
certain amount of discovery is enough. But confronting these difficulties is better, in an imperfect world, than pretending that the same issues can be resolved at the pleading stage. Some evidence is better
than none, and discretionary control of discovery (explicitly authorized
by the Rules) 34 2 is much less unsettling than discretion to dismiss. So

long as the basic focus is on whether the court can confidently conclude
that the defendant did not in fact violate the plaintiff's rights, sensible
judges should reach sensible results.
CONCLUSION

I fear that every age must learn its lesson that special pleading
cannot be made to do the service of trial and that live issues
between active litigants are not to be disposed of or evaded on
the paper pleadings ....
343
Charles E. Clark
This Article began by asking whether Clark's pessimism based on
340. Id. at 1030 (quoting Contemporary Mission, Inc. v. United States Postal Serv.,

648 F.2d 97, 107 (2d Cir. 1981)).
341. For a discussion of those problems, see supra notes 209-27 and accompanying

text. Where, after reasonable discovery, the plaintiff cannot persuasively challenge the
defendant's assertions, a court may comfortably decide against the plaintiff. See, e.g.,

Sames v. Gable, 732 F.2d 49 (3d Cir. 1984) (upholding summary judgment against
claims that plaintiffs were demoted for political reasons on basis of defendant's denials
of any such motivations in their depositions, in light of plaintiffs' failure to proffer any
other evidence).
Lest Kadairbe thought unique, see Wallace v. Brownell Pontiac-GMC Co., 703 F.2d
525 (11 th Cir. 1983) (defendants granted summary judgment before plaintiff had opportunity for discovery); Willmar Poultry Co. v. Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 520 F.2d 289
(8th Cir. 1975) (same), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 915 (1976). But cf. Sonenshein, supra
note 299, at 785 (summary judgment inappropriate when party opposing motion has

not had opportunity to complete discovery).
342. Note that the wording of Rule 56(f) is discretionary, see supra note 310. See
also supra note 62 and accompanying text.

343. Clark, supra note 71, at 46.
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Gresham's Law has been vindicated by the judicial handling of his
pleading reforms. Certainly Rule 8(a)(2) has not received the brutal
treatment the New York judges inflicted on the Field Code. 3 44 Further-

more, Conley v. Gibson effectively scotched any serious efforts to revert
to code pleading formalism. It is equally clear, however, that the new
fact pleading is more restrictive than Clark would have wanted. The
courts' efforts to puncture factual conclusions are inconsistent with the
spirit of the Rules, and the present handling of legal conclusions would
probably offend a reformer who originally wanted to do away with
pleading motions altogether.3 45 So Gresham's Law seems at least
partly at work, but the courts are not the only ones who have been its
instruments. Clark probably would have opposed some of the 1980
34 6
and 1983 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure;
whether as a result of Gresham's Law or other developments, time
seems to have tarnished his vision of the litigation system.
The obvious stimulus for the new fact pleading is the litigation
boom, and the fact pleading cases are therefore concentrated in the
areas that have experienced the greatest growth. The prospect that liberal pleading affords broad discovery to abusive litigants or lawyers is
undeniably distressing. But the circumstances do not actually seem so
urgent as portrayed by many. Rapid growth in the level of civil litigation is not unknown in English and American experience.3 4 7 Although
the public perception of the problem has been concentrated in the last
decade or two, judicial lobbying about protracted litigation goes back
nearly four decades. 3 48 Moreover, the frequency of abusive practices
by plaintiffs has not been shown to be high.A49 Indeed, some have gone

so far as to label the current preoccupation with the litigation boom
"an item of elite folklore."3 5 0 Under these circumstances, there seems
to be little reason for radical retrenching on the handling of pleadings,
even if that were a promising solution.
The real question is whether pleading practice can yield reliable
merits decisions. The prevalence of notice pleading jargon has obscured this question by forcing courts interested in disposing of cases
on the merits to couch their decisions in terms of demanding notice of
the basis of the claim. The pressures of the litigation boom could have
the desirable effect of ending this camouflage effort. This Article has
therefore suggested that the notice pleading rationale be abandoned.
Unless there is some prospect that it will lead to a merits decision of
344. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
345. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
346. Cf. F. James & G. Hazard, supra note 11, § 3.11, at 154-55 (characterizing
requirement under amended Rule I1 of statement of factual grounds for a claim as "a
move in the direction of code pleading").
347. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
348. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
349. Cf. supra note 140 and accompanying text (relating to class actions).
350. Galanter, supra note 46, at 64.
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pleading practice is little better
some or all of the claims or defenses,
35
than an expensive waste of time. '
Once the notice pleading chimera is banished, very difficult
problems remain. Under the Federal Rules, there is a systemic tendency to react to the risk of inaccurate decisions by adding procedural
layers intended to improve accuracy. Laudable in theory, this tendency
can deprive litigants of any decision on the merits;3 52 failure to dismiss
a weak case or grant summary judgment may be something of a default
in the judicial function. Sometimes a decision, even with some risk of
error, may be preferable to the drain of continued litigation. If the litigation boom causes the courts to come to grips with this responsibility,
that is also desirable.
The circumstances in which such merits decisions are possible on
the pleadings, however, are distressingly limited. This Article has
found that such situations fall generally into two categories, those in
which more detail will reveal a fatal defect and those in which sufficient
detail will show that the defendant has not violated the plaintiff's
rights. 3 53 As the recent experience under RICO demonstrates,3 5 4 it is
often difficult to identify elements of a claim that plaintiffs should be
forced to establish. Even more troubling is the risk that courts will indulge in weighing of evidence in the process of trying to decide on the
basis of the pleadings whether the defendant's conduct violated the
plaintiff's rights. Outside these limited areas, more stringent pleading
3 55
or
practices cannot be justified as appropriate for "suspicious" cases
6

35
as part of the trial court's discretion in handling litigation.
Instead, more flexible use of summary judgment, in tandem with
case management, seems the more promising course. 3 57 This approach reduces the disquieting possibility that a plaintiff will be unable
to satisfy the court's demand for proof of the defendant's misconduct
because he has been denied discovery. It is also comforting to have
merits decisions based on evidence rather than allegations. Moreover,
selective cost-shifting, coupled with active case management, should di-

351. See supra notes 113-21 and accompanying text.

352. Justice Rehnquist, for example, has remarked on the effect of the "seeming
compulsion to make sure that the final result reached in any case is the correct one."
Rehnquist, Speech at University of Florida Law School (Sept. 15, 1984) at 16 (unpublished) (on file at the offices of the Columbia Law Review). This compulsion has had an
effect on the design of the litigation system: "It is very much as if the government were
to announce a governmental monopoly on the production of cars, and then proceed to
produce only Cadillac limousines with jump seats." Id. at 14; see also Leubsdorf, Constitutional Civil Procedure, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 579, 589 (1984) ("Those who are not rich
often cannot afford litigation on the scale for which the system is designed.").

353. See supra notes 149-95 and accompanying text.
354. See supra notes 154-71 and accompanying text.
355. See supra notes 228-77 and accompanying text.
356. See supra notes 278-96 and accompanying text.

357. See supra notes 297-342 and accompanying text.
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minish some concerns about litigation abuse.3 5 8 This course is neither
easy nor foolproof, however. Case management is time-consuming and
vexing, and Rule 56(f) requests for postponements will often require
particularly difficult determinations about the utility of further discovery. Evaluating evidence in the summary judgment context is not easy,
but it should be more reliable than scrutinizing factual conclusions in
the pleadings. Thus, the suggestion is simply a better course, not a
panacea.
In the end, Clark's pessimism seems to reflect the cyclical nature of
procedural reform. For more than a century reform efforts in England
and America have followed a similar course, with simplifications breeding new complexities.3 5 9 To a large extent, these difficulties result
from shifting uncertainties about substantive law. They also result
from the fact that we have an adversarial system in which litigants and
lawyers try to use the procedures that exist to the advantage of their
clients. In the face of these pressures, the reality is that manipulation of
procedural mechanisms for settlement leverage will never be eliminated.3 60 As tinkerers, we will have to repeat the cycle of revision and
relapse again and again.
358. See supra notes 66, 143 and accompanying text.

359. The English Judicature Acts of 1875 represented a watershed similar to the
adoption of the Federal Rules. Like the Federal Rules, the Act was designed to simplify
litigation, shelve formalism, expand discovery, and assure decisions on the merits.
Within 10 years, excessive litigation, particularly excessive discovery, had run up the
cost of litigation so much that it was said the reforms seemed to be defeating their own
ends. See Rosenbaum, Studies in English Procedure, 63 U. Pa. L. Rev. 273, 289-91
(1915). Among the remedies proposed for this situation were elimination of pleadings,
id. at 295, 382, and requiring closer supervision of discovery by masters, id. at 386.
360. Cf. Weinstein, Some Reflections on the "Abusiveness" of Class Actions, 58
F.R.D. 299, 302 (1973) ("As in any litigation, the pressure on the defendant to buy his

peace through settlement cannot be totally eliminated.").
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THE REVIVAL OF FACT PLEADING UNDER THE
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
Richard L. Marcus*
Unfortunately by a kind of Gresham's Law, the bad, or harsh,
procedural decisions drive out the good, so that in time a rule
becomes entirely obscured by its interpretive barnacles.
Charles E. Clark'
As Dean of Yale Law School and reporter of the committee that
drafted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Charles Clark2 was the
principal architect of the Rules and leading proponent of the liberal
ethos that underlies them. His pessimism about procedural reform
therefore deserves attention. This Article examines the fate of the centerpiece of Clark's new system-simplified pleading under Rule 8(a)(2),
which requires only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief." This Rule was designed to escape the complexities of fact pleading under the codes, which had generated great confusion about how to allege the required "ultimate
facts" while avoiding forbidden "conclusions" and "mere evidence."
There were pockets of resistance against the new pleading rules in the
years after 1938, 4 but in 1957 the Supreme Court threw its weight decisively behind the new liberal ethos in Conley v. Gibson:5 "[A] complaint
should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears
* Professor of Law, University of Illinois. B.A. 1969, Pomona; J.D. 1972, University of California, Berkeley. I received numerous helpful suggestions from the partici-

pants in an Illinois Faculty Workshop that discussed some of these ideas. In addition, I
am indebted to United States District Judge Milton Shadur (N.D. Ill.) and Jan Vetter,

who reviewed earlier drafts of this Article and made numerous helpful comments, and to
Ed Wilhoite who provided valuable research assistance. All errors that remain are mine

alone.
1. Clark, Special Problems in Drafting and Interpreting Procedural Codes and
Rules, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 493, 498 (1950).

2. Charles Clark graduated from Yale Law School in 1913, and began to teach there
in 1919. From 1929 to 1939 he was Dean. In 1939, he was appointed a judge of the
Second Circuit, of which he served as Chief Judge from 1954 to 1959. From 1935 to

1956 he served as Reporter of the Supreme Court's Committee on the Rules of Civil
Procedure, which drafted the rules. See 4 Who Was Who in America 174 (1968).
3. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); see also 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice & Pro-

cedure § 1202, at 59 (1969) ("Rule 8 is the keystone of the system of pleading embodied
in the federal rules."); Smith, Judge Charles E. Clark and The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 85 Yale L.J. 914, 917-18 (1976) (general pleading was one of Clark's three

basic goals for new procedural rules).
4. See infra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
5. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
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beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of
his claim that would entitle him to relief."6 Clark could hardly have put
it more forcefully himself.
Although Conley v. Gibson put the Supreme Court on record as
clearly favoring the liberal view, the actual application of its admonition
in subsequent cases was more problematic. Taken literally, it might
have precluded dismissal in any case where the plaintiff invoked a valid
legal theory. How can a court ever be certain that a plaintiff will prove
no set of facts entitling him to relief? The case itself provided little
help. Plaintiffs were black union members who accused their union of
racial discrimination. Defendants argued that the complaint failed to
state a claim because it lacked particulars about their allegedly discriminatory activities. The lower courts did not accept that argument, 7 and
the Supreme Court rejected it with the broad statement quoted above.
But the complaint did contain particulars, and the case could have been
decided without such sweeping language. 8 The Court's broad language was intended for other cases, not this one. Pleadings were intended only to give general notice, it seemed, and pleading practice
was to shrivel and die.
One seeming impact of Conley v. Gibson was that commentators lost
interest in pleading. For years before and after the adoption of the
Federal Rules in 1938, pleading had been the subject of intense academic discussion.9 After the decision, this discussion stopped abruptly.
Perhaps that was because some viewed the battle about detailed pleadings as irretrievably over,' 0 or because they understood that Conley authorized a "fishing expedition" to determine whether plaintiff actually
had a claim." Whatever the reason, for more than twenty years after
Conley, there was virtually no academic recognition that pleading practice had not vanished; defendants continued to make motions to dismiss and courts continued to grant them. Only recently have
commentators begun to acknowledge this reality. 12
6. Id. at 45-46 (citations omitted).
7. The lower courts had dismissed on the ground that the claim was subject to the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Railroad Adjustment Board. The Supreme Court rejected
that argument. See id. at 43-44.
8. Plaintiffs alleged, for example, that the defendant union maintained two separate
locals, one for whites and the other for blacks, providing inferior representation to the
black local, see Complaint
VI, VII, Transcript of Record at 8-11, Conley, and that in
May, 1954, with the connivance of the union, the railroad had fired 45 blacks and replaced them with whites, see Complaint
VIII, X, Transcript of Record at 11-13.
9. For a collection of such authorities, see Weinstein & Distler, Drafting Pleading
Rules, 57 Colum. L. Rev. 518, 524-25 (1957).
10. See, e.g., Friedenthal, A Divided Supreme Court Adopts Discovery Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 69 Calif. L. Rev. 806, 816 (1981) ("Once
it became clear that the battle for a return to the code formulation was irretrievably lost,
other devices were utilized to raise the same issue in different contexts.").
I1. F.James & G. Hazard, Civil Procedure § 3.11, at 153-54 (3d ed. 1985).
12. This commentary tends to focus on narrow problems rather than the more gen-
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Not only has pleading practice survived, but fact pleading, the bate
noir of the codes, seems to be enjoying a revival in a number of areas in
which courts refuse to accept "conclusory" allegations as sufficient
under the Federal Rules. Consider, for example, Heart Disease Research
Foundation v. General Motors Corp.,13 which the Guinness Book of World
Records listed as the suit with the largest damage claim in the history of
litigation, $375 trillion. 14 Plaintiff sued on behalf of a class of 125"million American urban dwellers alleging that the defendant Big Four
automakers had conspired in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act to
restrain the development of automobile air pollution mechanisms,
thereby polluting the atmosphere of North America. The Second Circuit affirmed the trial court's dismissal for failure to state a claim' 5 because "it was well within the district court's discretion to dismiss the
claim since no facts are alleged supporting an antitrust conspiracy.
Although the Federal Rules permit statement of ultimate facts, a bare
bones statement of conspiracy or of injury under the antitrust laws
without any supporting facts permits dismissal."' 6 This attitude appears worlds away from the approach articulated in Conley. The result
becomes more remarkable when one considers that the United States
had also sued the Big Four alleging the same conspiracy, and ultimately
obtained a consent decree in that litigation for "essentially all" the relief it had sought.' 7 The dismissal upheld by the Second Circuit was
certainly correct on other grounds,' 8 but it illustrates that Conley is not
eral question of the role of pleadings in the modem litigation system. See, e.g., Roberts,
Fact Pleading, Notice Pleading, and Standing, 65 Cornell L. Rev. 390, 399-400, 415
(1980); Saveri & Saved, Pleading Fraudulent Concealment in an Antitrust Price Fixing
Case: Rule 9(b) v. Rule 8, 17 U.S.F.L. Rev. 631, 639-40 (1983); Sovern, Reconsidering
Federal Civil Rule 9(b): Do We Need Particularized Pleading Requirements in Fraud
Cases?, 104 F.R.D. 143, 150 (1985); Wingate, A Special Pleading Rule for Civil Rights
Complaints: A Step Forward or a Step Back?, 49 Mo. L. Rev. 677, 680-83 (1984); Note,
Pleading Securties Fraud Claims With Particularity Under Rule 9(b), 97 Harv. L. Rev.
1432 (1984).
13. 463 F.2d 98 (2d Cir. 1972).
14. N. McWhirter & R. McWhirter, Guinness Book of World Records 387 (12th ed.
1973). The case has since been eclipsed by more ambitious litigation. See Windsor v.
Pan American Airways, 744 F.2d 1187 (5th Cir. 1984) (suit for $400 trillion).
15. The district court had relied in the alternative on Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. See Heart
Disease Research Found. v. General Motors Corp., 15 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan)
1517, 1519 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). The Second Circuit chose not to rely on that ground. See
463 F.2d at 100.
16. 463 F.2d at 100.
17. This litigation was filed, along with the massive antitrust suit against I.B.M., in
the last days of the Johnson Administration. See R. Harris, Justice 128 (1970). The
government suit charged a conspiracy beginning at least as early as 1953 to retard competition in the development of air pollution control equipment. After negotiations, the
government and the automakers agreed to a consent judgment in October, 1969, which
"granted essentially all of the relief which the government had sought." United States v.
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n, 643 F.2d 644, 645 (9th Cir. 1981).
18. As a nonprofit foundation, the plaintiff had no standing to sue for damages
under the antitrust laws. Cf. In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution, 481 F.2d 122 (9th
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taken literally. This case, moreover, is not an anomaly. Although they
rarely acknowledge the shift,' 9 federal courts are insisting on detailed
factual allegations more and more often, particularly in securities fraud
20
and civil rights cases.
Does the revival of fact pleading show that Clark was right to expect the courts to undermine his liberal reforms with restrictive barnacles? Using this question as a starting point for an analysis of the
proper role of pleadings under the Federal Rules, this Article concludes that reality is more complicated. The new fact pleading is an
effort to cope with the pressures of the litigation boom, itself caused in
part by the innovations of the Federal Rules. Contrary to the conventional wisdom that the sole purpose of pleadings is to give notice, this
Article suggests that their role should be to enable courts to decide
cases on their merits. The important question then is how pleading
rules can be used to accomplish that purpose. Unfortunately, operating in the shadow of Conley v. Gibson and caught up in the vocabulary of
notice pleading, the courts have not given that question much
attention.
This Article finds that the answer is to look for cases in which the
plaintiff's legal conclusions can be profitably evaluated. It identifies
two broad categories of such cases-those in which more specificity is
likely to disclose a fatal defect in a plaintiff's case, and those in which
sufficient detail will enable the court to make a reliable determination
that the defendant did not violate the plaintiff's rights. Used in this
fashion, pleading practice is an important tool, but not a panacea. In
other kinds of cases, whether purportedly justified as providing "notice" or otherwise, pleading motions are largely a waste of time.
The new fact pleading does not stop with these two kinds of cases,
however. Courts now regularly use it, as in Heart Disease Research Foundation, to probe and reject plaintiff's factual conclusions. Although this
practice is understandable in view of the breadth of modern discovery
and the limits on summary judgment, it does not provide a reliable
method for determining whether a defendant has violated the plaintiff's rights because it requires the plaintiff to marshall evidence before
conducting discovery. Neither can it be justified as a special way of
handling certain "suspicious" claims or as a step toward discretionary
dismissals. Instead, the preferable route for probing plaintiff's factual
conclusions should be to rely on more flexible use of summary judgment. Under this approach, the principal focus would often be on the
Cir.) (holding that state governments and crop farmers lacked standing to seek damages
in litigation over same conspiracy), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973).
19. See Roberts, supra note 12, at 420 ("What is most noteworthy about this slow
erosion of federal notice pleading ... is the utter silence in which the process is taking
place."). For a review of the new fact pleading cases, see infra notes 84-104 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 84-101 and accompanying text.
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amount of discovery to be allowed a plaintiff under Rule 56(f) before
ruling on summary judgment, thereby controlling the risk of abuse of
discovery. Such flexible use of summary judgment would be particularly effective if done in conjuction with more active case management
by judges. Combined with selective cost-shifting in cases of proven litigation abuse, this evidentiary scrutiny would provide a better system
for pretrial disposition.
I.

THE EVOLUTION AND CORRUPTION OF SIMPLIFIED PLEADING

A. The Sins of the Past
In pleading, they studiously avoid entering into the Merits of
the Cause; but are loud, violent and tedious in dwelling upon
Circumstances which are not to the Purpose.
21
Jonathan Swift

Common law pleading, which was originally oral, evolved over centuries into an increasingly detailed written exercise. During the same
period, the forms of action were developing, and their limitations reinforced pleading difficulties. In order to prevail, the common law plaintiff had to choose the correct form of action. He and his lawyer then
embarked on an exchange of pleadings with the defendant that was
designed ultimately to produce a single issue for resolution by a judge
or trial by a jury, 22 with
trial itself as something of an afterthought to
23
the pleading process.
Whatever the wisdom of the common law approach as an abstract
system, it proved extremely susceptible to Gresham's Law. Over time,
it became necessary to use highly stylized verbal formulations to present even simple grievances. These expressions-known as "color"24
often had little relation to the underlying facts of the particular case.
They certainly told the defendant little or nothing about the plaintiff's
claims, and the defendant would remain in the dark until trial because
discovery was limited or nonexistent. Nevertheless, the defendant
could take comfort in the prospect that the plaintiff could ultimately
lose because his lawyer bungled the pleading war. As pleading practice
25
prospered, decisions on the merits became increasingly infrequent.
21. J. Swift, Gulliver's Travels 352-53 (H. Williams ed. 1926) (1st ed. London
1726).

22. For a description of this ritual, see A. Harding, The Law Courts of Medieval

England 78-79 (1973).
23. R. Palmer, The County Courts of Medieval England 90 (1982); see also A. Harding, supra note 22, at 78 ("Cases were often decided by the pleading-contest rather
than by jury or the other methods of trial.") (citation omitted).
24. On the growth of legal fictions, see Sutherland, Legal Reasoning in the Fourteenth Century: The Invention of "Color" in Pleading, in On the Laws and Customs of
England, Essays in Honor of Samuel Thorne 182 (M. Arnold, T. Green, S. Scully & S.
White eds. 1981).
25. See F. James & G. Hazard, supra note 11, § 3.2, at 132.
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Popular dissatisfaction with this situation in England led, in the
late nineteenth century, to abandonment of the forms of action and
simplification of pleading. 26 A movement for similar reforms in this
country was spearheaded by David Dudley Field, the drafter of the New
York code adopted in 1848. While one may question whether Ameri27
can judges were really so formalistic as the reformers suggested, it
was clear that the Field Code reforms were intended to eliminate decisions based on technicalities. In place of stylized verbiage, the Code
directed that the complaint contain "[a] statement of the facts constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language, without repea person of common
tition, and in such a manner as to enable
28
understanding to know what is intended."
The high hopes for the Field Code were not realized. In part, one
may attribute this failure to judicial sabotage. 2 9 No doubt the Code's
fate was what Clark had in mind when he spoke of Gresham's Law. But
there were real problems with the codifier's reformulation of pleading
rules in that they invited unresolvable disputes about whether certain

assertions were allegations of ultimate fact (proper), mere evidence
(improper), or conclusions (improper).3 In particular, there was great
difficulty distinguishing ultimate facts from conclusions since so many
concepts, like agreement, ownership and execution, contain a mixture

of historical fact and legal conclusion. Pleading decisions caused increasing difficulty for even the most common claims. For example, the

detail needed to allege negligence was regularly recalibrated.31 Such
fencing among lawyers led to stagnation that interfered with resolution
of disputes on their merits.

26. See generally 15 W. Holdsworth, A History of English Law 128-32 (A.
Goodhard & H. Hanbury ed. 1965) (describing theJudicature Act of 1873, which simplified pleading in England).
27. Indeed, the Field Code itself may be viewed as an example of 19th century
formalism. See M. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law 265-66 (1977).
28. An Act to simplify and abridge the Practice, Pleadings and Proceedings of the
Courts of this State, ch. 379, § 120(2), 1848 N.Y. Laws 521.
29. See McArthur v. Moffet, 143 Wis. 564, 567, 128 N.W. 445, 446 (1910) (referring to "[t]he cold, not to say inhuman, treatment which the infant Code received from
the New York judges").
30. See Cook, Statements of Fact in Pleading Under the Codes, 21 Colum. L,Rev.
416,417 (1921), for an argument that these distinctions are ultimately meaningless. But
cf. McCaskill, Actions and Causes of Action, 34 Yale LJ. 614, 620 (1925) (arguing that
cause of action concept must be retained because pleadings will otherwise be "half
baked and undigestible").
31. See, e.g., Gillispie v. Goodyear Serv. Stores, 258 N.C. 487,490, 128 S.E.2d 762,
765 (1963) (" '[Nlegligence is not a fact in itself, but is the legal result of certain
facts.' ") (quoting Shives v. Sample, 238 N.C. 724, 726, 79 S.E.2d 193, 195 (1953)); cf.
C. Clark, Handbook of the Law of Code Pleading § 47, at 300-03 (2d ed. 1947) (noting
that requirements for pleading negligence under code pleading were actually more demanding than under common law).

HeinOnline -- 86 Colum. L. Rev. 438 1986

19861

FACT PLEADING

B. The Federal Rules: The Liberal Ethos Triumphant
Ancestor worship in the form of ritualistic pleadings has no
more disciples. The time when the slip of a sergeant's quill
pen could spell death for a plaintiff's cause of action is past.
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint is not
an anagrammatic exercise in which the pleader must find just
exactly the prescribed combination of words and phrases.
32
Judge John Minor Wisdom

Sobered by the fate of the Field Code, Dean Clark and the other
drafters of the Federal Rules set out to devise a procedural system that
would install what may be labelled the "liberal ethos," in which the
preferred disposition is on the merits, by jury trial, after full disclosure
through discovery.3 3 At first, Clark favored eliminating pleading motions altogether.3 4 Ultimately other voices held sway, but Rule 8(a)(2)
was drafted carefully to avoid use of the charged phrases "fact," "conclusion," and "cause of action." To make the point clearer, the drafters
prepared a series of form complaints that were by definition sufficient
to satisfy the new standard.3 5 These forms were startlingly brief. For
example, Form 9 preempted decades of pleading litigation by declaring
sufficient the allegation that "defendant negligently drove a motor vehicle against plaintiff."'3 6 No longer would the objection that negligence was a legal conclusion hold sway.
Clark did not expect that most complaints would be as abbreviated
as the form complaints, and he hoped that most pleaders would continue to do their pleading carefully.3 7 Nonetheless, he had little pa32. Thompson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 476 F.2d 746, 749 (5th Cir. 1973).
33. See Clark, The Handmaid ofJustice, 23 Wash. U.L.Q. 297, 318-19 (1938) (denouncing attempts to resolve cases on pleadings and asserting that "in the case of a real
dispute, there is no substitute anywhere for a trial"); see also infra text accompanying
note 343.
This is not to say that all the framers of the rules were enthusiastic about jury trial.
To the contrary, some have characterized the attitude of the rules' framers as mistrusting juries and preferring resolutions by judges (presumably on summary judgment).
See 21 C. Wright & K. Graham, Federal Practice & Procedure, § 5025, at 146-51 (1977)
(describing "Progressive Procedural Paradigm"). But their hopes for summary judgment were not vindicated by subsequent events, which made summary judgment difficult
to obtain. See infra notes 297-303 and accompanying text; cf. Clark, supra, at 318 (summary judgment "is adapted only for rather simple issues where the facts are on the surface"). Instead, under the influence of Conley v. Gibson, the customary decision-making
method became jury trial, as was desired by Conley's authorJustice Black. See Kaufman,
The Federal Civil Rules and the Pursuit of Justice, in Hugo Black and the Supreme
Court; A Symposium 221, 224-25 (S.Strickland ed. 1967) (Black was the most vigorous
champion ofjury trial in Supreme Court history.).
34. Smith, supra note 3, at 927-28.
35. Fed. R. Civ. P. 84 declares that "[t]he forms contained in the Appendix of
Forms are sufficient under the rules and are intended to indicate the simplicity and brcvity of statement which the rules contemplate."
36. Form 9, Appendix of Forms, Fed. R. Civ. P.
37. See C. Clark, supra note 31, § 39, at 245.
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tience with the use of a "mere formal motion" 3 8 to challenge the
sufficiency of the pleadings because it "really decides nothing of substance." 3 9 Clark's proteg6, Professor Moore, emphasized in his treatise
that pleadings need "do little more than indicate generally the type of
litigation that is involved."'40 Rather than dwell on pleading niceties,
under the new system litigants were to use the expanded discovery
mechanisms provided by the Federal Rules to get to the merits of the
case. Armed with that information, they could in appropriate cases
move for summary judgment, allowing the court to decide the merits.
Normally, however, the proper method for resolving them was trial by
41

jury.

The liberality of the pleading requirements is reflected throughout
the Federal Rules. Thus, amendment of pleadings is freely granted,
even after trial, 42 and the court is admonished in any event to grant the
parties whatever relief they are entitled to after trial, whether they have
requested it or not.4 3 By the time Conley v. Gibson was decided, the

stage seemed set for assuring litigants decisions on the merits.
C. The Sins of the Present. The Catharsis of the Liberal Ethos
The history of procedure is a series of attempts to solve the
problems created by the preceding generation's procedural
reforms.
Professor Judith Resnik 4 4
Whatever their internal symmetry, the Federal Rules contributed
to a number of developments that have dismayed a considerable portion of the federal judiciary. Much ink has already been spilled on the
litigation "boom" and the crisis in the adversary system, 45 but dramatic
increases in litigation are hardly unprecedented. 46 The reader none38. Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774, 775 (2d Cir. 1944); cf. Gottreich v. San
Francisco Inv. Corp., 552 F.2d 866, 867 (9th Cir. 1977) ("We had thought that this kind
of nit-picking had disappeared in 1938 .... ").
39. Proceedings of the Institute at Washington, D.C. and of the Symposium at New
York City 54 (1938). These proceedings were held to publicize the new federal rules.
40. 2AJ. Moore &J. Lucas, Moore's Federal Practice 8.03, at 8-10 (2d ed. 1985)
[hereinafter cited as Moore's Federal Practice]; see Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495,
501 (1947) ("The new rules, however, restrict the pleadings to the task of general notice-giving .. ").
41. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
42. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(b) (amendment to be allowed unless the objecting party
shows prejudice).
43. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(c).
44. Resnik, Tiers, 57 S.Cal. L. Rev. 837, 1030 (1984).
45. See, e.g., R. Marcus & E. Sherman, Complex Litigation: Cases and Materials on
Advanced Civil Procedure 1-22 (1985).
46. One researcher has found the conditions of 1946 to 1980 in the federal courts
similar to those in 1876, when civil cases were more important than criminal. See Clark,
Adjudication to Administration: A Statistical Analysis of Federal District Courts in the
Twentieth Century, 55 S.Cal. L. Rev. 65, 123 (1981); see also id. at 99-105 (noting
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theless intuits that the existing pressures on the federal judicial system
arose, somewhat unexpectedly, within the last twenty years. Things
were not actually so tranquil during the Federal Rules' first quarter century, however. Ten years after the Rules were adopted, concern about
protracted litigation caused the Judicial Conference of the United
States to appoint a committee headed by Judge E. Barrett Prettyman to
examine the peculiar problems caused by such litigation. 4 7 In 1955,
ChiefJustice Warren commissioned a special panel of federal judges to
study the handling of complicated cases, 48 a process leading ultimately
to the promulgation of the Manualfor Complex Litigation. So the pressures of managing litigation were sensed soon after the Federal Rules
came into effect. Undeniably, however, these concerns did escalate
with the rapid rise in federal court filings during the 1960s and 1970s.
Peering out from behind this mountain of litigation, federal judges
also perceived a pro-plaintiff shift in the balance of power in litigation
resulting largely from the breadth of discovery, which could impose
very substantial costs on defendants. 4 9 Moreover, at least some courts
said that once the plaintiff had obtained information through discovery
he could do anything he wanted with it; discovery could even become
the principal objective of a lawsuit, rather than merely a device for helping resolve it.5° Other procedural innovations, particularly the 1966
amendment of Rule 23 on class actions, seemed to load the dice in
burst of growth in civil filings between 1900 and 1907). England experienced a litigation boom in the 16th and 17th centuries. See Brooks, Litigants and Attorneys in the
King's Bench and Common Pleas, 1560-1640, in Legal Records and the Historian 41 (1.
Baker ed. 1978). Nor is the duration and magnitude of the current "boom" undisputed.
See Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know
(And Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31
UCLA L. Rev. 4, 9 (1983) (In 1960, there was concern about a decline in litigation.).
47. The committee's report, entitled Procedure in Anti-trust and Other Protracted
Cases, appears at 13 F.R.D. 62 (1951). The report anticipates much of the debate that
would develop over the following three decades. Consider the following: "Pleadings
will not serve to particularize issues sufficiently in these cases, and motions for particulars will not serve that purpose. Such particularization must be achieved by informal
conferences between judge and counsel well in advance of a possible trial date." Id. at
67. This approach was ultimately adopted by the 1983 amendments to the Federal
Rules. See infra note 61 and accompanying text.
48. The panel's proposal, entitled Handbook of Recommended Procedures for the
Trial of Protracted Cases, appears at 25 F.R.D. 351 (1960).
49. See, e.g., In re Commonwealth Oil/Tesoro Petroleum Corp. Sec. Litig., 467 F.
Supp. 227, 250 (W.D. Tex. 1979) ("unchecked access to the in ten'orem power of the
federal discovery mechanism"). Such arguments echo the debate about pleading specificity during the 1950s. See infra notes 69-71 and accompanying text; New Dyckman
Theatre Corp. v. Radio-Keith-Orpheum Corp., 16 F.R.D. 203, 206 (S.D.N.Y. 1954)
(Vague pleading becomes "a springboard ... into an almost bottomless sea" of discovery in an antitrust case.).
50. See Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 258 (7th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976); accord, In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 187 (D.C. Cir.
1979). For a criticism of this view, see Marcus, Myth and Reality in Protective Order
Litigation, 69 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 29-41 (1983).
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favor of plaintiffs by greatly increasing the stakes and actually impeding
disposition on the merits. 5 1 Together with pro-plaintiff substantive
changes, 52 themselves fueled by successful discovery forays,5 3 the
Rules' procedural innovations appeared to some to leave defendants

little meaningful opportunity to prove their innocence on the merits.

54

The result of this synergy was a litigation industry55 in which the value
51. Milton Handler, for example, charged that the amended Rule 23 "utilizes the
threat of unmanageable and expensive litigation to compel settlement ... it is a form of
legalized blackmail." Handler, The Shift from Substantive to Procedural Innovations in
Antitrust Suits-The Twenty-third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 9
(1971). For a time, there was considerable reason to take this view. By relaxing requirements for rule 23(b)(3) class actions for damages, the 1966 amendments certainly increased the stakes of litigation, and an action arguably was a class action from the date it
was filed. Meanwhile, Eisen v. Carlisle &Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974), could be read
to forbid consideration of the merits until the court had decided whether to certify a
class, a process that could take months or years. But cf. Berry, Ending Substance's Indenture to Procedure: The Imperative for Comprehensive Revision of the Class Damage Action, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 299, 314 (1980) ("Despite [Eisen,] there is pervasive
sentiment [among judges and lawyers] favoring some sort of preliminary hearing on the
merits."). It should be noted that strictures on precertification merits decisions have
been relaxed. See, e.g., Wright v. Schock, 742 F.2d 541 (9th Cir. 1984) (upholding
precertification grant of defendant's motion for summary judgment). But class certification is still thought to give plaintiffs a bargaining edge in settlement negotiations. See
Note, Certifying Classes and Subclasses in Title VII Suits, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 619, 626-27
(1986).
52. Examples abound. Bad faith tort claims caused a variety of contract and other
commercial disputes to take on new aspects. See, e.g., W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton
& D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts 11 (5th ed. 1984) (growth in punitive damages claims for bad faith by insurance companies) [hereinafter cited as Prosser
& Keeton]; Farber, Reassessing the Economic Efficiency of Compensatory Damages for
Breach of Contract, 66 Va. L. Rev. 1443, 1468-77 (1980) (arguing for supercompensatory damages in certain situations); Galane, Proving Punitive Damages in Business
Tort Litigation, 2 Litig., Spring 1976, at 24, 24 (listing eight business torts in which
punitive damages are available). Both compensatory and punitive awards have skyrocketed. See Friedman, The Six Million Dollar Man: Litigation and Rights Consciousness
in Modem America, 39 Md. L Rev. 661, 664-65 (1980).
53. See Friedenthal, supra note 10, at 818-19 & n.59 (discovery serves to stimulate
growth of substantive remedies).
54. See, e.g., infra notes 58-60, 134 and accompanying text. This view is not universal. To the contrary, empirical investigation suggests that the current preoccupation
with the litigation "boom" may be an overreaction. See Galanter, supra note 46, at
61-69. Nevertheless, courts have seen a number of suits that seemed to have no value
except as vexation or recreation. See, e.g., Hailes v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 729
F.2d 1037, 1037 (5th Cir. 1984) (employment discrimination claim "the product of a
project to obtain a lawsuit-not a secretarial position"); Beachboard v. United States,
727 F.2d 1092, 1095 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ("The unescapable conclusion is that Beachboard
is engaged on this appeal in 'recreational' litigation, misusing precious and limited resources better spent on meritorious claims of his fellow citizens .... "); Norman v.
Reagan, 95 F.R.D. 476, 477 (D. Or. 1982) ("It is possible, of course, that this is not
intended as a claim at all, but as a literary artifact.").
55. Cf. In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 98 F.R.D. 48, 72 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (quoting a
letter from counsel for plaintiff class referring to "plaintiffs' antitrust industry"), rev'd in
part, 751 F.2d 562 (3d Cir. 1984).
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of litigation appeared only slightly connected to the merits of claims
being asserted-a "gigantic slot machine" approach to litigation 56 in
a defendant overshadowed the merits of the
which the status of 5being
7
dispute.
underlying
The Supreme Court increasingly has voiced concern about abuse
of the litigation process by plaintiffs with groundless claims. In 1975,
for example, in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,58 the Court restricted standing to sue for securities fraud because "the liberal discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure" give plaintiff
"an in terrorem increment of the settlement value," 5 9 so that "even a
complaint which by objective standards may have very little chance of
success at trial has a settlement value to the plaintiff out of any proportion to its prospect of success at trial so long as he may prevent the suit
60
from being resolved against him by dismissal or summary judgment.
The same concerns led to pressures to change the Federal Rules
56. Friedenthal, supra note 10, at 818 (referring to "plaintiffs who sometimes treat
the judicial system as if it were a gigantic slot machine").
57. Symptomatic of this trend is the suggestion that the settlement value of meritless litigation is protected by the Sherman Antitrust Act against "conspiracy" by the
defendants not to settle. In Lemelson v. United States, 3 Ct. Cl. 161 (1983), aff'd in
part, vacated in part, 752 F.2d 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1985), for example, plaintiff sued the
United States and two third party defendants for violating plaintiff's patent. After settlement negotiations were unsuccessful, the infringement case went to trial and defendants
won. Id. By that time, however, plaintiff had sued the defendants again, alleging that
they had violated the antitrust laws by agreeing not to settle the infringement case separately in order to present a common front. See Lemelson v. Bendix Corp., 104 F.R.D.
13 (D. Del. 1984) (discovery motion in same case). The partial vacation and remand of
the decision in the infringement case, see Lemelson v. United States, 752 F.2d 1538
(Fed. Cir. 1985), may make the antitrust case seem less extraordinary, but plaintiff's
claim was not premised on that. Instead, his premise was that the Sherman Act protected his opportunity to parlay his invalid patent claim into the best possible settlement
by playing the defendants off against one another. Eventually, after three years of litigation, the court granted summary judgment to defendants in the antitrust case on the
ground plaintiff had insufficient evidence of an illegal conspiracy. See Lemelson v. Bendix Corp., 621 F. Supp. 1122 (D. Del. 1985).
In other contexts, the litigation value of an invalid claim has also been given protection. Thus, in Aloy v. Mash, 38 Cal. 3d 413, 696 P.2d 656, 212 Cal. Rptr. 162 (1985),
the court held that failure to assert a claim which was shown by later decisions to be
invalid could nonetheless be actionable malpractice. The defendant lawyer had represented plaintiff in her divorce in 1971 and had not then asserted a claim that the husband's military pension was community property. In 1981, the United States Supreme
Court decided that states could not award interests in such pensions as community
property, so the claim would not have been meritorious. But the California court was
unmoved by this fact, reasoning that given the uncertainty of the pre-1981 law, the
claim, though now known to be meritless, could then have had litigation value, so that
the lawyer could be liable for failure to assert it.
58. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
59. Id. at 741.
60. Id. at 740; see also Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 345 (1979) (Courts
"must be especially alert to identify frivolous claims brought to extort nuisance
settlements.").
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themselves. After extensive debate, the Rules were amended in 1980
and 1983 to promote active case management through pretrial conferences that could "formulate issues" and eliminate "frivolous claims and
defenses" and control the conduct and content of discovery. 6' No
longer does Rule 26(a) invite unlimited discovery; the judge is now explicitly authorized to limit discovery that is duplicative or "unduly burdensome or expensive" to protect the parties' right to a reasonably
economical decision on the merits. 62 The amended Rules also place
greater emphasis on the duty of lawyers to avoid abuse of litigation by
requiring an attorney to investigate both the legal and factual basis of a
claim before filing suit, and by promoting increased use of sanctions for
violation of various rules. 63 Courts have begun using sanctions energetically, perhaps too energetically, 64 to punish those who bring or
maintain groundless suits, 65 an effort that may deter some groundless

litigation. 66 The recent amendments do not, however, abandon the
premise that lawsuits should be decided on their merits rather than
technicalities.
D. The Revival of Fact Pleading
Oh, you might say, we have motions to dismiss-rule 12(b)(6),
the vaunted motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. It is a wonderful tool on paper,
but have you ever looked at the batting average of rule
61. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(1), 26(b), (0. For a review of the 1983 amendments, see
Marcus, Reducing Court Costs and Delay: The Potential Impact of the Proposed
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 66 Judicature 363 (1983). See
generally Elliott, Mangerial Judging and the Evolution of Procedure, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev,
(forthcoming 1986) (managerial judging as an ad hoc method for narrowing issues). For
an example of the emphasis on this approach, see United Food & Commercial Workers
v. Armour & Co., 106 F.R.D. 345, 349 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (endorsing telephone conference to establish baselessness of complaint); cf. Portsmouth Square, Inc. v. Shareholders
Protective Comm., 770 F.2d 866, 869 (9th Cir. 1985) (sua sponte grant of summary
judgment at final pretrial conference).
62. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
63. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, 16(0, 2 6(g); Marcus, supra note 61, at 369-70.
64. Cf. Curtin, Chairman's Comer, 10 Litig. News, Winter 1985, at 2 (reporting
views of Professor Arthur Miller that, with respect to sanctions, "the pendulum might
swing too far in the other direction" because "judges might impose too many sanctions
rather than too few."). In his annual report to the judiciary, however, ChiefJustice Burger urged more frequent use of sanctions. Burger Says Vacancies Add to Judicial Deficit, N.Y. Times, Dec. 30, 1985, at 12, col. 1.
65. See, e.g., Olympia Co. v. Celotex Corp., 771 F.2d 888, 892-94 (5th Cir. 1985);
Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 251-54 (2d Cir. 1985):
Huettig & Schromm, Inc. v. Landscape Contractors Council, 582 F. Supp. 1519 (N.D.
Cal. 1984); Van Berkel v. Fox Farm & Road Mach., 581 F. Supp. 1248 (D. Minn. 1984).
66. See, e.g., Conard, Winnowing Derivative Suits Through Attorneys Fees, 47 Law
& Contemp. Probs., Winter 1984, at 269, 284-85; Rowe, Predicting the Eilcts of Attorncy Fee Shifting, 47 Law & Contemp. Probs., Winter 1984, at 139, 161.
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12(b)(6) motions? I think it was last effectively used during
the McKinley administration.
Professor Arthur R. Miller 67
Amidst the tumult surrounding the litigation boom, there has been
almost no talk of changing the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governing pleading. 68 The last serious proposal was in the early 1950s,
when the Ninth Circuit, in what has been described as a "guerrilla attack" 6 9 on simplified pleading, urged that Rule 8(a)(2) be amended to
revive code pleading by requiring the plaintiff to allege "the facts constituting a cause of action."' 70 During the same period, several district
judges in the Southern District of New York were engaged in what
Clark himself characterized as "something bordering on a revolt"
against the existing rule. 7 1 The Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules
rejected the proposed change, 7 2 and Conley v. Gibson seemed to scotch
the effort to revert to code practice.
Undoubtedly, lax pleading has, like the procedural and substantive
changes discussed above, 73 benefitted plaintiffs. Plaintiffs have an incentive to plead vaguely in hopes that discovery will turn up material on
67. A. Miller, The August 1983 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Promoting Effective Case Management and Lawyer Responsibility 7-8 (1984).
68. E.g., National Commission Staff Paper, The Early Narrowing and Resolution of
Issues, 48 Antitrust L.J. 1041, 1056 (1980) ("There has been little testimony or comment presented to the [National] Commission [for Review of the Antitrust Laws] favoring increased specificity in antitrust pleadings.") (footnote omitted).
69. R. Field, B. Kaplan & K. Clermont, Materials For a Basic Course in Civil Procedure 439 (5th ed. 1984).
70. See Claim or Cause of Action: A Discussion on the Need for Amendment of
Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 13 F.R.D. 253, 253 (1952).
71. Clark, Special Pleading in the "Big Case," 21 F.R.D. 45, 49 (1957). These
judges began in the early 1950s to insist on more specific pleadings in large cases, particularly antitrust cases. See Baim & Blank, Inc. v. Warren-Connelly Co., 19 F.R.D. 108,
109-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). In Nagler v. Admiral Corp., 248 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1957), the
Second Circuit, speaking through Chief Judge Clark, rejected this movement: "lit is
quite clear that the federal rules contain no special exceptions for antitrust cases." Id. at
322-23.
Coupled with the Supreme Court's pronouncement the same year in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957), Nagler ended the debate in the courts, but the participants
continued it elsewhere. Thus, Judge Dawson, the author of Bairn & Blank, hic., later
commented: "The anti-trust bar was beginning to understand the necessity for this type
of pleading in those cases . . . until Judge Clark made his speech at the Seminar [on
Protracted Cases] last year and then followed it up with his decision in Nagler v. Admiral
Coiporation ...... Dawson, The Place of the Pleading in the Proper Definition of the
Issues in the "Big Case," 23 F.R.D. 430, 434 (1958). Clark responded to "Judge
Dawson's slashing attack" in Clark, Comment on Judge Dawson's Paper on the Place of
the Pleading in the Proper Definition of the Issues in the "Big Case," 23 F.R.D. 435
(1958).
72. See Report of Proposed Amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure for the
United States District Courts 18-19 (1955) (explaining decision not to modify Rule
8(a)(2)).
73. See supra notes 49-54 and accompanying text.
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which to base a more specific charge.7 4 Indeed, it has even been suggested that specificity inherently favors defendants. 7 5 Moreover, under
Conley v. Gibson courts may be inclined to deny motions to dismiss precisely because they cannot tell enough about a plaintiff's claim from the
pleadings to decide whether the plaintiff has a chance of prevailing at
trial. As the Supreme Court noted in Blue Chip Stamps, 76 plaintiffs with
weak claims have good reason to want to stave off dismissal in hopes of
a settlement.
A natural antidote to pro-plaintiff biases and the impulse toward
vagueness is to promote pleadings decisions, and the courts have
adopted this solution in areas that were viewed as particularly troubling. The Supreme Court itself, while approaching pleading issues with
what has been called "appalling casualness" 77 and continuing outwardly to adhere to Conley, 78 has nevertheless provided some support
for such creativity. It has suggested that "insubstantial" cases can be
dismissed despite "artful pleading" 79 and appeared receptive to using
pleading motions to weed out meritless cases. In a 1983 decision reversing dismissal of an antitrust case, for example, it exhorted the district court to require plaintiff to plead with particularity, concluding
that "in a case of this magnitude, a district court must retain the power
to insist upon some specificity in pleading before allowing a potentially
80
massive factual controversy to proceed."
*Perhaps taking its own advice about the value of specificity, the
Court has relied increasingly on fact pleading to resolve standing issues. In a 1975 decision, for example, the Court rejected plaintiffs'
standing allegations as "conjectural" and "conclusory." 8' Such allega74. Judges are not oblivious to this tendency toward vagueness. See, e.g., Levitch
v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 94 F.R.D. 292, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (dismissing
amended complaint characterized as "an effort [by plaintiffs] to keep their claim as ambiguous as possible"), affid, 697 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1983); Weinstein, Proposed Revision
of New York Civil Practice, 60 Colum. L. Rev. 50, 72 (1960) ("[T]he federal rules provide no protection against the unskilled and the skillful obscurers."). Clark certainly had
no intention of fostering a shift to vagueness. See C. Clark, supra note 31, § 41, at 253
("[W]e should not put a premium upon ignorance, so that the pleader who knows the
least about his case will be the most protected by his pleading.").
75. See Friedenthal, supra note 10, at 815. On the other hand, it may be that defendants resist more vigorously when plaintiffs allegations are vague. See Kingdon,
The "Big Antitrust Case": Thoughts on Procedural Reform, 37 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 25,
38 (1980); cf. Brazil, Kahn, Newman & Gold, Early Neutral Evaluation: An Experimental Effort to Expedite Dispute Resolution, 69Judicature 279, 279 (1986) (notice pleading makes early settlement difficult because true center of dispute cannot be identified).
76. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975); see supra notes
58-60 and accompanying text.
77. Roberts, supra note 12, at 399.
78. See, e.g., Hishon v. King & Spalding, 104 S. Ct. 2229, 2233 (1984).
79. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507 (1978) (dictum).
80. Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters,
459 U.S. 519, 528 n.17 (1983) (dictum).
81. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 503, 509 (1975).
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tions were insufficient, the Court explained without reference to Conley
v. Gibson, because they were not supported by "particularized allegations of 2fact" and "specific, concrete facts" showing harm to
plaintiffs.S
Many lower courts have been even more vigorous in insisting on
fact pleading. Although special pleading rules are sometimes used to
accomplish a narrow policy objective, 8 3 these decisions generally fit
into one of three categories.
1. Securities Fraud. - Virtually unknown when the Federal Rules
were adopted,8 4 securities fraud cases have since proliferated. Many
courts have responded by requiring plaintiffs to plead detailed facts.
To some extent this insistence can be justified by the special pleading
requirements of Rule 9(b), which requires that in fraud cases "the cir'85
cumstances constituting fraud. . . shall be stated with particularity.
Clark, who viewed this Rule as a compromise with judges' habits, said it
"probably states only what courts would do anyhow."'8 6 The Rule does
not overturn the general thrust of the Federal Rules to avoid pleading
87
battles and promote decisions on the merits in their place.
82. Id. at 501, 508. Two years earlier, the Court had shown a preference for deferring standing decisions until the summary judgment stage. See United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 689-90
(1973). For a criticism of the use of pleading to resolve standing issues, see Roberts,
supra note 12.
83. The Ninth Circuit adopted a special pleading rule in cases involving activity
arguably protected by the first amendment. See Franchise Realty Interstate Corp. v. San
Francisco Local Joint Executive Board of Culinary Workers, 542 F.2d 1076, 1083 (9th
Cir. 1976) ("[T]he danger that the mere pendency of the action will chill the exercise of
First Amendment rights requires more specific allegations than would otherwise be required."), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 940 (1977). Arguably, this insistence on greater specificity in pleading to protect first amendment interests should be reexamined in light of
Calder v.Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790-91 (1984) (rejecting argument that first amendment
concerns should limit scope of personal jurisdiction), and Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S.
153 (1979) (rejecting argument that first amendment provides basis for privilege against
discovery into editorial process in libel action).
84. The first case recognizing a private cause of action for damages under rule lOb5 was Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
85. Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
86. Clark, Simplified Pleading, 2 F.R.D. 456, 463 (1943).
87. The commentators have roundly rejected the formalistic argument that rule
9(b) erects a special regime immune to the liberal pleading approach of rule 8. E.g., 5
C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 3, § 1298, at 406 (rule 9(b) must be read in conjunction with rule 8); 2A Moore's Federal Practice, supra note 40, 9.03, at 9-28 (same).
Even the Second Circuit, most active in expansive use of rule 9(b), has on occasion
recognized this. See Felton v. Walston & Co., 508 F.2d 577, 581 (2d Cir. 1974) ("[I]n
applying rule 9(b) we must not lose sight of the fact that it must be reconciled with rule 8
.... "). Moreover, the actual emphasis in many cases on detailed evidence supporting
allegations about the defendant's state of mind, see infra notes 90-93 and accompanying
text, is forbidden by the second sentence of rule 9(b), which explicitly permits general
pleadings to state of mind. See infra note 216 and accompanying text.
Nor is the use of rule 9(b) to permit expansive pleadings decisions justified on policy grounds. First, the disfavored claims idea, which is one historical antecedent of rule
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Consistent with the general purposes of the Rules, some courts
find that Rule 9(b) is designed to provide somewhat more specific notice and that it requires only "slightly more" detail than Rule 8(a)(2). a8
However, other courts, particularly the Second Circuit, find that Rule
9(b) serves a much more substantive purpose-to protect defendants'
reputations from unfounded claims of fraud and to assure that such
malodorous claims are not filed as a pretext for discovery: " 'It is a
serious matter to charge a person with fraud and hence no one is permitted to do so unless he is in a position and is willing to put himself on
o89
record as to what the alleged fraud consists of specifically.'
The stricter courts pay great attention to "conclusory" allegations
about defendants' knowledge or intent. Some hold that plaintiffs may
not rely on allegations based on information and belief.90 Some insist
that the plaintiff provide specific details that support factual conclusions. For example, in Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 9 1 plaintiff shareholders
sued the company and its senior officers. Plaintiffs claimed that the defendants had knowingly or recklessly failed to disclose the health risks
caused by use of the Dalkon Shield intrauterine device that eventually
resulted in the filing of hundreds of lawsuits against Robins, with total
claims far exeeding Robins' net worth.9 2 In their complaint, plaintiffs,
who bought their shares in 1973, alleged that Robins had then touted
the device as a boost to the company's financial health even though in
9(b), see 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 3, § 1296, at 400, simply fails to justify the

new fact pleading. See infra notes 228-38 and accompanying text. Second, the courts'
effort to erect special protections against charges of fraud, see infra note 89 and accompanying text, does not explain why fraud should be treated differently from other claims
such as racketeering, racial discrimination, price-fixing, and environmental pollution, for
which there are no special pleading rules. See infra notes 237-38 and accompanying
text. Finally, and most importantly, in many cases fact pleading provides no reliable

mechanism for evaluating a plaintiffs factual conclusions. Fact pleading therefore
threatens the objectives of promoting reliable decisions on the merits and avoiding
pleading battles. See infra notes 196-227 and accompanying text. Both from the perspective of the rules governing pleading and more generally in terms of the overall purpose of the rules, then, the presence of special pleading provisions does not justify the
new fact pleading even in the area of fraud.
88. See, e.g., Tomera v. Galt, 511 F.2d 504, 508 (7th Cir. 1975); cf. Walling v.
Beverly Enter., 476 F.2d 393, 397 (9th Cir. 1973) (Rule 9(b) only requires that circumstances constituting fraud be pleaded with sufficient particularity so that defendant can
prepare an answer, and does not require pleading of detailed evidentiary matters.).
89. Segal v. Gordon, 467 F.2d 602, 607 (2d Cir. 1972) (quoting IA W. Barron & A.

Hotzhoff, Federal Practice and Procedure § 302, at 215-16 (Wright rev. 1960)); see also
Billard v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 683 F.2d 51, 57 (2d Cir. 1982) (Rule 9(b) construed

strictly to minimize strike suits). For criticism of this use of Rule 9(b), see Sovern, supra
note 12, at 165-71; Note, supra note 12, at 1439-47.
90. See, e.g., Wayne Inv., Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 739 F.2d 11, 13-14 (1st Cir. 1984);
Duane v. Altenburg, 297 F.2d 515, 518-19 (7th Cir. 1962).
91. 607 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 946 (1980).

92. In fact, Robins has recently sought protection from these suits by filing a petition under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. See Robins Files for Protection of'
Chapter 11, Wall St.J., Aug. 22, 1985, at 3, col. 1.
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May, 1974, the company wrote 120,000 doctors across the country
warning them of health hazards associated with the use of the device.
To bolster their claim that defendants had known or recklessly disregarded these risks prior to plaintiffs' purchase of their shares in 1973,
plaintiffs pointed to an unpublished 1972 study detailing the health
hazards associated with the Dalkon Shield. Because plaintiffs did not
allege Robins was aware of the study, however, the Second Circuit
found the complaint inadequate for failure to "specifically plead those
events which they assert give9rise
to a strong inference that defendants
3
had knowledge of the facts."
2. Civil Rights Cases. - Like securities fraud cases, civil rights suits
have since 1938 become a staple of the federal courts' civil docket. Unlike securities fraud cases, however, there is no special provision of the
Federal Rules applicable to civil rights claims. Many lower federal
courts have nevertheless revived fact pleading requirements in such
cases.
The leader in this movement has been the Third Circuit, which is
forthright about its motivation: " 'In recent years there has been an
increasingly large volume of cases brought under the Civil Rights
Act. . . . It is an important public policy to weed out the frivolous and
insubstantial cases at an early stage in the litigation . . . .
4 To

achieve this objective most courts now declare that conclusory allegations are inadequate to state a civil rights claim. They require specific
delineation of the facts claimed to show a violation of plaintiff's civil
rights 95 and, as in securities fraud cases, focus particularly on plaintiff's
allegations about intent. 96
These requirements have been applied with remarkable enthusiasm. In United States v. City of Philadelphia,9 7 for example, the Department of Justice filed a complaint alleging in part that the Philadelphia
police department systematically violated the civil rights of minority
persons by abusing them physically. The complaint was signed by several government lawyers, including the Attorney General. 98 Citing,
among other things, the potential that such a claim could be vexatious
to local police officials, the trial court dismissed. 9 9 Although it specifically disavowed any need to determine whether the claim was frivo93. 607 F.2d at 558.
94. Rotolo v. Borough of Charleroi, 532 F.2d 920, 922 (3d Cir. 1976) (quoting
Valley v. Maule, 297 F. Supp. 958, 960 (D. Conn. 1968)).
95. See, e.g., Jones v. Community Redevelopment Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th
Cir. 1984). See generally Roberts, supra note 12, at 417-19 (canvassing civil rights

pleading cases).
96. See, e.g., Albany Welfare Rights Org. Day Care Center, Inc. v. Schreck, 463
F.2d 620, 623 (2d Cir. 1972) (upholding dismissal for failure adequately to allege defendant's motivation), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 944 (1973).
97. 644 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1980).

98. Id. at 205.
99. 482 F. Supp. 1274, 1278 (E.D. Pa. 1979), aff'd, 644 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1980).
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lous, 0 0 the Third Circuit affirmed on the ground that the complaint

did not satisfy the specificity requirement for civil rights cases, which it
said was necessary to provide "fair notice" and to dispose of frivolous
cases.101

3. Conspiracy. - Concerns about conspiracy seem pervasive today,
and many plaintiffs include conspiracy allegations in their complaints.
As Heart Disease Research Foundation v. General Motors Corp. 102 shows, the
lower courts also scrutinize conspiracy allegations with care. In general, they say that broad, vague charges of conspiracy do not suffice.' 0 3
Some require, at a minimum, that the plaintiff0 4enumerate the overt acts
alleged to show that the conspiracy existed.'
4. Summary: The Persistent Themes. - The situations in which the
new fact pleading has been applied possess significant common characteristics. For one, they represent important segments of activity in the
litigation boom, each type of claim having experienced enormous
growth since the Federal Rules were adopted. 10 5 More significantly,
however, these situations present particularly difficult problems involving the potential abuse of litigation because they often involve outwardly innocent or admitted behavior that can, depending on the
defendant's state of mind, result in very substantial liability. In a typical
securities case, for example, the dispute is not over the content of the
representations made by the defendants, but rather whether those representations were inaccurate and, if inaccurate, whether defendants
knew or should have known of such inaccuracy. In the paradigmatic
employee's civil rights suit, the dispute is not over whether defendants
have fired the plaintiff, but rather their motivation for doing so. In
many antitrust cases, the dispute is not over what happened to the
100. 644 F.2d at 205 n.28; cf. P. Marcus, The Big Antitrust Case in the Trial

Courts, 37 Ind. L.J. 51, 61 (1961) ("The writer is not aware of the filing of a government
antitrust suit where there was not sufficient knowledge of facts to warrant an honest
belief that a violation of the Sherman Act existed.") (emphasis added).
101. Id. at 205-06. In view of the change of administration in Philadelphia (Mayor
Rizzo was replaced) and the imminent change of administrations in Washington, the
Carter administration decided not to seek Supreme Court review. See 0. Fiss & D.
Rendleman, Injunctions 56 (2d ed. 1984).

102. 463 F.2d 98 (2d Cir. 1972); see supra text accompanying notes 13-18.
103. See, e.g., Fullman v. Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 557 (11th Cir. 1984); California
Dump Truck Owners Assoc., Inc. v. Associated Gen. Contractors, 562 F.2d 607, 615

(9th Cir. 1977); Burnett v. Short, 441 F.2d 405, 406 (5th Cir. 1971). But see Quinones
v. Szorc, 771 F.2d 289, 291 (7th Cir. 1985); Hoffman v. Halden, 268 F.2d 280, 294-95
(9th Cir. 1959) ("Hoffman also alleges the 'defendants conspired.' In what other way

can plaintiff plead conspiracy? . . . He should not be required here to plead his
evidence.").
104. See Powell v. Workmen's Compensation Bd., 327 F.2d 131, 137 (2d Cir.
1964), and cases cited therein.

105. This is not to say that strict fact pleading requirements were unknown in such
cases before the 1960s. See, e.g., Dunn v. Gazzola, 216 F.2d 709, 711 (1st Cir. 1954)
(rejecting allegation of conspiracy not supported by facts); Connor v. Real Title Corp.,
165 F.2d 291, 294 (4th Cir. 1947) (same).
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plaintiff, but rather whether whatever happened resulted from an
agreement or conspiracy among the defendants. Given the breadth of
potential discovery on issues like intention and knowledge, it is understandable that some courts have attempted to weed out groundless
cases at the outset.
II.

NOTICE PLEADING

Whatever the earlier function of pleadings, the stated modern justification is limited to notice. Conley v. Gibson 0 6 itself appeared to endorse the notice pleading idea,10 7 which the Supreme Court had
previously suggested was the sole purpose of pleadings.' 0 8 Since
Conley, the received learning has been that the function of pleadings is
to give notice. 10 9 Even where Rule 9(b)'s particularity requirement applies, some courts routinely deny pleading motions if they believe defendant has sufficient notice to prepare an answer, 10 sometimes even
though the complaint itself fails to provide notice.' 1 ' According to this
approach, defendant's desire for further information about plaintiff's
claims should be handled later through discovery and other pretrial
12
procedures.1
But notice pleading is a chimera. Within a year after Conley, Clark
himself described it as "something like the Golden Rule, which is a nice
hopeful thing; but . . . isn't anything that we can use with any precision." 1 13 More fundamentally, one may ask why it should be used at
106. 355 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1957).

107. See id. (referring to "simplified 'notice pleading' [that] is made possible by the
liberal opportunity for discovery and the other pretrial procedures established by the
Rules to disclose more precisely the basis of both claim and defense and to define more
narrowly the disputed facts and issues") (footnote omitted).
108. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947) (Federal Rules "restrict the
pleadings to the task of general notice-giving.").
109. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.

110. See, e.g., Bosse v. Crowell, Collier & Macmillan, 565 F.2d 602, 611 (9th Cir.
1977) ("Rule 9(b) . . .only requires the identification of the circumstances constituting
fraud so that the defendant can prepare an adequate answer from the allegations
111. See, e.g., In re Commonwealth Oil/Tesoro Petroleum Corp. Sec. Litig., 467
F. Supp. 227, 251 (W.D. Tex. 1979) (Rule 9(b) does not "require plaintiffs repeatedly to

redraft pleadings" when the defendants have "pre-existing full knowledge of the matters
which plaintiffs' pleading addresses. Therefore, . . . even though plaintiffs' pleadings
are vague, [where] the defendants do in fact have notice of the matters of which plaintiffs
complain, a strict application of Rule 9(b) can serve no purpose."); cf. Whittier, Notice
Pleading, 31 Harv. L. Rev. 501, 505 (1918) ("[I]f the opponent does understand the
pleader's claim, whether that be the result of the pleading itself or partly due to the
opponent's own knowledge, he is obviously not entitled to particulars."). How the court
is to determine whether the defendant has sufficient knowledge indepedent of the pleadings, however, is something of a mystery.

112. See C. Wright, The Law of the Federal Courts § 68, at 439 (4th ed. 1983);
supra note 107.
113. Clark, Pleading Under the Federal Rules, 12 Wyo. LJ. 177, 181 (1958). Some
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all. Providing notice would seem, after all, to be the function of a motion for a more definite statement under Rule 12(e), which is allowed
when a pleading "is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading."' 14 But a defendant
hardly needs specificity to deny a vague allegation," 15 and will rarely be
unable to raise a legitimate affirmative defense due to vagueness of the
pleadings. To take a common example, defendants can preserve statute of limitations defenses by alleging in their answers that plaintiffs'
claims are barred, in whole or in part, by limitations. 1 6 Moreover, if
ambiguity of pleadings has obscured an affirmative defense, courts will
rarely refuse an amendment to add the defense once discovery has
shown it to be applicable.' 1 7 Accordingly, it would seem that the defendant always has enough notice to be able to prepare an answer.
More detailed pleadings are similarly unimportant in relation to
other pretrial activities. Although they may pinpoint an opposing
party's view of the facts somewhat, they are hardly substitutes for examination by deposition. Moreover, as the opposing party obtains more
information through discovery, his view of the facts is likely to evolve.
In practice, discovery itself is often difficult to limit to specific factual
allegations, and the liberal amendment provisions of the Rules would
be undermined by efforts to imprison the plaintiff within detailed initial
assertions.
Balanced against the marginal utility of more detailed notice 1 8 is
have suggested, however, that these views represent something of a political retreat by
Clark, not a modification of his basic view. See Smith, supra note 3, at 925-26.
114. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e).
115. It is true that Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b) imposes a good faith requirement not to
deny matters known to be true, but it also says that where the pleader "is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of an averment, he shall so
state and this has the effect of a denial." As a general matter, then, where the defendant
is uncertain about the law or the facts on which the plaintiff relies, it may deny. See
Shultz v. Manor House of Madison, Inc., 51 F.R.D. 16, 17-18 (W.D. Wis. 1970).
116. See 2A Moore's Federal Practice, supra note 40, 12.18, at 12-145 to 12-146.
117. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) directs that leave to amend be "freely given." The
Supreme Court has indicated this means amendment should be allowed in the absence
of bad faith or undue delay by the moving party. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182
(1962); see also supra note 42 and accompanying text. This same liberality applies to
amendments of answers to add affirmative defenses. See, e.g., Glater v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
712 F.2d 735, 738-39 (1st Cir. 1983).
118. For a recent example of the minimal importance the Supreme Court attaches
to notice in other contexts, consider Brandon v. Holt, 105 S.Ct. 873 (1985), Plaintiffs,
injured by a policeman, sued the director of the police department for failure to fire the
officer for previous misconduct. Although plaintiffs obtained a judgment, the court of
appeals reversed on the ground that the director was protected by qualified immunity
because he was not personally aware of the officer's tendencies and thus was acting in
good faith.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a judgment against a public servant in
his official capacity imposes liability on the entity he represents. The Court held that
judgment should be entered against the city itself because even though the city had
never been named as a defendant it could be added under Rule 15(b) as an amendment
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the substantial cost of pleading practice designed to elicit additional
details. Dilatory motions remain a problem, " 9 and motions seeking an
emendation of the complaint seem peculiarly susceptible to abuse due
20
to their potential for delay. For example, in Ross v. A. H. Robins Co.,'
while the Second Circuit faulted plaintiff's pending complaint for lacking facts "strongly supporting" the inference defendants knew about
the dangers of the Dalkon Shield, it also remanded to give them another chance to do so. They evidently succeeded, and the case re12
mained on the district court's docket for at least another four years.
Neither the early motion practice nor the appeal seem to have advanced
the case meaningfully toward ultimate resolution.
This is not to say either that specifics and precision are undesirable, or that no complaints are so opaque that redrafting is necessary in
order to apprise the defendant of the nature of the plaintiff's grievance.1 2 2 In general, however, pleading motions are unlikely to advance
the litigation process in a meaningful way unless they provide some
hope of leading to a resolution of the case on the merits. Early resolution on the merits is the objective of the Rule 12(b) (6) motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim. The 12(b)(6) motion should not be diluted
into a variant of the motion for a more definite statement.' 23 Indeed,
some courts use the more definite statement to expose defects in the
claim that would permit dismissal.' 24 To require the courts to approach this objective indirectly, using the language of notice pleadto conform to proof. Id. at 877-78. Justice Rehnquist dissented on the ground that
Rule 15(b) had not been satisfied by plaintiffs' one-sentence reference to amendment in
their reply brief to the Supreme Court. Id. at 879. Chief Justice Burger concurred in
the judgment, noting: "[M]odern pleading is less rigid than in an earlier day, but it is
not too much to ask that if a person or entity is to be subject to suit, the person or entity
should be named. I agree with Justice Rehnquist that it is a dubious business to encourage such shoddy pleading practices, but the courts have crossed that bridge." Id.
119. See Edelstein, The Ethics of Dilatory Motion Prctice: Time for Change, 44
Fordham L. Rev. 1069 (1976).
120. 607 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 946 (1980); see supra
notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
121. See Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., [1982-83 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 99,095 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 1983).
122. See, e.g., Mountain View Pharmacy v. Abbott Laboratories, 630 F.2d 1383,
1386-87 (10th Cir. 1980) (In a complex case, more details are necessary.).
123. See 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 3, § 1376, at 732-34 (motion for more
definite statement is limited to a "quite small" class of cases in which court can discern a
viable claim but the complaint is still "so vague or ambiguous that the opposing party
cannot respond, even with a simple denial, in good faith and without prejudice to himself") (footnote omitted). As indicated supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text, it is
doubtful any such cases really exist. At most, as Professors Wright and Miller conclude,
the motion for a more definite statement "should be strictly limited to those few instances in which a significant advancement of the litigation will result." 5 C. Wright & A.
Miller, supra note 3, § 1376, at 747.
124. See 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 3, § 1376, at 743-44 (discussing use
of more definite statement to permit disposition on grounds of statute of limitations or
Statute of Frauds); id. § 1217, at 131 ("[Clourts often will use a motion directed at the

HeinOnline -- 86 Colum. L. Rev. 453 1986

454

COLUMBIA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 86:433

ing,' 25 either obscures or deflects the proper inquiry. Moreover, once
sufficient details are included to show that a legitimate claim has been
stated, any notice objective should also have been satisfied. 1 26 Notice
should not be the sole, or even the principal, objective of pleadings
practice. The proper focus should shift to merits dispositions.
III.

MERITS DECISIONS

Under the received tradition, the problem with common law pleading practice was that, while it led to actual decisions, it often did not
lead to merits decisions because cases were frequently resolved on
technicalities. The notice pleading scenario, by way of contrast, eliminates the possibility for even genuine merits decisions at the pleadings
stage. The middle ground is to use pleading practice to make genuine
and reliable merits decisions. Contrary to expectation, this activity is
not dead, though it is often camouflaged in notice pleading language.
This Part examines the contemporary use of pleadings to decide
cases on the merits, which is the ultimate effect of revived fact pleading.
It begins by examining the key question: whether decisions at the
pleading stage are to be preferred to settlements, which occur in most
cases that are not dismissed before trial. Finding that such decisions
are desirable in the abstract to achieve the objectives of the substantive
law, it then explores situations where pleading practice can effectively
resolve the merits-where legal conclusions relied on by the plaintiff
can be shown to be groundless by requiring more factual detail in
pleading. Finally, this Part explores the problem of scrutinzing plaintiff's factual conclusions, which is the focus of much of the new emphasis on fact pleading, and finds that this problem cannot sensibly be
handled at the pleading stage. Accordingly, although merits resolution
by pleading motion may in many cases be possible, it appears ill-suited
for the kinds of cases in which the courts have been using fact pleading
as an antidote to the ills of the litigation boom.
A. Merits Decision Versus Settlement
Most cases are never resolved by a court, on the merits or otherwise, because they are settled. 127 Recently this statistic has kindled a
form of a pleading as a vehicle for considering whether any possible claim for relief
exists.").
125. See, e.g., Hayduk v. Lanna, 775 F.2d 441,444 (1st Cir. 1985) (absence of facts
supporting claim that defendants conspired to defraud plaintiff deprives defendants of
notice of basis of claims against them). See generally 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra
note 3,§ 1217, at 131 (Courts use motions directed to the form of a complaint to determine whether any claim for relief exists.).
126. See supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text. Accordingly, some advocate
eliminating the motion for a more definite statement altogether, leaving discovery to
clarify vague claims. See 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 3, § 1376, at 740 & n.50.
127. This statistic is hardly new. Clark observed in 1935 that only 30% of federal
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debate between the proponents of the "dispute resolution" model of
litigation and the advocates of the "public interest" model. Imported
into the pleading practice area, the debate identifies the underlying
issues.
Proponents of the public interest model oppose viewing the court
system primarily as a lever or facilitator for essentially private dispute
resolution. To some, this means that any resolution of a lawsuit except
by judicial decision represents a failure of the judicial system. Professor Owen Fiss, a leading light in this camp, explains that "[to be
against settlement is only to suggest that when the parties settle, society
gets less than what appears, and for a price it does not know it is paying. Parties might settle while leaving justice undone." 128 Although
the proponents of the public interest view seem generally to have in
mind a decision after a full dress trial, the reasoning appears to apply
equally to pretrial judicial decisions, including pleading dispositions.
Indeed, given the impossibility of actually trying all civil cases, logic
seems to favor pretrial disposition.
The dispute resolution advocates, on the other hand, mistrust judicial resolution. Even judges openly question the desirability of complete resolution after trial as the generally preferred outcome. As one
experienced federal judge put it in a seminar for new judges,
" [o]ptimal justice is usually found somewhere between the polar positions of the litigants. Trial is likely to produce a polar solution, and
often the jury or the judge has no choice except all or nothing. Settlement is usually the avenue that allows a more just result than trial." 1 29
court civil cases then reached a court decision. Clark & Moore, A New Federal Civil
Procedure: Pleadings and Parties (pt. 2), 44 Yale LJ. 1291, 1294 & n.8 (1935); cf.
Galanter, The Emergence of the judge as a Mediator in Civil Cases, 69 Judicature 256,
257 (1986) ("It remains unclear whether the percentage of cases terminated by settlement has increased in recent years.").
128. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 Yale LJ. 1073, 1085 (1984). He explains further:
I do not believe that settlement as a generic practice is preferable to judgment
or should be institutionalized on a wholesale and indiscriminate basis. It
should be treated instead as a highly problematic technique for streamlining
dockets. Settlement is for me the civil analogue of plea bargaining ....
Like
plea bargaining, settlement is a capitulation to the conditions of mass society
and should be neither encouraged nor praised.

Id. at 1075. Professor Fiss is generally opposed to treating courts primarily as dispute
resolution forums. See Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms

ofJustice, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 29 (1979) ("[C]ourts exist to give meaning to our public
values, not to resolve disputes."). Despite Fiss' arguments, all plea bargaining need not
be viewed as a failure of the judicial system. For an argument that the only constitutional concern with plea bargaining is that the innocent will plead guilty, see McCoy &
Mirra, Plea Bargaining as Due Process in Determining Guilt, 32 Stan. L. Rev. 887,

921-22 (1980). Similar concerns bear on the undesireability of settlements in civil cases.
See infra notes 133-39 and accompanying text.
129. Tone, The Role of the Judge in the Settlement Process, in Seminars for Newly
Appointed United States District judges 57, 60 (1975); accord Coons, Approaches to
Court Imposed Compromise-The Uses of Doubt and Reason, 58 Nw. U.L. Rev. 750,
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This view evinces great skepticism about the liberal ethos and its preference for judicial resolution on the merits. Instead, a settlement may
be preferable, whatever the ultimate merits of the claim, 130 so long as
the plaintiff "firmly believes" he has a legitimate grievance against defendant. 3 1 Arguably, then, dismissal on the pleadings would not be a
13 2
desirable alternative.
Thus, the two schools pose the core problem: Are pleadings decisions or settlements better? Denial of a motion to dismiss often means
only that a defendant who will ultimately prevail must litigate longer.
Even the confident defendant may decide to settle, however. To the
extent that decision is made "in the shadow of the law" because it reflects a prediction of the substantive merits of the case,1 3 it accomplishes the objectives of the substantive law, albeit in a modified form
because a settlement is not an "all or nothing" result. Freed of the
burden of deciding the settled case, the court system is able to turn its
attention to other cases, and there apply the substantive law.
The settlement model breaks down, however, when the defendant's payment to the plaintiff is based mainly on factors other than the
substantive merits of the suit.' 3 4 This is the spectre which haunts the
751 (1964) (seeing the 'judicial power to compromise between the often harsh alternatives of all-or-nothing" as promoting a "fair" decision that is unattainable by law).
130. Cf. Marek v. Chesny, 105 S. Ct. 3012, 3018 (1985) ("Rule 68's policy of encouraging settlements is neutral, favoring neither plaintiffs nor defendants; it expresses
a clear policy of favoring settlement of all lawsuits.").
131. The phrase comes from Clark's famous opinion reversing a dismissal in Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774, 775 (2d Cir. 1944).
132. To some extent this preference for a negotiated over a judicial resolution is
confirmed by the handling of prisoner cases, where the courts act because they have to.
"Relatively few prison cases can be settled, primarily because meaningful negotiations
between prisoners acting pro se and states' attorneys are practically impossible. Thus,
unlike other civil litigation, some court action is required on almost all the cases."
Turner, When Prisoners Sue: A Study of Prisoner Section 1983 Suits in the Federal
Courts, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 610, 637 (1979). The dismissal rate in such cases is very high.
Id. at 617-18.
133. See Mnookin & Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case
of Divorce, 88 Yale L.J. 950 (1979) (discussing role of legal rules in negotiation of settlements in divorce cases). Priest and Klein conclude that changes in the legal standard
affect settlements, not outcomes, by shifting the bargaining advantage. Priest & Klein,
The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13J. Legal Stud. 1, 12-30 (1984). For a debate
on the accuracy of their method, see Priest, Reexamining the Selection Hypothesis:
Learning from Wittman's Mistakes, 14J. Legal Stud. 215 (1985); Wittman, Is the Selection of Cases for Trial Biased?, 14J. Legal Stud. 185 (1985); see also Galanter, supra
note 46, at 32-33 (legal decisions radiate and affect settlement value of cases). But cf.
Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. Rev. 754, 790-91 (1984) (definitive rulings deter innovative
settlement packages).
134. See Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional
Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. Rev. 29, 46-47:
[Pirocedure is not being used merely as a more efficient way of enforcing a
substantive claim, but also as an instrument of private policy for the vindication
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liberal ethos. The financial burden of litigation is obviously an important factor,' 3 5 but it is not the only one. The pendency of a lawsuit
imposes other costs that settlement can avert, whether or not the claim
is well founded. In derivative suits, for example, the defendants' desire
to avoid publicity13 6 and to reduce the time drain of litigation 3 7 may
incline them toward settlement. In antitrust cases, the unavailability of
contribution may make the risk of litigation so great that settlement
seems essential.' 3 8 Moreover, the value of a decision by a court deserves some deference; without a body of such decisions the law may
not cast a discernible shadow for those who seek to rely on the law in
fashioning settlements. 13 9 Accordingly, pleadings decisions on the
merits seem justified when they can be made reliably.
The pressure to encourage pleadings decisions is far from overwhelming, however, and there is much dispute about the extent to
which nuisance settlements are in fact extracted. For example,
although the class action procedure has been blamed for breeding vexatious litigation, existing empirical data do not show that the problem
is severe.1 40 Litigation cost, the most-cited villain, has an ambivalent
In the vast
of expectations which are not justified by the substantive law ....
majority of cases which are settled, there is not even a pretense that the result
has been determined by the application of a system of substantive rules to given
factual premises.
See also Eisenberg, The Principles of Consideration, 67 Cornell L. Rev. 640, 645 (1982)
(labelling "trading on the transaction costs of litigation" as "moral extortion").
135. Thus, Judge Tone explains that "candidates for settlement" can easily be recognized: "They are the cases in which the amount involved is small in relation to the
anticipated costs of litigation, or in which relief other than the payment of money is the
plaintiff's principal objective and it is less painful for the defendant to give that relief
than to bear the expense of further litigation." Tone, supra note 129, at 62. The distinguishing feature in these cases, it should be noted, is litigation cost, not strength or
weakness on the merits.
136. SeeJones, An Empirical Examination of the Resolution of Shareholder Derivative and Class Action Lawsuits, 60 B.U.L. Rev. 542, 546 (1980). The existence of such
noneconomic stakes in litigation may, on the other hand, incline defendant againstsettlement. See Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiffs Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86
Colum. L. Rev. (forthcoming May 1986).
137. See Coffee, The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff as Monitor in Shareholder Litigation, 48 Law & Contemp. Probs., Summer 1985, at 5, 15.
138. It is true that the absence of contribution reflects in part an assessment of
Congress' substantive objectives in enacting the antitrust laws. See Texas Indus. v.
Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 639, 645-46 (1981) (court has no authority to
provide for contribution in antitrust cases because Congress made contrary legislative
judgment). But that judgment was hardly intended to leave one alleged conspirator
facing a bankrupting liability to a plaintiff class after all the others have settled, a litigation reality that tends to deprive the defendant of any meaningful opportunity to defend. This reality explains the willingness of defendants to contract with one another
for contribution, thereby reducing this settlement leverage. See Note, Sharing Agreements Among Defendants in Antitrust Cases, 52 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 289 (1984).
139. See supra note 133 (discussing effect of legal rules on settlements).
140. See DuVal, The Class Action as an Antitrust Enforcement Device: The
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effect. When the cost of litigating a meritorious claim is greater than
the expected recovery, a suit filed in hopes of an early settlement may
141
be characterized as a nuisance suit even though the claim has merit.
Moreover, defendants can limit their costs.'

42

Accordingly, there is no

compelling impetus toward radical change, and care is in order before
concluding that a particular case can be reliably decided on the
1 43

pleadings.

Chicago Experience (pt. 2), 1976 Am. B. Found. ResearchJ. 1273, 1344-46 (little indication that class allegations affect settlement value); Note, The Rule 23(b)(3) Class Action: An Empirical Study, 62 Geo. LJ. 1123, 1137 (1974) (even defense counsel label
only a handful of class actions frivolous). But cf. Kennedy, Securities Class and Derivative Actions in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas: An
Empirical Study, 14 Hous. L. Rev. 769, 824-26 (1977) (class allegations give plaintiff
settlement leverage). Thus, concern about abuse of the class action device has abated.
See Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the
"Class Action Problem," 92 Harv. L. Rev. 664 (1979).
141. See Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public
Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 849, 896 n.171 (1984); Rosenberg &
Shavell, A Model in Which Suits Are Brought for Their Nuisance Value, 5 Int'l Rev. L. &
Econ. 3 (1985).
142. Thus Robert Banks, General Counsel of Xerox Corp., reports that "corporate
lawyers are working to decrease costs by focusing in on the net value of every motion,
every pleading, every discovery." AnnualJudicial Conference SecondJudicial Circuit of
the United States, 101 F.R.D. 161, 191 (1983); see also Smith, "Top-Dollar Clients" Can
Limit Expenses, Legal TimesJune 11, 1984, at 22, col. 2 (providing suggestions on how
clients can economize on legal services).
143. One suggested antidote to the cost problem is cost shifting. Because the principal component of litigation expense is attorneys' fees, some urge that we adopt the
English system of routinely awarding the winner his attorneys' fees. Under such a regime, one might argue that litigants should be allowed to make their litigation investment decisions without interference from possibly premature efforts to decide cases on
motions to dismiss, and that such decisions should therefore be discouraged. For several reasons, increased cost shifting is not an alternative to early merits decisions.
First, reliance on economic decisions of litigants unduly devalues judicial decisionmaking as a device for clarifying rules of law. Without adopting Professor Fiss' view, see
supra note 128 and accompanying text, it remains true that litigants seeking to settle
cases in the "shadow of the law" need judicial assistance in discerning the contours of
that shadow. See supra text accompanying notes 133, 139. The small number of cases
that are tried would not be sufficient for this purpose.
Second, despite the existence of a body ofjudicial decisions the law is often uncertain, and litigants must guess as best they can about the outcome of their suit. Denying
them a prompt decision where it can reliably be made simply increases for no good
reason the amount that will ultimately be imposed on the loser. In this connection, it is
unclear whether adopting routine attorneys' fee awards would increase expenditures on
litigation by increasing the stakes. See Braeutigam, Owen & Panzar, An Economic Analysis of Alternative Fee Shifting Systems, 47 Law & Contemp. Probs., Winter 1984, at
173, 180-81.
Third, awarding attorneys' fees does not, in many cases, fully compensate the winning party for noneconomic costs resulting from the suit. See supra notes 135-137 and
accompanying text. Deferring decision would continue for no good reason to impose
these uncompensated costs on a party who ultimately wins.
Fourth, the availability of attorneys' fees awards may stimulate the filing of some
kinds of suits, thus increasing the need to scrutinize the grounds for such suits. See
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B. Legal Conclusions: Implementing the Substantive Law

Both sides of the settlement-dispute resolution controversy wish
ultimately to implement the substantive law. That is, after all, the generally accepted objective of procedure. 144 But the substantive law may
frustrate that goal in the pleading context by relying on rules that can
only be applied with reference to a multitude of factors or factual matters that cannot be adequately assessed at the pleading stage. Whether
or not it is inevitable that legal rules will become more uncertain over
time, 14 5 it is certainly true that the evolution of the law away from pre-

arbitrary) rules has reduced the utility of pleading
cise (and rather
46
decisions.'
A simple example illustrates this difficulty. Before 1938, the detail
required to plead negligence was the subject of much dispute, a past
the Federal Rules sought to bury with Form 9.147 But the underlying
problem with pleading decisions was not really procedural. It was substantive because the negligence determination turned on such a variety
of circumstances that it could not reliably be made on the basis of
Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 555-56 (1984) (Powell, J., dissenting) (asserting that
since enactment of Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act, 42 U.S.C § 1988 (1982),
civil rights suits have "increased geometrically").
In sum, while fee shifting as a sanction may hold some promise, see supra note 66
and accompanying text, the prospect of greater private policing of the decision to file
suit through economic incentives caused by fee shifting provides no reason for abandoning interest in refining the pretrial motion process.
144. The adoption of the Federal Rules was not intended to alter the outcome except to assure that it corresponds to the merits under what is understood to be the
substantive law. Indeed, the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982), precludes
such tampering with substantive law. This Article proceeds on that understanding.
145. See D'Amato, Legal Uncertainty, 71 Calif. L. Rev. 1, 1 (1983) ("Legal certainty
decreases over time. Rules and principles of law become more and more uncertain in
content and in application because legal systems are biased in favor of unravelling those
rules and principles."); Epstein, Settlement and Litigation: Of Vices Individual and Institutional, 30 U. Chi. L. Sch. Rec. 2, 5-7 (1984) (complexity and uncertainty of modern
substantive rules contribute to increase in frequency and severity of litigation). In part,
the development can be seen as a shift from hard-and-fast "rules" to more flexible
"standards." See Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 Harv.
L. Rev. 1685 (1976).
146. See Clark, supra note 71, at 51 (The real problem with pleadings decisions in
antitrust cases is that the Sherman Act is broad.); Epstein, Pleadings and Presumptions,
40 U. Chi. L. Rev. 556, 566 (1973) (referring to "the importance [in evaluating pleadings] of an exact knowledge of the substantive theory in question in order to distinguish
ultimate issues of fact from the questions of proof that they raise"); Kingdon, supra note
75, at 34 (lack of clear standards in antitrust field is one cause of vague pleading); cf.
Miller, supra note 140, at 672-73 (watering down substantive rules increases litigation).
The same phenomenon can be seen at the summary judgment stage. See, e.g., Tunis
Bros. v. Ford Motor Co., 763 F.2d 1482, 1502 (3d Cir. 1985) ("Under the 'rule of reason' standard, there is a greater reluctance to uphold a grant of summary judgment
where the conduct is to be examined for its reasonableness than where it is to be subjected to a per se rule.").
147. See supra notes 31, 36 and accompanying text.
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pleadings, whatever detail they contained. Had negligence law been
atomized into a multitude of concrete subrules, the resulting emphasis
on specific points could have permitted pleading decisions in many
cases. It may be argued that the law has gone too far toward multifactor generality, 148 but that problem is substantive, not procedural.
Nonetheless, the substantive law can provide tools that permit
pleadings dispositions. The courts' handling of such cases falls generally into two categories: Cases in which the substantive law requires a
certain element that is missing and cases in which the court, by carefully
analyzing the totality of the plaintiff's allegations, can sensibly decide
on the basis of the pleadings that the defendant did not violate the law.
1. Using Pleadingsto Identify Missing Elements. - Although it may begin as an amorphous proscription, the substantive law can sharpen over
time so that specific elements of a claim can be identified and applied at
the pleading stage. For example, when the Supreme Court held in Blue
Chip Stamps that securities fraud plaintiffs had to be purchasers or sellers, 14 9 the lower courts had a new substantive tool to use in evaluating
complaints. 150 Similarly, when the Court held that only direct purchasers could sue for price fixing,1 5 ' the lower courts could entertain motions to dismiss suits by indirect purchasers. 15 2 Just this last Term, the
Court confirmed that misrepresentation or nondisclosure is a necessary
element for a claim under the Williams Act, 15 3 and the same process
may be expected there.
The process works more actively in emerging areas of law. Consider, for example, the burgeoning civil litigation under the 1970 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 154 which
epitomizes the litigation boom. The statute, as one court put it, is
"constructed on the model of a treasure hunt."' 155 In a provision little
discussed in Congress, it authorizes a private action for treble damages,
plus an award of attorneys' fees, for "[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation."1 56 The key triggering event
for a violation is a "pattern of racketeering activity."' 15 7 The statute
forbids use of income from such an activity in operation of a business
148. For an argument that specificity in pleading could be useful in negligence
cases, in conjunction with modifications in the substantive law, see Epstein, supra note
146, at 566.
149. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
150. See, e.g., Sacks v. Reynolds Sec., Inc., 593 F.2d 1234, 1239-41 (D.C. Cir.
1978) (dismissal pursuant to Blue Chip Stamps).
151. See Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
152. See, e.g., Merican, Inc. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 713 F.2d 958, 965-69 (3d
Cir. 1983) (dismissal pursuant to Illinois Brick), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1024 (1984).
153. Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2458 (1985).
154. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982).
155. Sutliff, Inc. v. Donovan Cos., 727 F.2d 648, 652 (7th Cir. 1984).
156. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982).
157. Id. § 1962.
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engaged in interstate commerce,' 5 8 acquiring a business through such
activity, 159 or participation in the conduct of the affairs of an enterprise
through such activity.' 60 A "pattern of racketeering activity," in turn,
requires the commission within ten years of two or more "predicate
6
acts," which include violation of one of a series of criminal statutes.' '
Since mail fraud 162 and wire fraud 163 are included in this list, "garden
variety fraud" could be catapulted into a treble damage action with the
addition of the lurid term "racketeering" to the complaint.
For about ten years after RICO was passed, the civil suit provisions
languished. Around 1980, however, a wave of litigation under the statute began. This has caused an uproar in the courts.1 6 4 Some courts
have tried to graft requirements onto the statute and dismiss cases that
do not satisfy those requirements. Most notably, the Second Circuit
decided that a RICO claim could not lie unless the defendant had been
convicted of the predicate acts. 16 5 Courts also dismissed cases for failure to allege links to organized crime,' 66 a special RICO injury,' 67 or
68
an enterprise separate from the person accused of violating the Act.' 69
The Supreme Court has recently rejected certain of these elements,'
158. Id.
159. Id. § 1962(b).
160. Id. § 1962(c).

161. Id. § 1961(1). The pattern requirement has been interpreted to mandate
something more than the predicate acts. See Northern Trust Bank/O'Hare, N.A. v. Inryco, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 828 (N.D. Il. 1985) (predicate acts must show both continuity
and relationship to each other).
162. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982).
163. Id. § 1343.
164. "Congress. . . may well have created a runaway treble damage bonanza for
the already excessively litigious." Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1361 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1002 (1983); see Pickholz, The Firestorm Over Civil RICO,
A.B.A. J., Mar. 1985, at 78. Antitrust plaintiffs with weak claims (but not those with
strong ones) are advised to add RICO claims. See Fricano & Brusca, RICO Route May
Suit Potential Antitrust Plaintiffs, Legal Times, Apr. 8, 1985, at 17, col. I.
165. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd, 105 S. Ct.
3275 (1985).
166. See Barr v. WUI/TAS, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). But see Schacht v.
Brown, 711 F.2d 1343 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1002 (1983); see also Note, Civil
RICO: The Temptation and Impropriety ofJudicial Restriction, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1101,
1106-09 (1982) (disapproving requirement of organized crime link).
167. See Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 741 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1984), vacated, 105
S. Ct. 3550 (1985).
168. See United States v. Computer Sciences Corp., 689 F.2d 1181, 1190-91 (4th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1105 (1983). But see United States v. Hartley, 678
F.2d 961, 987-90 (11 th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1170 (1983); see also Haroco,
Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384, 401 (7th Cir. 1984) ("Discussion
of this person/enterprise problem under RICO can easily slip into a metaphysical or
ontological style of discourse-after all, when is the person truly an entity 'distinct' or
'separate' from the enterprise?"), affd on other grounds, 105 S. Ct. 3291 (1985).
169. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985) (rejecting requirement of conviction for predicate acts); American Nat'l Bank &Trust Co. v. Haroco, Inc.,
105 S. Ct. 3291 (1985) (civil claim under RICO need not allege damages suffered
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so that some opportunities for dismissal have disappeared, although
170
others may arise.
The experience under RICO illustrates how limits imposed by the
substantive law can frustrate efforts to facilitate dismissal of cases. Despite the intensity of the lower courts' attempts to locate grounds for
dismissal, the Supreme Court has suggested that the RICO boom can
only be curtailed by amending the statute. 171 Similar substantive constraints may hamper efforts to develop grounds for dismissal in other
areas as well. Whatever the pressures of the litigation boom, then,
often the substantive law simply will not support development of the
kind of separable issues that can be used to winnow cases at the pleading stages.
Where the substantive law does provide such separable issues, it
will often be necessary, in response to the natural urge towards vagueness in pleading under the Federal Rules,' 7 2 for a court to demand additional particulars to resolve such separable issues. This emphasis on
detail differs significantly from the notice pleading idea because it seeks
to elicit details that will allow resolution of the case at the outset.1 7 3
But the existence of such a severable issue does not mean that making
an early decision will always be easy. Consider, for example, pleadings
dispositions on statute of limitations grounds. Although it is an affirmative defense, limitations can be raised by motion to dismiss, and the
plaintiff can be required to provide details sufficient to evaluate the limitations question. Despite the seemingly automatic application of limitations, however, the law has over time developed equitable doctrines
regulating accrual and tolling that turn on the facts of the particular
case and therefore often preclude pretrial decision.' 74 Even where a
severable issue can be identified, a reliable merits decision at the outset
may be impossible.
2. PleadingsDeterminationsthat Defendant Has Not Violated the Plaintiff's
Rights. - Even without segregating a separable issue a court may, with
sufficient details, be able to decide at the pleading stage that the dethrough violation of predicate offenses). While acknowledging that plaintiffs must allege
each element of a RICO claim, the Court, by a 5-4 vote, held that the Second Circuit's
efforts to construct new elements for a claim were invalid. Sediia, 105 S. Ct. at 3286.
The majority recognized that the dramatic growth in civil RICO cases may not be what
Congress had in mind, but said that if correction is necessary it should come from Congress. Id. at 3287.
170. In Sedima, the Court clearly enunciated four requirements that must be alleged
to state a claim: "(1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity." 105 S. Ct. at 3285 (footnote omitted). It remains to be seen how the lower
courts will apply these elements, particularly the third and fourth, at the pleading stage.
171. See supra note 169.
172. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
173. See supra note 124 and accompanying text (discussing use of motions for a
more definite statement to accomplish this purpose).
174. See Marcus, Fraudulent Concealment in Federal Court: Toward a More Disparate Standard?, 71 Geo. LJ. 829, 902-04 (1983).
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fendant has not violated the plaintiff's rights. For example, in 1976 the
Supreme Court upheld dismissal of a prisoner suit alleging that defendants' denial of medical care constituted cruel and unusual punishment.1 7 5 Although it reaffirmed the policy that pro se complaints
should be liberally construed,1 7 6 the Court rejected this prisoner's
claim because his "complaint provide[d] a detailed factual accounting
of the treatment he received. .

.

. It is apparent from his complaint

that he received extensive177medical care and that the doctors were not
indifferent to his needs."
Such case-specific decisions are possible in a number of contexts,
and the courts' rejection of conclusory allegations often reflects the
sensible belief that more detail may reveal a basis for dismissal. Civil
rights cases provide a good example; it is commonplace now for courts
1 78
to hold that conclusory allegations are insufficient to state a claim.
This is no mere formality. The tendency of litigants to repackage anything that strikes them as unfair as a violation of due process compels
the courts to demand more information about the historical events that
the plaintiff claims occurred. Often these details demonstrate that the
79
incident constituted at most a state law tort, and dismissal follows.'

Merits determinations of this type are not limited to civil rights
cases. The willingness of many courts to find that the facts as pleaded
reveal no legal violation reflects an approach to dispositions on the
merits at the pleading stage that Conley v. Gibson would not appear to
permit. In Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.,' 80 for example, the Seventh Circuit expressly rejected a literal application of the Conley stan175. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
176. Id. at 106 (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972)).
177. Id. at 108 n.16. For a similar dismissal of a prisoner case, see Benson v. Cady,
761 F.2d 335 (7th Cir. 1985).
178. See, e.g., Williams v. Gorton, 529 F.2d 668, 671 (9th Cir. 1976) (Conclusory
allegations, unsupported by facts, are insufficient to state a claim under the Civil Rights
Act.).
179. See, e.g., Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing Serv., 771 F.2d 194 (7th Cir. 1985) (delay in booking suspect due to negligence not a valid civil rights claim); Wright v.
Anthony, 733 F.2d 575, 577 (8th Cir. 1984) (no constitutional violation where plaintiff
was allowed to submit only written statement to congressional committee rather than
full oral statement); Woodard v. Los Fresnos Indep. School Dist., 732 F.2d 1243 (5th
Cir. 1984) (departure from school rules regarding punishment at most a tort, not a violation of constitutional rights); Green v. Maraio, 722 F.2d 1013 (2d Cir. 1983) (prisoner's action against state court judge dismissed because judge did not act with clear
absence ofjurisdiction and was therefore immune).
These cases should be distinguished from other civil rights actions dismissed by the
courts for lack of state action, e.g., Cohen v. Illinois Inst. of Technology, 581 F.2d 658
(7th Cir. 1978) (conclusory allegation that state and federal support to private school
constituted support for specific discriminatory practices insufficient), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1135 (1979), which fits the mold discussed supra notes 149-74 and accompanying
text, of severable elements for which specifics may be demanded.
180. 745 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1758 (1985).
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dard in upholding the dismissal of an antitrust complaint.181 Plaintiffs
had provided car transportation services to Ford Motor Company for a
number of years until Ford terminated the arrangement and contracted
with another company for those services. Plaintiffs sued Ford and the
new transport company, alleging that defendants had entered into a
conspiracy to drive plaintiffs out of business, switched the contract to
provide transport services through a "sham and knowingly predatory
bid," and thereby enabled the competitor to acquire plaintiffs' assets
for less than their true
value.1 8 2 The trial court granted defendants'
83
dismiss.'
to
motion
The Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that "Conley has never
been interpreted literally"' 8 4 and that, in practice, " 'a complaint...
must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the
material elements necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable
legal theory.' "s185 Measured against this standard, the court found the
specific factual allegations to contradict, rather than support, any viable
theory for plaintiffs. To prevail, plaintiffs had to allege either a per se
violation of the antitrust laws or a forbidden effect on competition.
Although plaintiffs used the per se label,' 8 6 they had not alleged that
defendants had terminated plaintiffs' services as retaliation for price
cutting, which is traditionally handled as a per se violation. To the contrary, plaintiffs alleged that they had continually sought to raise their
prices.' 8 7 Further, even if their allegations of a conspiracy were
credited as showing a group boycott, that would constitute a per se violation only if used to implement agreements that themselves constituted per se violations, which the complaint failed to show. 188 The
ominous reference to "sham" and "predatory" behavior, the court concluded, stated no more than a legal conclusion: "it would be improper
for us to attempt to conjure up some sort of tenable antitrust scheme
for these cryptic allusions."' 8 9 Plaintiffs' effort to allege an anticompetitive impact similarly failed: "In considering a motion to dismiss, the
court is not required to don blinders and to ignore commercial reality." 90 Hence, plaintiffs' assertions about "predatory" actions meant
nothing, the court found, because it would be "preposterous" for Ford
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

Id. at 1106.
Id. at 1105.
561 F. Supp. 885, 889 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
745 F.2d at 1106 (citation omitted).
Id. (quoting In re Plywood Antitrust Litig., 655 F.2d 627, 641 (5th Cir. 198 1)).
Id. at 1108.
Id.
Id. at 1109.

189. Id. at 1109 n.5; see also id. at 1107 n.4 ("Standing alone, the boilerplate recitation of a conspiracy in . . . the complaint is insufficient to withstand a motion to
dismiss.").
190. Id. at I110.
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to arrange to be the victim of such activity.' 9 ' To uphold this complaint, the court concluded, would undercut the Sherman Act by under19 2
mining a buyer's right to replace its supplier.

Car Carriersstrains the outer limits of pleading practice. Although

courts can sometimes make such determinations on the basis of detailed pleadings,' 9 3 it will not often be possible to do so. Certainly,

insistence on detailed pleading should not be used to obscure unsettled
issues of substantive law,' 9 4 and using pleadings as an opportunity to
evaluate the whole of the plaintiff's allegations may tempt courts to
question the factual conclusions on which the plaintiff has rested his
claim, 195 a temptation that courts should resist.
191. Id. The court at two points discounted plaintiffs' allegations as "inherently
implausible." See id. at 1107 n.4, 1109. Although this language suggests that it was
evaluating the persuasiveness of plaintiffs' evidence, a highly questionable course, see
infra notes 196-227 and accompanying text, it should be considered as part of its reference to commercial reality. See supra text accompanying note 190.
192. 745 F.2d at 1110.
193. See, e.g., Sante Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 474 (1977) (affirming dismissal of securities claim because "the transaction, if carried out as alleged in the complaint, was neither deceptive nor manipulative").
194. This seems to be the objection of Professor Roberts in his article on the application of fact pleading to standing cases. See Roberts, supra note 12, at 421-25. But
the root problem there is substantive; as Professor Chayes has observed, the Supreme
Court has a ritual recitation of the "rules" governing standing and, "[t]his ritual recitation having been performed, the Court then chooses up sides and decides the case."
Chayes, The Supreme Court 1981 Term-Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 23 (1982). As Professor Roberts argues, the Court may
be using pleading language to hide its failure to reach consensus on the law of standing.
See Roberts, supra note 12, at 421. Were there such a consensus, however, it might be
that standing questions could often be resolved on the pleadings with sufficient particulars, although Professor Roberts remains dubious owing to the ambiguity of substantive
standing doctrine. See id. at 430. If so, standing is like many other substantive legal
rules that can only be applied with reference to a multitude of factors and are therefore
not readily subject to application at the pleading stage. See supra notes 145-48 and
accompanying text. But cf. Page, The Scope of Liability for Antitrust Violations, 37
Stan. L. Rev. 1445, 1448 (1985) (arguing that antitrust standing rules are well suited to
summary disposition).
195. One way they might do this is by mischaracterizing essentially factual conclusions as legal conclusions. For example, in Strauss v. City of Chicago, 760 F.2d 765 (7th
Cir. 1985), the plaintiff alleged an unprovoked beating by a police officer for which he
claimed the city was liable due to its practice of hiring and retaining brutal police officers. In support of his allegation that the city had such a practice, he submitted statistical summaries of complaints filed about police behavior. Although it claimed to follow
Conley, id. at 767-68, the Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal because it found the statistical material too general, id. at 768 & n.4, a circumstance it held "renders the allegations
mere legal conclusions of Section 1983 liability devoid of any well-pleaded facts," id. at
767. Compare Payne v. City of LaSalle, 1 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (Callaghan) 1116, 1117 (N.D.
Il. 1985) (suggesting Strauss creates a Catch-22 situation for the § 1983 plaintiff suing a
municipality).
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C. The Problem of Factual Conclusions Contrasted
The thrust of many of the new fact pleading cases is to challenge
the plaintiff's "conclusory" factual allegations, often about the defendant's state of mind. Car Carrierscould be criticized as doing so, but it
focuses on the legality of defendants' conduct as alleged rather than
plaintiffs' inability to marshall enough evidence to support their factual
conclusions.
The line between scrutiny of legal conclusions and scrutiny of factual conclusions is often obscure, however. For example, in Decker v.
Massey-Ferguson, Ltd., 196 plaintiff sued on behalf of a class of purchasers
of Massey-Ferguson stock, charging that the company, a producer of
farm machinery, had committed securities fraud by painting too rosy a
picture of itself in its 1975 annual report and other documents. After
ordering plaintiff to amend his complaint to identify the specific state19 7
ments claimed to be false, the district court dismissed.
Citing the Supreme Court's warnings about strike suits in Blue Chip
Stamps, 19 8 the Second Circuit affirmed. It did so by comparing the allegations in plaintiff's "prolix and discursive 69 page complaint"' 199 with
the 1975 annual report and other documents issued by Massey. On the
basis of this comparison, it found plaintiff's allegation that Massey had
falsely claimed record profits "patently false" because the reports were
"replete with facts and figures whose accuracy has not been challenged" that showed just such profits. 20 0 Similarly, it rejected plaintiff's claim that Massey should have announced that it was
undercapitalized because its capitalization and debt structure were fully
disclosed in its financial reports. 20 ' It also held that Massey's 10-K filings with the SEC "substantially satisfied" then-applicable regulations,
202
and that any forecasts contained in the report were not actionable.
Decker seems to further the objectives of the substantive law because it reflects the court's conviction that defendants had not violated
the law. Hence, Decker might be viewed, at least in part, as a legal conclusion case. In particular, the court's conclusions that Massey's 10-K
filings satisfied applicable regulations and that forecasts are not actionable appear to mandate dismissal. But the handling of other claims is
troubling. Undoubtedly, "patently false" charges should not enable a
plaintiff to use broad discovery to bludgeon a nuisance settlement out
of defendants. But where the focus is on factual conclusions, one loses
196. 681 F.2d I11 (2d Cir. 1982).
197. Decker v. Massey-Ferguson, Ltd., 534 F. Supp. 873, 884 (S.D.N.Y. 1981),
aff'd, 681 F.2d 111 (1982).
198. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 740 (1975); see supra

notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
199. 681 F.2d at 114.
200. Id. at 115.
201. Id. at 116.
202. Id. at 116-17.
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the confidence, present in a legal conclusion case, that a decision to
dismiss on the merits is sufficiently reliable.
Decker illustrates the point even though plaintiff's claim there
seems to have been extremely weak. Although the court was able to
cite "facts and figures whose accuracy has not been challenged," there
is at least a nagging doubt about whether plaintiff could have challenged those figures had he been allowed discovery. 20 3 Moreover, the
appellate court seemed to be relying on material that was not contained
in the complaint, 20 4 which would normally convert the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. 20 5 Indeed, evaluation of
certain securities law claims may inherently be unworkable on the
pleadings. 20 6 In Decker, the court might well have concluded that plaintiffs should be afforded little or no discovery before ruling on summary
judgment, 20 7 but handling the motion in the summary judgment format
better accords with the objective of assuring that the outcome accurately reflects the substantive merits.
The difficulties with scrutinizing factual conclusions become manifest in connection with the frequent demand that the plaintiff proffer
sufficient supporting evidence to make conclusory allegations, particu203. See Note, supra note 12, at 1437 (criticizing Decker for denying plaintiff discovery of internal memoranda and projections).
204. For example, the court cited a New York Times story aboutJohn Deere & Co.,
another manufacturer of agricultural implements, to support its conclusion that the period after 1975 was "the type of economic climate in which section 10(b) litigation flourishes." 681 F.2d at 114. The court stated that Massey's 1975 annual report was "in the
record," but it did not say that the document was an exhibit to plaintiff's complaint,
although its citation to pertinent authority under Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c) suggests it may
have been. See 681 F.2d at 113 (citing 5 C. Wright &A. Miller, supra note 3, § 1327, at
491 n.18). In any event, the court appeared to look beyond the 1975 annual report and
referred to Massey's consolidated financial statements, SEC filings, and 1977 annual report. See id. at 117.
205. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b).
206. The Decker court's approach seems quite different from the attitude in
Goldman v. Belden, 754 F.2d 1059 (2d Cir. 1985), in which the court reversed dismissal
of a securities class action, stating:
The court's view that the facts may not really have been problems was not so
much a ruling as to the adequacy of the pleading as it was an evaluation of the
materiality of the nondisclosures. Materiality is a mixed question of law and
fact, and a complaint may not properly be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)
(or even pursuant to Rule 56) on the ground that the alleged misstatements or
omissions are not material unless they are so obviously unimportant to a reasonable investor that reasonable minds could not differ on the question of their
importance.
Id. at 1067 (citation omitted); see also Eichler v. Berner, 105 S. Ct. 2622, 2629 n.21
(1985) ("We note ... the inappropriateness of resolving the question of the respondents' fault solely on the basis of the allegations set forth in the complaint."). Although
there may be a distinction between determining whether a statement is "false" and
whether it is "material," any such distinction seems insufficient to support such a difference in treatment.
207. See infra notes 317-29 and accompanying text.
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larly those relating to state of mind, 20 8 credible. In these cases, unlike
Decker, the court is not affirmatively concluding that plaintiff's charges
are false, but only that they are unsupported. Although the desire to
insist on some underlying evidence is natural, that exercise is materially
different from the substantive scrutiny described above. Requiring
plaintiff to proffer supporting evidence at the pleadings stage cannot be
justified for several reasons.
First, this attack on factual conclusions stands the code distinction
between ultimate facts and evidence on its head. State of mind is undoubtedly a fact, even now sometimes labelled an "ultimate fact."' 209
The insistence on more details is really a demand for an offer of
proof-some specification of evidence that will raise an inference that
the defendant's state of mind was as alleged. This creation of a new
burden of production effects a subtle but real shift in the substantive
law because plaintiff's lack of evidence provides insufficient assurance
2 10
that plaintiff in fact has no valid claim against defendant.
Where the court requires detailed support for a legal conclusion,
analysis of the details may permit the court to conclude confidently that
the plaintiff has no case. 2 11 But where the plaintiff is unable to provide
details because only the defendant possesses such information, no such
confidence is possible. 21 2 To the contrary, it may be that the defendant
has so effectively concealed his wrongdoing that the plaintiff can
unearth it only with discovery. To insist on details as a prerequisite to
discovery is putting the cart before the horse. RICO provides an illustration. Rather than requiring that the defendant be convicted of the
offenses that the plaintiff relied upon as predicate acts, 213 some courts
insisted that, where defendant had not been convicted, plaintiff plead
sufficient facts to provide probable cause to believe that defendant was
guilty of the predicate offenses. 2 14 The Seventh Circuit, however,
properly refused to impose this pleading requirement because plaintiffs
2 15
have no opportunity for discovery before filing suit.

208. See supra notes 90-93, 96 and accompanying text.
209. See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 170 (1979) (defendant's actual malice an
"ultimate fact" in defamation cases); see also Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United
States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 498 (1984) (knowledge a "fact").

210. Cf. Hazard, The Effect of the Class Action Device Upon the Substantive Law,
58 F.R.D. 307, 307 (1973) ("[It seems fair to say that procedure's very function is to

modify the substantive law."). But see supra note 144.
211. See supra notes 175-95 and accompanying text.
212. See Note, supra note 12, at 1435 ("[Ihe inflexible application of the particularity requirement in contemporary securities fraud cases inevitably results in the dismissal of some meritorious claims.").
213. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
214. See Taylor v. Bear Stearns & Co., 572 F. Supp. 667, 682-83 (N.D. Ga. 1983);
Bache Halsey Stuart Shields Inc. v. Tracy Collins Bank &Trust Co., 558 F. Supp. 1042,
1045-46 (D. Utah 1983).

215. See Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384, 404 (7th
Cir. 1984), affd on other grounds, 105 S.Ct. 3291 (1985).
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Second, insistence on detailed evidence regarding state of mind
violates the second sentence of Rule 9(b), which specifies that
"[m]alice, intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind of a person
may be averred generally." 21 6 On its face, this sentence precludes use
of the Rule to require plaintiffs to provide particulars on the very matters for which so many courts say that supporting facts are now
21 7
required.
Third, the new scrutiny of the proof regarding factual conclusions
calls for judgments for which the legal system presently lacks an appropriate standard. How much evidence is enough? Consider Ross v. A.H.
Robins Co. ,218 where the Second Circuit held that plaintiff in a securities
fraud action had failed to allege sufficient facts to support the conclusion that defendants knew by 1973 of the dangers of the Dalkon
Shield. 21 9 Plaintiffs had provided some detail by pointing out that in
1972 an independent researcher had identified and reported on the
risks of the device and that in May, 1974, Robins itself had sent a letter
to 120,000 doctors alerting them to possible health problems resulting
from use of the device. The appellate court held that this showing was
insufficient without some connection between the independent re220
searcher and Robins.
The court's insistence on more evidence is difficult to understand.
Even if there were no connection between the researcher and Robins,
the fact that the researcher could independently assemble data on the
harmful effects of the device by 1972 certainly supports the inference
that Robins could readily have done so itself or at least have learned of
the independent report. Indeed, other cases have shown that Robins
22
made a practice of gathering data on the safety of the Dalkon Shield. '
It had earlier made a number of public statements, presumably based
on the investigations of skilled persons, about the safety of the prod216. Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b); see Wayne Inv., Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 739 F.2d 11, 13
(1st Cir. 1984) (Rule 9(b) does not require particulars from which intent can be inferred)

(citation omitted).
217. See supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.

218. 607 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 946 (1980).
219. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
220. See 607 F.2d at 558.
221. For a detailed review of the efforts actually made by Robins to evaluate the
safety of this new product, see the post-trial findings of fact in Hawkinson v. A.H. Robins
Co., 595 F. Supp. 1290, 1295-1306 (D. Colo. 1984). The Hawkinson court found further

that "Robins could have learned about and warned of such dangers with the application
of the reasonable skill and foresight expected of an established pharmaceutical company," and that "Robins not only failed to disclose its lack of knowledge; it affirmatively
asserted that the Shield was safe." Id. at 1307. This is not to suggest that the outcome
of this personal injury case should affect the decision of a securities fraud suit, given the
different culpability showing required in a securities fraud action, but only to show that
the need for more detailed allegations to get into discovery in Ross is difficult to square
with the results of discovery in other cases.
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UCt. 2 22 By May, 1974, it was sufficiently alarmed about safety to write

over one hundred thousand doctors. The court of appeals felt, how223
ever, that any inference of knowledge was not a "strong" inference.
Whatever this standard requires, it is not defined anywhere in the Federal Rules.
Fourth, this analysis invites weighing of evidence. It is traditionally
said that the likelihood of plaintiff's success on the factual merits is not
a proper subject for evaluation at the pleading stage. 224 Yet the courts
do weigh the likelihood that plaintiff will be able to prove its factual
conclusions. In a recent civil rights suit, for example, the Ninth Circuit
affirmed dismissal because the "factual surroundings" cut against the
plaintiff's conclusion of racial motivation. 2 25 Such a determination at
the pleading stage is highly troubling. The better view was articulated
by the Seventh Circuit in refusing to impose a probable cause standard
in RICO suits: "Even the most specific allegations do not establish
probable cause unless they are reliable. We are, to say the least, perplexed as to how a court might undertake such evaluations of reliability
in deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12."226 To suggest that
courts can do so stands in stark contrast to the standard for grant of
summary judgment, where any reasonable inference favoring the party
opposing summary judgment is said to create an issue of fact preclud2 27
ing pretrial disposition.
In sum, the courts' tendency to scrutinize the proof supporting
222. See S. Englemayer & R. Wagman, Lord'sJustice 39-54 (1985) (detailing statements made by Robins, and contrasting them to evidence available to Robins). Indeed,
Robins even used information from Mary Gabrielson, upon whose report the plaintiff in
Ross relied, see 607 F.2d at 558, in publicity designed to assuage doubts about the safety
of the Dalkon Shield. See S. Englemayer & R. Wagman, supra, at 48-50.
223. Ross, 607 F.2d at 558. Lest it be thought that thejudges of the Second Circuit
can easily apply this kind of demanding standard, consider Albany Welfare Rights Org.
Day Care Center, Inc. v. Schreck, 463 F.2d 620 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S.
944 (1973). Plaintiff claimed that defendant county officials refused to refer children to
its child care facilities in retaliation for plaintiff's organizing activities among welfare
recipients. The majority upheld dismissal because "[t]he complaint in the instant action
presents no facts to support the allegation that the refusal to refer children was in retaliation for [plaintiffs] organizing activities." Id. at 623. Judge Feinberg, dissenting,
agreed that dismissal would be appropriate if the complaint "offered nothing more than
[a] bald assertion," id. at 624, but found that "the complaint is the antithesis of the
typically sparse, bare bones, conclusory pleading that might justify dismissal," id. at 625.
224. See, e.g., Leimer v. State Mut. Life Assurance Co., 108 F.2d 302, 306 (8th Cir.
1940) ("No matter how improbable it may be that [plaintiff] can prove her claim, she is
entitled to an opportunity to make the attempt ....").
225. Jones v. Community Redevelopment Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 650 (9th Cir.
1984). But cf. Wade v.Johnson Controls, Inc., 693 F.2d 19, 22 (2d Cir. 1982) (allegation that employer failed to replace or repair defective air purification system with purpose of harming employees "not beyond the realm of possibility").
226. Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384, 404 (7th Cir.
1984), affd on other grounds, 105 S.Ct. 3291 (1985).
227. See 10A C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2728,
at 178-86 (1983) (although convinced that should verdict be returned against movant at
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factual conclusions appears impossible to justify within the existing
framework for pleadings decisions. As the following discussion demonstrates, the risks associated with heightened scrutiny of factual conclusions are not warranted even when limited to "suspicious" claims nor
are they permissible as part of the trial court's discretion.
IV.

SEGREGATING SUSPICIOUS CLAIMS-TOWARD

DISCRETIONARY DISMISSALS?

Since the new fact pleading cases seem to be limited to certain recurring situations symptomatic of the perceived drawbacks of the litigation boom, the new fact pleading might be cabined to a few limited
categories of cases. A review of the likely categories shows, however,
that none provides an adequate justification for applying stringent
pleading requirements. The alternative of expanded trial court discretion to dismiss also fails. The problems of the litigation boom cannot
so easily be shunted onto a special track.
A. Disfavored Claims
The classic justification for singling out some claims for onerous
pleading requirements is that they are "disfavored. '2 28 Malicious prosecution, for example, has long been viewed with disfavor because of its
tendency to cause litigation to proliferate-making one lawsuit the basis for filing a second lawsuit. 229 The critical point is that the disfavor is
directed at the type of claim being asserted, not the risk that it may
prove baseless. Federal courts adopting stricter scrutiny of factual conclusions often display somewhat similar disfavor for claims falling into
the categories that have experienced the greatest increase in filings during the last twenty years. But the growth in filings provides insufficient
23 0
justification for this treatment.
The most common focus for disapproval are civil rights cases, but
such claims should not be disfavored. To the contrary, they are central
to our concept of liberty, and the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized their importance. 23 ' Private enforcement has played a key
trial court would have to set aside verdict and order new trial, court has no discretion to
grant summary judgment if there is dispute as to facts).
228. See 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 3, § 1296, at 400 (disfavored claim
idea an "old cliche").
229. See Prosser & Keeton, supra note 52, at 876.
230. Cf. Dalton, Taking the Right to Appeal (More or Less) Seriously, 95 Yale L.J.
62, 64 (1985) (caseload concerns alone provide insufficient justification for curtailing

right to appeal); Redish, Book Review, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 1378, 1391 (1985) (increase in
civil rights filings not a reason for limiting liberal interpretation of civil rights laws).
231. See, e.g., Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977) ("the first line of defense
against constitutional violations"). Thus, when Congress authorized the award of attorneys' fees to the prevailing party in civil rights litigation, the Court held that prevailing
plaintiffs could recover almost automatically, see Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390
U.S. 400 (1968) (per curiam), but that defendants could only recover if the action were

HeinOnline -- 86 Colum. L. Rev. 471 1986

COLUMBIA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 86:433

role in accomplishing civil rights goals, 232 so that antagonism toward
assertion of this type of claim by private litigants cannot be justified.
Securities claims, the next most vilified category, are hardly disfavored. Many of the most important claims were implied by the courts
themselves in order to accomplish the objectives of legislation that
might not be enforced without private suits.2 3 3 Although the Supreme

Court has cut back on implication of private remedies, it has also rejected efforts to impose a high burden of proof in actions under rule
lOb-5, 234 the most significant group of securities actions. Whatever
their potential for abuse, securities fraud suits are not disfavored
claims.
Similarly, although overbroad reading of the Sherman Act in favor
of plaintiffs may frustrate its purposes, 23 5 antitrust claims cannot be
viewed as disfavored. Private antitrust suits were intended by Congress
to serve an important function in deterring violation of the Sherman
6
Act.

23

A variant of the disfavored claims approach is the argument that
the potential for harming a person's reputation that fraud claims present justifies heightened scrutiny in those cases.2 3 7 Similar arguments
have been advanced concerning claims under RICO (involving charges
that defendant is a "racketeer"), but it is difficult to say that the opprobrium connected with such claims is really greater than that attached to
brought vexatiously or in bad faith, see Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S.
412 (1978). Marek v. Chesny, 105 S. Ct. 3012 (1985), alters the former result where the
defendant makes a Rule 68 offer to compromise that plaintiff refuses, and plaintiff recovers less than the amount of the Rule 68 offer.
232. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see also Norman,
The Strange Career of the Civil Rights Division's Commitment to Brown, 93 Yale L.J.
983, 984 (1984) (After Brown, the federal government did little to enforce it, leaving
enforcement to private suits.).
233. See, e.g.,J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964) (action implied for
violation of rules governing proxy solicitation because "[p]rivate enforcement of the
proxy rules provides a necessary supplement to [Securties & Exchange] Commission
action").
234. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375 (1983), in which the
Court refused to apply the common law requirement that fraud be proved by clear and
convincing evidence in a private action under Rule lOb-5 because "an important purpose of the federal securities statutes was to rectify perceived deficiencies in the available common-law protections by establishing higher standards of conduct in the
securities industry." Id. at 389; cf. Eichler v. Berner, 105 S. Ct. 2622, 2628-29 (1985)
(Court refuses to apply common law in pari delicto defense in federal securities fraud
action).
235. Thus, the Antitrust Division of the Department ofJustice has recently participated on behalf of defendants in antitrust cases, arguing against broad interpretations of
antitrust law. See Marcus, Conflicts Among Circuits and Transfers Within the Federal
Judicial System, 93 Yale L.J. 677, 707-08 n.187 (1984).
236. See, e.g., Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 751-52
(1947);Javelin Corp. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 546 F.2d 276, 280 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
431 U.S. 938 (1977).
237. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
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others which do not invoke heightened pleading scrutiny. 238 Accordingly, this basis for treating claims as disfavored seems unpersuasive as

well.
It would surely be odd to treat the above claims as less favored

than ordinary automobile torts that find their way into federal court
due to diversity jurisdiction. Yet auto accident cases are clearly, under
Form 9, subject to minimal scrutiny at the pleading stage. The factors
that may give civil rights, securities, or antitrust claims a high settle-

ment value despite lack of merit result from problems endemic to the
litigation system-such as broad discovery-and the fact that the content of the underlying substantive laws provide no easy handles for
early resolution of claims. These difficulties, however, provide no basis
for treating these claims as disfavored.
B. Disfavored Litigants

If the nature of the claim does not justify a hostile reception in the
courts, it may be argued that the identity of the plaintiff or his lawyer
does. But the categories suggested by the cases do not commend
themselves as general standards. To the contrary, a review of these
categories suggests that one should not single out cases for stricter
pleading scrutiny by focusing on the characteristics of the participants.
1. The Repeat Player. - Although Professor Marc Galanter may be
' 23 9
some indicorrect that most private parties are "one shot litigants,

viduals distinguish themselves by suing frequently. 240 The sheer

238. Judge Cardamone made this point well in his dissent in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v.
Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1984) (Cardamone, J., dissenting), rev'd, 105 S. Ct.
3275 (1985):
Today, defendants in civil suits are labelled as violators of environmental laws
when pumping coal byproducts into the atmosphere, despoilers of our rivers
when emptying oil from their tanker's bilges, adulterers in state divorce actions, and killers in vehicular wrongful death actions. The allegations of the
civil complaint do not make these citizens criminals, although their conduct
may well subject them to criminal prosecutions. Why the outcry over RICO?
Id. at 508. In reversing, the Supreme Court appeared to agree with him. See 105 S.Ct.
at 3283 ("As for stigma, a civil RICO proceeding leaves no greater stain than do a
number of other civil proceedings."); see also Herman & McLean v. Huddleston, 459
U.S. 375, 390 (1983) ("The interests of defendants in a securities case do not differ
qualitatively from the interests of defendants sued for violations of other federal statutes
such as the antitrust or civil rights laws ....").
239. See Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits
of Legal Change, 9 Law & Soc'y Rev. 95, 97-114 (1974) (differentiating between litigants who are "one shotters" who have only occasional recourse to the courts, and "repeat players," who are involved in many similar litigations over time).
240. This is hardly a new phenomenon. Consider, for example, the following description of the "serious litigant" in 16th century England: "The serious litigant ....
litigated as a matter of business practice, less with the intention of vindicating his rights
than to obtain advantage over his opponent, bent upon bringing the adversary party to
compromise or ultimately wearing him down to defeat and capitulation." Barnes, Star
Chamber Litigants and Their Counsel, 1596-1641, in Legal Records and the Historian
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weight of past litigation sometimes prompts courts to curtail new filings
by certain plaintiffs, particularly in prisoner suits,

241

and a history of

vexatious litigation is considered pertinent to sanctions for present
abuse of litigation. 2 42 Given the concerns about the litigation boom,
one might argue that courts should ask more of the repeat plaintiff at
the pleading stage.
The fact that the plaintiff is a repeat litigant does not, standing
alone, warrant stricter treatment. Consider, for example, Harry Lewis,
perhaps America's leading corporate gadfly. Without attracting much
public attention, Mr. Lewis, who often files derivative suits, has over the
last decade brought literally dozens of suits, including at least one that
reached the Supreme Court. 2 43 He has not won all the cases, but he
has occasionally obtained relief. While some judges have been suspicious about his litigation activities, 24 4 it seems that in general he has
not been found to have engaged in groundless litigation.2 45 Even
though derivative actions may be viewed as peculiarly susceptible to
abuse, 24 6 the fact that a given plaintiff has filed many such actions does
not necessarily show that he is abusing the litigation process.
There are two basic and related problems with subjecting the
pleadings of repeat litigants to stricter scrutiny. First, the only possible
relevance of a plaintiff's prior litigation activities is to show that he is
7, 22-23 (. Baker ed. 1978). For recent examples see Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d
1221, 1231 n.13 (9th Cir. 1984) (plaintiff had filed over 100 separate actions); Demos v.
Kincheloe, 563 F. Supp. 30 (E.D. Wash. 1982) (184 actions in three years).
241. See, e.g., Abdullah v. Gatto, 773 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1985) (leave of court
needed for future filings); Urban v. United Nations, 768 F.2d 1497 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(injunction against filing suit in any federal court without prior approval of that court).
Regarding the burden of prisoner suits, see infra note 269.
242. See, e.g., Taylor v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 39 Fed. R. Serv. 2d
(Callaghan) 1309 (N.D.N.Y. 1984) (Imposing Rule 11 sanctions on plaintiff said to "embody the paragon of harassing and vexatious litigation" on the basis of"[t]he beleaguering saga of these and other Alan Taylor lawsuits.").
243. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979). Also,
a leading corporate decision is the product of a Lewis lawsuit. See Aronson v. Lewis,
473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).
This author's research revealed that by the end of 1984, Mr. Lewis had been a
named plaintiff in 43 reported federal cases, filed in seven different circuits, as well as
eight reported state cases. The data are on file with the Columbia Law Review.
244. See Lewis v. Curtis, 671 F.2d 779, 782-83 (3d Cir. 1982), in which the district
judge, before dismissing, queried Lewis' lawyer: "So you brought another strike suit,
didn't you?" The appellate court reversed and ordered that another judge handle the
case on remand. See id. at 789.
245. Professor Conard singles out Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 869 (1980), as an example of a sensible decision to terminate a
derivative suit after the challenged action was ratified by shareholders and the shareholders' right to be consulted had thereby been vindicated. Conard, supra note 66, at
274-75.
246. See, e.g., Brown v. Hart, Schaffner & Marx, 96 F.R.D. 64, 67 (N.D. Ill. 1982)
("Such lawsuits are the base work of rapacious jackals whose declared concern for corporate well-being camouflages their unwholesome appetite for corporate dollars.").
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the type of person who indulges in groundless litigation, supporting
the inference that this litigation is also groundless. This is precisely the
sort of relevance reasoning that is forbidden by the general prohibition
against introduction of character evidence. 2 47 Courts usually exclude
evidence of prior litigation activity, in particular, as unduly prejudicial
is not a proper ground for deciding the
because dislike for the litigious
24 8
merits of the current case.
The second problem stems from the first. The inference regarding
the litigant's character is only supportable if the past litigation was in
fact groundless; the fact that plaintiff is a gadfly is not relevant to the
merits of the current case. Accordingly, the court must determine
whether the prior litigation was indeed groundless. Since one would
presumably make such an inference only if there were several earlier
cases, 2 49 that determination could require more effort than deciding
the instant case on its merits, a point that is reinforced by considering
0
the difficulty of evaluating Mr. Lewis' past litigation. 25 Partly to avoid
such collateral issues, even where character evidence is allowed it is
or reputation evidence, rather than evinormally restricted to opinion
251
dence of specific events.
Inviting though it seems, then, the repeat player criterion is neither
a useful nor a fair device for singling out cases for heightened scrutiny
at the pleading stage. Even if it were, it would apply in a very small
number of cases. If litigation abuse is confined to that small number of
cases it is not so significant as many argue.
247. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(a) (excluding evidence of character to prove action in

conformity therewith on a particular occasion).
248. See C. McCormick, McCormick on Evidence § 196 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984); 1
D. Louisell & C. Mueller, Federal Evidence § 99 (1977); cf. Crisafi v. Holland, 655 F.2d
1305, 1309 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("[A] complaint filed in forma pauperis is not subject to
dismissal simply because the plaintiff is litigious. The number of complaints a poor per-

son files does not alone justify peremptory dismissal.").
When prior claims are admitted in evidence, it is generally on the theory that they
are so similar and numerous that they cast a shadow on the truthfulness of the present
claim. For example, San Antonio Traction Co. v. Cox, 184 S.W. 722 (Tex. Civ. App.
1916), a suit for injuries allegedly sustained alighting from one of defendant's streetcars,
involved 15 other claims by relatives of plaintiff for injuries allegedly received during the
same year getting onto or off of defendant's streetcars. The court excluded the evidence
because plaintiff had not been linked to the claims by his relatives, but stated that it
would have allowed them had plaintiff himself made them. See also Mintz v. Premier
Cab Ass'n, 127 F.2d 744 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (evidence admitted that plaintiff had previously made claim for injuries allegedly received while a passenger in a cab).
249. See D. Louisell & C. Mueller, supra note 248, § 99, at 735-36 (impeachment
of claimant with evidence of "many recent, unsuccessful, similar claims" permissible but
not where there is only "a single unsuccessful previous claim, even if it was highly
similar").
250. See supra notes 243-45 and accompanying text.
251. See Fed. R. Evid. 405.
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While most litigants are not repeat

players, lawyers certainly are,2 5 2 and their prior litigation activities

could affect the courts' attitudes toward their cases. Some courts have
2 3
relied on such personal history in making important decisions. 1
While courts have not explicitly based the dismissal of a pleading on a
lawyer's history in prior litigation, this does not dispel the real experience of lawyers that judges view different lawyers differently. Nonetheless, for two important reasons challenges to the plaintiff's lawyer do
not provide an appropriate basis-overt or covert-for stricter scrutiny
of the pleadings.
First, there will be disputes about the lawyer's prior behavior. For
example, consider I. Walton Bader, the attorney for plaintiff in Heart
Disease Research Foundationv. GeneralMotors Corp.2 54 Mr. Bader has had a
number of clashes with judges during his career, 255 and has recently
been sanctioned by a judge who relied in part on this history. 25 6 One
could imagine that defendants might be tempted to attack Mr. Bader as
part of an effort to have cases dismissed. The example of Mr. Bader,
however, proves just how inappropriate a lawyer's prior behavior would
be as a basis for dismissal. As will always be the case, there is another
side: some view Mr. Bader as a vigorous, effective advocate. 25 7 More
252. See Coffee, supra note 137, at 18-19, 22-23 (referring to plaintiff's attorneys
as repeat players and describing a "distinct subspecies" who are said to repeatedly file
strike suits).
253. See, e.g., Eavenson, Auchmuty & Greenwald v. Holtzman, 775 F.2d 535, 543
(3d Cir. 1985) (in imposing sanctions, district court referred to "a lot of harrassment"
that lawyer had used in another case); Rogers v. Kroger Co., 669 F.2d 317, 319 (5th Cir.
1982) (district court dismissed action when plaintiffs attorney was unprepared to proceed, citing a prior case in which she had also been unprepared). It should be noted that
the district court orders in both these cases were reversed.
254. 463 F.2d 98 (2d Cir. 1972); see supra notes 13-19 and accompanying text.
Recall that the district court dismissed the suit as frivolous. See 15 Fed. R. Serv. 2d
(Callaghan) 1517, 1519 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
255. See In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 659 F.2d 1332, 1335 (5th Cir.
1981) (reporting lower court's finding that Bader had tried to disrupt multidistrict proceedings "by filing and threatening to file duplicative and harassing litigation"); Independent Investor Protective League v. Touche Ross & Co., 607 F.2d 530, 534 n.5 (2d
Cir.) (affirming discovery sanctions against Bader and characterizing his conduct as "utterly intolerable and reprehensible"), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 895 (1978); Slumbertogs,
Inc. v.Jiggs, Inc., 353 F.2d 720, 720 (2d Cir. 1965) (affirming sanction of dismissal as
appropriate "[in view of the dilatory and contumacious conduct of plaintiffs and their
counsel in virtual defiance of the rules and orders of at least six judges in the district
court"), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 969 (1969); Jackson v. Bader, 74 A.D.2d 621, 622, 424
N.Y.S.2d 926, 927 (1980) (listing examples of "I. Walton Bader's cavalier attitude towards the spirit and letter of the CPLR").
256. See In re Itel Sec. Litig., 596 F. Supp. 226, 235 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (referring to
"Mr. Bader's history in this type of litigation"). For more background on this case, see
Riley & Galante, Mr. Outside-A Fiasco Over Fees, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 19, 1984, at 1, col. 1.
257. See A Bondholder's Best Friend, Forbes, Dec. 15, 1975, at 41, 43 ("Bader's
career reminds us of a story about Davy Crockett. As he travelled through Tennessee, a
stranger asked why he was going to Texas, where he later fell at the Alamo. 'To fight for
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generally, disputes about the lawyer's pedigree could, like examination
of plaintiff's prior litigation, 25 8 immerse the court in the merits of other
a helpful addition to burdensome motion
lawsuits, hardly
25 9
proceedings.
Second, even assuming that a lawyer's prior bad behavior can be
established in some cases, it is perilous to ascribe that prior behavior to
his current client, and it is that client's case that is subject to dismissal. 260 However true it may be that the client is generally derivatively
responsible for the lawyer's actions on his behalf,26 1 it hardly follows
that the client is responsible for the lawyer's misdeeds in other cases.
3. The Poor. - The Federal Rules were designed, in part, to open
up the federal courts to those of lesser means, and their moderate success in this regard may have caused courts to tighten pleading requirements for the poorest plaintiffs, indigents. Some courts fear such
litigants because indigents seem to have nothing to lose by bringing
groundless suits. 262 Moreover, they often sue pro se, so that insistence

on details may be more likely to reveal a fatal defect than in other cases,
where a lawyer alert to the defect might try to elude detection through
vagueness. The actual fate of most suits brought by the indigent-victories for plaintiffs are extremely rare 2 6 3-seems to justify suspicions
that a particular indigent plaintiff cannot prove facts that merit relief.
Courts animated by such suspicions arguably have a statutory basis
for treating pauper cases differently. The same statute that authorizes
my rights,' said Crockett."); The Numbers Game, Forbes, Apr. 1, 1974, at 54, 54 ("Walton Bader is the scourge of the U.S. accounting profession. A man whose name strikes
fear in the hearts of senior partners in the big certified public accounting firms.").
258. See supra notes 249-51 and accompanying text.
259. Cf. Becker, TheJudge's Perspective, 51 Antitrust LJ.437, 439 (1983) ("Now
we will have Rule 11 hearings, and then we will have discovery on the Rule I1 issue. If
you want to proliferate litigation, if you want to cause further delay, pass these rules
because we will have sanctions hearings coming out of our ears ....").But cf. Fed. R.
Civ. P. I1 advisory committee note (Rule 11 discovery should only be conducted in
"extraordinary circumstances" and a hearing may not be necessary).
260. Thus, when Rule 11 was amended in 1983 to put more teeth into sanctions
against attorneys who abuse litigation, the amendment also deleted the provision authorizing the striking of the pleading. As the advisory committee notes explained, the
power to strike "tended to confuse the issue of attorney honesty with the merits of the
action." Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee note. Cf. Risinger, Honesty in Pleading
and Its Enforcement: Some "Striking" Problems with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
11, 61 Minn. L. Rev. 1 (1976) (criticizing use of former Rule 11 to dismiss cases).
261. See Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 633-34 (1962) ("Petitioner voluntarily
chose this attorney as his representative in the action, and he cannot now avoid the
consequences of the acts or omissions of this freely selected agent.").
262. See, e.g., Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1226 (9th Cir. 1984); Anderson
v. Coughlin, 700 F.2d 37, 42 (2d Cir. 1982).
263. Prisoner suits, which constitute the bulk of pro se filings, result in judgment
for the defendant in a very high proportion of the cases. A 1978 study reported that
more than two-thirds of these suits are dismissed as groundless by the court without any
response from defendant, and that only a very small number go to trial. See Turner,
supra note 132, at 617-18.
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waiver of filing fees in in forma pauperis cases also provides that the
court may dismiss the complaint "if satisfied that the action is frivolous
or malicious. ' 26 4 Some courts feel that this power should not be exercised in any case that would survive a motion to dismiss under Conley v.
Gibson,2 65 but others view the statute as allowing greater latitude in dismissing the action. 26 6 The Supreme Court itself has clamped down on
in forma pauperis petitions for certiorari, 2 6 7 perhaps giving tacit support to the proponents of the more stringent treatment.
Carefully scrutinizing the factual conclusions alleged by the indigent is nevertheless hard to justify, as well as contrary to the objectives
of the Federal Rules. The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized
the need to take a liberal view of pro se pleadings, 2 68 and the indigent
are likely to be least able to ferret out the sort of proof the courts demand to support factual conclusions without first having some discovery. Moreover, despite widespread fear that courts will be inundated
with such cases, their actual impact seems modest. 269 Pleading practice
264. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1982). The statute has so provided since it was enacted
in 1892. Act ofJuly 20, 1892, ch. 209, 27 Stat. 252. On the difficulty of defining frivo.
lous, see Comment, Courts Are No Place for Fun and Frivolity: A Warning to Vexatious
Litigants and Over-Zealous Attorneys, 20 Willamette LJ. 441, 446-48 (1984).
265. See e.g., Phillips v. Mashburn, 746 F.2d 782, 784 (11 th Cir. 1984); Brandon v.
District of Columbia Bd. of Parole, 734 F.2d 56, 59 (D.C. Cir. 1984); see also Turner,
supra note 132, at 649 (arguing that courts should, at a minimum, use Conley v. Gibson
standard).
266. See Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1228 (9th Cir. 1984) (court can dismiss as frivolous although complaint states a claim if it is based on "wholly fanciful"
factual allegations); Anderson v. Coughlin, 700 F.2d 37, 43 (2d Cir. 1983); cf. Spears v.
McCotter, 766 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1985) (court may assign case to magistrate for evidentiary hearing to probe conclusory allegations and determine if case frivolous); Watson v.
Ault, 525 F.2d 886 (5th Cir. 1976) (court may require plaintiff to respond to questionnaire to assist it in deciding if claim frivolous).
There does not appear to be historical support for broader dismissal under the
statute than would be allowed had the plaintiff paid the fees, and very few cases were
decided prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules in 1938. See O'Connell v,Mason,
127 F. 435, 437 (D. Mass. 1903) ("It is possible that extreme cases might arise, where,
looking only at the face of the declaration, the court might determine that the suit was
frivolous or malicious even though the declaration were not demurrable."), aft'd, 132 F.
245 (1st Cir. 1904).
267. See, e.g., Brown v. Herald Co., 464 U.S. 928 (1983) (denying motion for leave
to proceed in forma pauperis). FourJustices dissented because review of such motions
increases the Court's workload. See id. at 929-30 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
268. See, e.g., Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982); Hughes v. Rowe, 449
U.S. 5, 9 (1980). These cases follow Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), which
stated that pro se complaints are subjected to "less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers."
269. See Eisenberg, Section 1983: Doctrinal Foundations and an Empirical Study,
67 Cornell L. Rev. 482, 526-33 (1982) (civil rights cases, including prisoner cases, impose modest burden); Turner, supra note 132, at 637-38, 647-49 (discussing expedited
procedures used to process prisoner petitions); see also C. Seron, The Roles of Magistrates in Federal District Courts 44 (1983) (prisoner cases often assigned to magistrates). But cf. Ford v. Estelle, 740 F.2d 374 (5th Cir. 1984) (prisoner cases cannot be
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in these cases may be more likely to elicit fatal details, but it is unlikely

to provide a method for assessing factual conclusions. Like the repeat

270
player, the poor plaintiff should not be shunted onto another track.

C. The Strike Suit Scenario
Rather than focusing on the type of claim or identity of the plain-

tiff, a court could seek to isolate those cases that might be strike suits.
Certainly the Supreme Court's opinion in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores2 7 1 supports sensitivity to the risk of strike suits, and the concern over strike suits lies close to the heart of the malaise of the liberal

ethos.

2 72

The problem is identifying a strike suit. 2 73 One feature often associated with strike suits is that the burden of litigation is sufficient to
prompt the defendant to settle, despite the weakness of the plaintiff's
claim, in order to avoid litigation expense or other disagreeable side
effects of litigation, such as publicity or interference with an impending
transaction. This concern is, of course, a reason for promoting pretrial

decisions. 2 74 It is of doubtful utility in singling out cases for stricter

pleading treatment, however, because there is no intrinsic relation be-

tween litigation expense or other disagreeable side effects of a lawsuit
and the absence of merit in plaintiff's case. Litigation expense, for ex-

ample, results from the need to do extensive preparation for trial, and
may make a small claim that is assured of success on the merits into a

nuisance suit, that is, one where litigation costs outweigh expected recovery. 275 Similarly, the fact that the suit may delay a transaction pro-

vides no basis for dismissing the suit if the proposed transaction itself is
assigned to magistrates for trial without parties' consent). Moreover, the assertion of
groundless claims may not be cost free for the petitioner. See Tasby v. United States,
504 F.2d 332 (8th Cir. 1974) (prosecution for perjury in connection with prisoner
petition).
270. Except for in forma pauperis situations, there is normally no occasion for
plaintiffs to disclose their financial condition to the court. Even if there were, there is no
standard by which to decide who is sufficiently poor for this unfavorable treatment.
271. 421 U.S. 723 (1975); see supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
272. Such concerns surface in decisions to limit discovery. See, e.g., Aviation Specialties, Inc. v. United Technologies Corp., 568 F.2d 1186, 1190 (5th Cir. 1978)
(describing plaintiff's interrogatories as "nothing more than a thinly veiled attempt to
enhance the strike capability of its suit"). Defendants can play this game also. See Blake
Constr. Co. v. International Harvester Co., 521 F. Supp. 1268, 1270 (N.D. Ill. 1981)
(referring to "Stalingrad defense").
273. See Pennsylvania Gas & Water Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 427 F.2d 568,
576 (D.C. Cir. 1970) ("Much that is sound and prophylactic in corporate law was developed in so-called strike suits ....
"); W. Cary & M. Eisenberg, Cases and Materials on
Corporations 888 (5th ed. 1980) ("The strike suit... may very well be no more than an
over-the-hill dragon, puffed into life to frighten the courts away from deciding substantive issues.").
274. See supra notes 134-42 and accompanying text.
275. See Rosenberg & Shavell, supra note 141, at 4.
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illegal. Moreover, there is no standard by which litigation inconvenience is to be gauged; every defendant finds litigation burdensome.
The key factor, then, is the weakness of the claim. Where the focus
is on a factual conclusion, however, the court is without a reliable way
of identifying cases in which plaintiffs are likely to prevail. 27 6 On balance, the strike suit scenario simply authorizes judges to dismiss cases
they view as weak when it appears to them that the litigation will unduly
27 7
inconvenience the defendant.
D. Discretionary Dismissals
The problems with the strike suit scenario suggest another approach-granting judges discretion to dismiss suits they conclude are
suspicious. The classic approach is that trial judges have no discretion;
any dismissal for failure to state a claim is subject to full review, and the
trial judge's decision is accorded no deference whatsoever. 2 78 Perhaps
this rule should be relaxed, and an abuse of discretion standard of review substituted. 2 79 This approach might allow judges to consider a
variety of factors including those discussed above, and to impose
stricter pleading standards when a case fits an abusive litigation profile.
Such a change in pleading doctrine would be consistent with the
current trend across a spectrum of trial administration issues. The Federal Rules of Evidence, for example, largely rely on the exercise of sen280
sible discretion by the trial court in admitting or excluding evidence.
The case management movement, fueled by the 1983 amendments to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, similarly emphasizes the importance of discretionary decisions on such matters as timing and scope of
276. See supra notes 196-227 and accompanying text.
277. It may even invite unwanted and irrelevant speculation about plaintiff's motives. For example, in Grant v. Smith, 574 F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 1978), the district court
dismissed a housing discrimination action after a trial to the court without ajury, noting
that plaintiffs seemed more interested in a strike suit than in securing accomodations.
Id. at 255. The appellate court reversed because of the district court's emphasis on
plaintiffs' good faith, which it found irrelevant to the question whether there was forbidden discrimination. Id.
278. See, e.g., Kelson v. City of Springfield, 767 F.2d 651, 653 (9th Cir. 1985).
279. The classic analysis of this standard is Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the
Trial Court, Viewed From Above, 22 Syracuse L. Rev. 635 (1971). For a careful examination of the types of treatment that an appellate court can adopt for discretionary trial
court decisions, broadly characterized as delegation and deference, see Post, The Management of Speech: Discretion and Rights, 1984 Sup. Ct. Rev. 169, 208-19.
Interestingly, early advocates of notice pleading seemingly viewed discretion as an
antidote to the tendency of appellate courts of that era to invent new pleading niceties
under the Codes. Thus, Professor Whittier, writing in 1918 to urge adoption of notice
pleading, expressed "hope[] that no law would develop determining what is sufficient
notice of any cause of action or defense. It should be left a question of fact in each case
to be determined by the trial judge ....
" Whittier, supra note 111, at 505.
280. See Waltz, Evidence is Dead, Wigmore Obsolescent: Long Live Judicial Discretion!, 65 Chi. B. Rec. 284 (1984).
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discovery, which can have a very great impact on a party's ability to
prepare and present his case. 28 ' Perhaps most analogous is the handling of the demand on directors requirement for derivative actions
28 2
under Rule 23.1-also governed by an abuse of discretion standard.
Expanded trial court discretion may indeed be the emerging reality
of trial court handling of pleadings motions. In Heart Disease Research
Foundation v. General Motors Corp.,283 for example, the Second Circuit
said the trial court had discretion to dismiss conclusory claims of conspiracy. 28 4 More significantly, trial judges are sometimes allowed to direct plaintiffs to replead even though the case would not be subject to
dismissal, and to enforce this order by dismissing if the plaintiff does
not comply. 285 Other cases suggest that appellate courts are coming to
regard the handling of pleadings motions as such individualized matters that consistency among decisions, the hallmark of an issue of law, is
not critical. Thus, in a 1978 decision affirming the dismissal of a securities fraud shareholders' class action, the Second Circuit was unmoved
by the fact that the same plaintiff, represented by the same lawyer, had
been allowed to proceed with another complaint of virtually identical
specificity. Instead, it disdained any effort to reconcile a welter of dismissal cases: "We see no profit in attempting to analyze these decisions, which may or may not be consistent and each of which
necessarily rests on its particular facts." '2 86 With their emphasis on

early "issue definition" and early disposition of groundless claims and
defenses, the 1983 amendments are likely to accelerate this trend to28 7
ward discretion.
281. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text. But consider Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 Emory LJ. 747, 755 (1982): "If we have been moving
increasingly in the direction of seeking justice in the individual case by more general
rules and grants of dispensing power . . .restrictions upon review of such decisions
made by courts of first instance are increasingly unacceptable."
282. See Lewis v. Graves, 701 F.2d 245, 248 (2d Cir. 1983).
283. 463 F.2d 98 (2d Cir. 1972).
284. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
285. For a recent example, see Friedlander v. Nims, 755 F.2d 810 (11th Cir. 1985),
a class action alleging RICO and securities fraud claims. One defendant moved to dismiss, and the trial court dismissed with leave to amend on the ground that the complaint
failed to plead fraud with particularity as required by Rule 9(b). When plaintiff did not
amend, the trial court dismissed with prejudice. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal as a sanction, but carefully noted that it was not holding that the original complaint was subject to dismissal without leave to amend. See id. at 814 n.6. However
logical this treatment is, it raises the prospect that a trial court could establish a predicate for dismissal with prejudice by ordering plaintiff to provide more specifics to support a claim not subject to dismissal with prejudice as originally pleaded.
286. Denny v. Barber, 576 F.2d 465,470 (2d Cir. 1978). The other case is Denny v.
Carey, 72 F.R.D. 574 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
287. Precisely this possibility has engendered much concern among commentators.
See, e.g., Sherman, Book Review, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 721, 729-32 (1984). Nonetheless,
there is some suggestion that even substantive decisions may be subject to trial court
discretion under RICO. See Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 741 F.2d 511, 518 n.7 (2d
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Although some relaxation of the idea that trial judges have no discretion in connection with pleading decisions may be inevitable, discretion is no panacea for handling the kind of factual conclusions that have
created the problem. First, increased discretion in this area runs
squarely against the grain of the Federal Rules. It is one thing to argue
for expanded power to resolve pleadings matters in order to assure litigants an opportunity for a decision on the merits. It is quite another to
authorize a judge to decide cases on instinct.2 88 That is not what we
mean when we endorse a merits decision.
Second, giving increased discretion to judges would disregard the
very real attitudinal differences amongjudges. With the growth of case
management, there can be little doubt that individual differences
among judges make the assignment of the case very important to the
way it develops in the pretrial stage, but differences in attitude toward
such matters as timing and breadth of discovery do not threaten the
substantive law. It is hard to deny, however, that at least some judges
view certain types of claims, although they are provided for under law,
as unimportant; 28 9 to increase discretion to dismiss could lead to
judge-by-judge "disfavored claims" treatment, surely less desirable
than the disfavored claim theory discussed above. 290 Such action
would threaten to fragment the substantive law by permitting judges to
create their own requirements for various kinds of claims. Present
practice already makes such diversity unavoidable to some extent. To
illustrate, one district judge has suggested that it is practical for litigants in RICO cases to tailor their allegations to the known predilections of the judge to whom the case is assigned.2 9' Although that
Cir. 1984) ("The matter of whether given conduct should be considered one or more
than one 'predicate act' is a matter best left, in the first instance, to the discretion of the
district judge."), vacated, 105 S. Ct. 3550 (1985); cf. Willamette Say. & Loan v. Blake &
Neal Fin. Co., 577 F. Supp. 1415, 1430 (D. Or. 1984) (regarding supposed requirement
of an independent racketeering injury, court observes that "[c]ourts recognize a racketeering injury when they see it," citingJustice Stewart's observation about obscenity that
"I know it when I see it"); Waste Recovery Corp. v. Mahler, 566 F. Supp. 1466, 1468
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (same).
288. Cf. Resnik, supra note 44, at 840-41 (discussing outrage caused by judge's
decision based on a coin flip).
289. Recall, for example, the hearings on the nomination of G. Harrold Carswell to
the Supreme Court, in which it was reported that as a district judge he had regularly
dismissed civil rights actions and been reversed. See 11 R. Mersky &J.Jacobstein. The
Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings and Reports on Successful and Unsuccessful Nominations of Supreme Court Justices by the Senate Judiciary Committee,
1916-1972, at 117-23 (1975) (testimony of Gary Orfield); id. at 139-47 (testimony of
John Lowenthal); id. at 177-82 (testimony of Norman Knopf; id. at 221-33 (testimony
of Leroy Clark); id. at 282-93 (testimony of Joseph Rauh). In particular, Professor
Orfield pointed up one case as an "example of [Judge Carswell's] willingness to use his
discretion as a district judge to even strike out [an] argument on a very important issue
raised by the litigants." Id. at 119.
290. See supra notes 228-38 and accompanying text.
291. Speech by Milton Shadur before the Illinois Institute on Continuing Legal Ed-
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suggestion results in part from the present diversity of interpretations
of RICO, it also shows how individualized "justice" could become if
greater discretion to dismiss on the pleadings were to become accepted
practice.
Third, there is simply no reason to believe that a trial judge is well
equipped for this task, whether experienced or not. One supposed
hallmark of a discretionary decision is that the trial judge is better positioned to decide the matter than appellate judges looking at a cold record. 29 2 That is simply not true in a meaningful way with respect to

factual conclusions in pleadings. At the pleading stage, the judge has
had no exposure to the parties or to evidentiary material. Instead, he
has only seen the pleadings and dealt with the lawyers. On the basis of
this information, it is impossible for him to form reliable conclusions
about whether given defendants have conspired to violate the antitrust
laws, discriminated against the plaintiff on grounds of race, or failed to
make a full disclosure in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. Yet these are precisely the types of issues that trial judges are
resolving using the vehicle of fact pleadings. 29 3 Admittedly judges
must make a similar determination at the summary judgment stage, but
that decision is at least based on evidentiary material. 2 94 At the pleading stage the judge must guess whether the plaintiff, if allowed discovery, will be able to gather evidence to support his claims. Uninformed
judicial speculation is not an adequate means of arriving at correct decisions on the merits.
Finally, enhancing the importance of selection of the judge would
encourage judge shopping. There can be no doubt that there are already incentives for judge shopping and that our courts seek to prevent
it.295 To endorse merits decisions that reflect the individual preferences of the judges involved, however, would tend to undermine the
notion that parties can expect evenhanded, and roughly equal, justice
from any judge. 2 96 However doubtful that assumption may be in realucation (Jan. 30, 1985) (unpublished) (on file at the offices of the Columbia Law
Review):
Once the case is assigned,

. . .

both lawyers should immediately run the

judge's name and the RICO acronym on Lexis or Westlaw. . . . Once you've
taken that judicial research step, unless the judge is such a maverick that you
have to play your case for the Court of Appeals from the beginning, it is obviously judicious on your part to adapt to what our sponsors [of the program]
...call the "judicial perspective."
292. See Rosenberg, supra note 279, at 663-65.
293. See supra notes 84-104 and accompanying text.
294. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) requires that affidavits submitted on summary judgment
motions be made on personal knowledge and set forth facts admissible in evidence. For
a discussion of the alternative of summaryjudgment treatment, see infra notes 297-342
and accompanying text.
295. See Marcus, supra note 235, at 706-07 n.183.
296. Cf. In re Cement Antitrust Litig., 673 F.2d 1020, 1027 (9th Cir. 1982) ("[lit is

difficult for us to think of a question which is more separable from and collateral to the
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ity, it could not be sustained were judges explicitly authorized to indulge their prejudices on the merits. Such a system would overtly tie
the outcome of the case to the assignment, and one could only hypocritically contend that efforts to influence the assignment of the case are
improper.
Accordingly, the solution to the problem of litigation abuse does
not lie in the direction of increasing the discretion of the trial judges to
dismiss cases because they sense misuse of the litigation system. Such a
development could undermine the substantive law just as fully as failure to dismiss meritless suits.
V.

THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT ROUTE

The fact that a case is not dismissed does not mean that it can only
be resolved on the merits by a full dress trial. To the contrary, the
intermediate step of summary judgment exists precisely to enable
courts to examine the factual conclusions of the pleader and determine
whether they are supported by sufficient evidence to warrant the time
and effort of a trial. Moreover, summary judgment works both ways;
plaintiffs can also use it to obtain a merits disposition. Indeed, summary judgment was originally adopted in England to enable plaintiffs to
penetrate groundless defenses. 2 97 Summary judgment was the stage
that Clark himself hoped would flourish as the mechanism for pretrial
disposition of cases, 29 8 but the early experience under Rule 56 failed to
achieve Clark's desire. Clark's own Second Circuit, over his objections,
adopted a "slightest doubt" standard, which resembled the dismissal
standard later articulated in Conley v. Gibson: summaryjudgment should
be denied whenever there is the slightest doubt about the entitlement
of the moving party to judgment. 29 9 Moreover, in 1962 the Supreme
Court cautioned that summary judgment should be "used sparingly in
complex antitrust litigation where motive and intent play leading
merits" than recusal of one judge.), aff'd sub nom. Arizona v. Ash Grove Cement Co.,
459 U.S. 1190 (1983); Hampton v. City of Chicago, 643 F.2d 478, 479 (7th Cir. 1981)
("While plaintiffs have a right to have their claim heard by the district court, they have
no protectable interest in the continued exercise ofjurisdiction by a particular judge.").
297. Louis, Federal SummaryJudgment Doctrine: A Critical Analysis, 83 Yale LJ.
745, 745 (1974).
298. Smith, supra note 3, at 918-19, 929.
299. See, e.g., Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946); Doehlcr Metal
Furniture Co. v. United States, 149 F.2d 130, 135 (2d Cir. 1945). See generally Louis,
supra note 297, at 760-62 (concluding that slightest doubt standard made summary
judgment unavailable on facts where moving party would be entitled to a directed verdict). This standard has been labelled "plainly wrong." Sonenshein, State of Mind and
Credibility in the Summary Judgment Context: A Better Approach, 78 Nw. U.L. Rev.

774, 798 (1983). For a discussion of Clark's opposition to this standard, see Smith,
supra note 3, at 930-31. For a discussion of the contrasting views of Judge Jerome
Frank, the architect of the slightest doubt standard, see R. Glennon, The Iconoclast as
Reformer 156-57 (1958).
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roles." 300
Limitations on summary judgment were particularly troublesome

in the kinds of cases that came to typify the new litigation boom precisely because those cases were often complex and turned on issues of
motive and intent. 30 1 Hence, restrictions on summary judgment may
have acted as a catalyst for the reemergence of fact pleading. Certainly,
the Second Circuit's refusal to credit plaintiffs' allegations that defendants were or should have been aware of the dangers of the Dalkon
Shield in Ross v. A.H. Robins Co.30 2 shows that the "slightest doubt"

standard was not being employed in the pleading context. The juxtaposition of these developments was ironic: at the pleading stage, plaintiffs might be denied discovery altogether unless they could offer facts
giving rise to a "strong inference"3 0 3 supporting their factual conclusions; thereafter, plaintiffs who had access to discovery were indulged
with great laxity at the summary judgment stage under the slightest
doubt view. This seems backwards.
The tendency toward this ironic result has abated over recent years
as limitations on summary judgment have relaxed. 30 4 In 1968, the
Supreme Court signalled greater flexibility in the handling of summary
judgment in antitrust cases, 30 5 and circuit courts have since upheld
300. Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962).
301. See supra text following note 105.
302. 607 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 946 (1980); see supra
notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
303. See supra notes 93, 219-23 and accompanying text.
304. For examples, see infra notes 305-307 and accompanying text. See generally
Louis, SummaryJudgment and the Actual Malice Controversy in Constitutional Defamation Cases, 57 S. Cal. L. Rev. 707, 709-10, 715 n.49 (1984) (discussing shift away from
Poller v. CBS and absence of articulated new rules); Sonenshein, supra note 299, at
778-79 (1963 amendment to Rule 56 expanded availability of summary judgment);
Booker, Summary Judgment Proves Versatile Antitrust Tool, Legal Times, Feb. 14,
1983, at 17, col. 1 (growing availability of summary judgment in antitrust cases). For a
strategy for such decisions see Schwarzer, SummaryJudgment Under the Federal Rules:
Defining Genuine Issues of Material Fact, 99 F.R.D. 465 (1984).
This is not to say that trial judges now have a free hand to grant summary judgment.
See Wechsler v. Steinberg, 733 F.2d 1054, 1058-59 (2d Cir. 1984) (reversing summary
judgment for defendant accountants in securities fraud action because "[i]ssues of motive and intent are usually inappropriate for disposition on summary judgment"); Neubauer, Snyder & Nolan, Judges Compare Courts, 11 Litig., Spring 1985, at 10, 15
(district judge explains that "[w]hat with the track record that district judges have in this
circuit on the subject of summary judgment. . . . [granting summary judgment] is a
high-risk judicial decision, as we all know"). But cf. Schwarzer, supra, at 467 & n.9
(reporting that in fact summary judgments are reversed less frequently than most judgments in Ninth Circuit).
305. See First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-90 (1968). The
Court upheld summary judgment in favor of defendant in an antitrust case, adding:
While we recognize the importance of preserving litigants' rights to a trial on
their claims, we are not prepared to extend those rights to the point of requiring that anyone who files an antitrust complaint setting forth a valid cause of
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summary judgment on the issue of whether there was a conspiracy. 0 ;
The Supreme Court has gone further in civil rights cases and encouraged summary disposition of suits against government officials on
the defense of qualified immunity, 30 7 an issue that turns in part on state
308
of mind.
Rather than indulging all possible doubts in favor of the opponent
to summary judgment, the courts seem to be shifting emphasis toward
ensuring an adequate opportunity for discovery and then scrutinizing
the fruits of that discovery. But the defendant can move for summary
judgment at any time, and may do so at the beginning of the case in
conjunction with a motion to dismiss. 309 At that point, the plaintiff is in
no better position to oppose summary judgment than he is to include
detailed evidence in the complaint in response to stringent fact pleading requirements. The plaintiff can, however, request under Rule 56(f)
that the summary judgment motion be postponed while he obtains discovery necessary to rebut the defendant's showing.3 10 The focus
should shift, then, to application of Rule 56(f).
A plaintiff is not automatically entitled to a Rule 56(f) postponement. Plaintiff must show that by exercising reasonable diligence he
could not have previously obtained evidence to controvert the defendant's showing. 3 1 ' Although this requirement may often be easy for the
action be entitled to a full-dress trial notwithstanding the absence ofany significant probative evidence tending to support the complaint.
Id. at 290. In dissent, Justice Black argued that the decision could not be squared with
Poller v. CBS. Id. at 303-05.
306. See, e.g., Barnes v. Arden Mayfair, Inc., 759 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1985); Products Liab. Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Crum & Forster Ins. Cos., 682 F.2d 660 (7th Cir. 1982);
Parsons v. Ford Motor Co., 669 F.2d 308 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 832 (1982).
Cf. Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 54 U.S.L.W. 4319, 4322-25 (U.S.
Mar. 26, 1985) (where defendants lacked rational economic motive to conspire, defendants entitled to summary judgement unless plaintiffs show unambiguous evidence that
tends to exclude the possibility that defendants acted independently).
307. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 813-19 (1982).
308. Interestingly, the Court's method for promoting summary disposition was to
introduce an objective reasonable person standard in place of a subjective standard
looking to defendant's actual state of mind. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 105 S. Ct. 2806,
2810-11 (1985); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). For criticism of this
approach, see Note, Qualified Immunity for Government Officials: The Problem of Unconstitutional Purpose in Civil Rights Litigation, 95 Yale L.J. 126 (1985).
309. In fact, if on a motion to dismiss the pleadings, the defendant submits and the
court does not exclude matters outside the plaintiff's pleading, the court must convert
the motion to one for summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b).
310. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f):
Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that he
cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the application forjudgment or may order a continuance to permit.

. .

depositions to be taken or discovery to be had .

. ..

311. See, e.g., Pfeil v. Rogers, 757 F.2d 850, 857 (7th Cir. 1985) (upholding rejection of Rule 56(f) request because plaintiffs' claim they could not earlier have obtained
information "strain[ed] credibilty").
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plaintiff to satisfy at the outset of the lawsuit, sometimes it is not. For
example, in a recent securities fraud action the Seventh Circuit upheld
summary judgment against plaintiffs who had been denied access to
discovery because defendants' motion was based on the statute of limitations and the only issue was the date on which plaintiffs were aware of
sufficient facts to put them on notice of the claim. 31 2 Defendants relied
on plaintiffs' depositions, and the court of appeals rejected the argument that summaryjudgment should be deferred pending discovery by
plaintiffs because "[tihe plaintiffs were the only people who would possibly be in possession of information sufficient to counter the infer'31 3
ences of a lack of due diligence found in their depositions.
The plaintiff must also show that the requested discovery is likely
to provide grounds for denying the motion, 3 14 a requirement said to
apply even where the information sought is exclusively in the defendant's possession. 3 15 The court need not credit speculation that some
controverting facts might be discovered. As one court explained, "[i]t
is not enough [for the plaintiff] to rest upon the uncertainty which
broods over all human affairs or to pose philosophic doubts regarding
the conclusiveness of evidentiary facts." 3 1 6 There should be some articulated justification for expecting the discovery to unearth evidence
that will rebut the defendant's showing.
Evaluating the plaintiff's justification may, however, prove extremely difficult. For example, in Decker v. Massey-Ferguson Ltd.,317
where the Second Circuit upheld dismissal of the plaintiff's securities
complaint based on a comparison of plaintiff's allegations with the contents of various reports issued by Massey, it might well be that had the
defendants' motion been treated as one for summary judgment there
would have been no need for discovery. Certainly, the appellate court's
conclusions that Massey's filings showed conclusively that its forecasts
312. See Gieringer v. Silverman, 731 F.2d 1272 (7th Cir. 1984).

313. Id. at 1278.
314. See United States ex. rel. Small Business Admin. v. Light, 766 F.2d 394,
397-98 (8th Cir. 1985); Willmar Poultry Co. v. Morton-Norwich Prods., 520 F.2d 289,
297 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 915 (1976); see also Reasor v. City of
Norfolk, 606 F. Supp. 788, 792 (E.D. Va. 1984) (court granted Rule 56(f) request but
cautioned plaintiffs' attorneys that they might be sanctioned if they did not thereafter
timely comply with Rule 11). If the information that the plaintiff seeks is not relevant to
the motion, the court should proceed to rule. See FirstJersey Nat'l Bank v. Dome Petroleum, Ltd., 723 F.2d 335, 341 & n.4 (3d Cir. 1983); Exxon Corp. v. FTC, 663 F.2d 120,
126-29 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
315. See Weir v. Anaconda Co., 773 F.2d 1073, 1083 (10th Cir. 1985); 6 Moore's
Federal Practice, supra note 40, 56.24, at 56-1432.
316. Robin Constr. Co. v. United States, 345 F.2d 610, 614 (3d Cir. 1965); accord
Neely v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 584 F.2d 341, 344 (9th Cir. 1978) ("An opposing party's mere hope that further evidence may develop prior to trial is an insufficient
basis upon which to justify denial of the motion.").
317. 681 F.2d I l1 (2d Cir. 1982); see supra notes 196-207 and accompanying text.
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were not actionable3 1 8 and that Massey had complied with applicable
SEC requirements3 19 suggest this result. But the court's reliance on
"unchallenged" figures in Massey's reports to show that plaintiff was
wrong in claiming Massey's statements were false ignores the possibility that discovery might have enabled plaintiff to challenge these
figures.3 20 The possibility, however, need not cause the court to pause
unless there were some reasonable prospect that discovery would in
fact provide a basis for challenging the figures, and the plaintiff has the
burden of specifying why that is true. At some point the off chance that
incriminating evidence might surface through discovery is not enough
to shake the court's confidence that, as the Second Circuit held in the
dismissal posture in Decker, there is no legitimate claim against
defendants.
Contrast, however, Ross v. A.H. Robins Co.,321 in which the Second
Circuit rejected the plaintiff's allegations about defendants' awareness
of the risks of the Dalkon Shield. Shifted into the summary judgment
context, that case presents a situation in which a court could not reasonably conclude that the defendants were free of the alleged awareness without allowing some discovery. In fact, discovery is usually
necessary to give plaintiff access to controverting evidence on state of
mind issues.
The proper focus here, as with merits decisions on dismissal motions, 3 22 is on the level of confidence that the defendant has not violated the plaintiff's rights. A court may be more comfortable in
granting summary judgment for the defendant than in deciding dismissal motions in defendant's favor because summary judgment can be
granted, even if the plaintiff makes no showing in opposition, only
where the defendant has affirmatively demonstrated that there are no
disputed issues of fact. 323
Rule 56(f) requests, however, generally should be liberally
318. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
319. See id.
320. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
321. 607 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 946 (1980); see supra
notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
322. See supra notes 144-95 and accompanying text.
323. See, e.g., Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 160 (1970); First Nat'il
Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289 (1968). Thus, in Catrett v. Johns-Manville
Sales Corp., 756 F.2d 181 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
106 S. Ct. 342 (1985), the court reversed the grant of summary judgment to defendant
because defendant had made no showing in support of its motion even though it appeared that plaintiff (who had the burden of proof) had no admissible evidence to oppose the motion. Judge Bork dissented, arguing that summary judgment is permissible
where the plaintiff has no evidence. Id. at 187-91. It is possible the Supreme Court may
use this case as a vehicle for revising the rule on this issue. Cf. Fontenot v. Upjohn Co.,
780 F.2d 1190, 1197 (5th Cir. 1980) (rejecting decision of D.C. Circuit in Cairell).
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granted.3 2 4 Nonetheless, they need not raise the spectre of voluminous
discovery. To the contrary, Rule 56(f) contemplates only limited discovery, 3 25 and the plaintiff's showing under Rule 56(f) should focus
that discovery effort. Moreover, the court could authorize such discovery in stages, reviewing the results of one stage before deciding
whether to authorize another.3 26 Such scrutiny of discovery results is
well adapted to the emerging case management orientation of federal
judges; discovery can be directed toward critical issues and assessed as
it is completed to determine whether summary disposition of part or all
of the case is then possible.3 27 Although excessive limitations may generate unnecessary disputes about the scope of discovery,3 2 8 the court's
power to tailor the discovery to the needs of the case limits the litigation boom risks that apparently prompted courts to adopt stringent fact
pleading requirements in the first place.3 29 In cases like Decker, the de-

cision whether to allow any discovery may be extremely difficult, but if
the Rule 56(f) issue is framed in terms of confidence that the defendant
has not violated the plaintiff's rights, the court will at least be addressing the right basic problem.
Unfortunately, some courts seem instead to take the same approach as the new fact pleading cases and deny Rule 56(f) requests
because the plaintiff presently lacks evidence, even though the issue
seems to call for discovery. In Paul Kadair,Inc. v. Sony Corp.,330 for example, the Fifth Circuit recently upheld summary judgment that defendants had not conspired even though the trial court had unilaterally
stayed discovery before plaintiff had taken any. Plaintiff, a stereo retailer, sued forty-one manufacturers, distributors, and retailers of elec324. See, e.g., Patty Precision, Inc. v. Brown & Sharpe Mfg., 742 F.2d 1260, 1264
(10th Cir. 1984); 10A C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 3, § 2740, at 530-32.

325. See First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 265 (1968) ("comparatively limited discovery"); see also id. at 298 ("discovery obtainable under Rule 56(f)

...would normally be less extensive in scope").
326. For a discussion of such a process in a related context, see Durham &Dibble,
Certification: A Practical Device for Early Screening of Spurious Antitrust Litigation,

1978 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 299. In Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (1979), the Court
cited this article with apparent approval while observing that "[d]istrict courts must be

especially alert to identify frivolous claims brought to extort nuisance settlements
....

" Id. at 345.

Plaintiff's attorneys may have an incentive to screen discovery results in this fashion
by themselves. Professor Coffee suggests that they may lose interest in cases in which
limited discovery does not turn up a "smoking gun." See Coffee, supra note 136. To
the extent he is correct, the courts may feel less need to intervene in the process.

327. For a discussion of such control of discovery, see W. Schwarzer, Managing
Antitrust and Other Complex Litigation § 3-3, at 62-63 (1982). Limitations on discovery can cause problems of their own, however. See Shaklee Corp. v. Gunnell, 748 F.2d

548 (10th Cir. 1984) (limitations on discovery denied defendants due process when matters deemed irrelevant during discovery became relevant during trial).
328. See 10A C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 3, § 2740, at 541.
329. See supra notes 45-105 and accompanying text.
330. 694 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1983).

HeinOnline -- 86 Colum. L. Rev. 489 1986

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86:433

tronic equipment, charging that they conspiratorially refused to deal
with plaintiff. A month after the complaint was filed, the trial court sua
sponte stayed all discovery pending a status conference in order to
"protect the plaintiff from a barrage of paper work." '3 3 1 The stay re332
mained in effect, subject to the right to request specified discovery.
After the trial court twice ordered plaintiff to amend its complaint to set
forth specific and detailed allegations as to each defendant, defendants
filed motions for summary judgment supported by affidavits denying
conspiratorial activity and specifying other reasons such as lack of
creditworthiness for refusing to deal with plaintiff. Plaintiff responded
with an affidavit seeking discovery pursuant to Rule 56(f), eventually
identifying fifteen individuals it wanted to depose, and specifying certain subjects it wished to cover in interrogatories. Emphasizing plaintiff's admission that it filed suit with limited evidence, 33 3 the trial court
found Rule 56(f) inapplicable because that Rule "is designed to enable
a party to seek particular facts relevant to an already-established factual
pattern of alleged antitrust activity."'3 34 Since plaintiff could not assure
the court that the proposed discovery would produce evidence sufficient to oppose defendants' motions, the court refused to allow it to
conduct a "fishing expedition, ' 3 3 5 and granted defendants' motions.
While troubled by indications that plaintiff's counsel had not undertaken discovery because he had been busy responding to defendants' motions, 33 6 the Fifth Circuit affirmed. It commended the trial
court's efforts to keep discovery under control,3 3 7 pointing out that
"the expensive and time consuming nature of antitrust litigation along
with the statutory treble damage remedy, may particularly inspire vexatious litigation, an evil which summary judgment may guard
against. '33 8 Noting that plaintiff failed to submit affidavits on matters
within its control, such as creditworthiness, and that its discovery requests "remained vague and peripheral to the key issue of conspiracy,"' 33 9 the appellate court found persuasive the views of the Second

Circuit that "[w]here a plaintiff fails to produce any specific facts whatsoever to support a conspiracy allegation, a district court may, in its
331. See Paul Kadair, Inc. v. Sony Corp., 88 F.R.D. 280, 284 (M.D. La. 1980), amd,
694 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1983).

332. The appellate court stated that the stay was not unequivocal about allowing
discovery. See 694 F.2d at 1031. But it appears that defendants' motions were filed

before the earliest time when the district court's stay order contemplated allowing any
discovery. See id.
333. 88 F.R.D. at 284, 285.

334. Id. at 289.
335. Id. The court explained that "the purpose of discovery ... would be to ascertain whatever information possible in order to set forth specific violations of the Act."
336. See 694 F.2d at 1023 n.12.
337. Id. at 1024 n.18.
338. Id. at 1031.
339. Id. at 1032.

HeinOnline -- 86 Colum. L. Rev. 490 1986

1986]

FACT PLEADING

discretion, refuse to permit discovery and grant summary judgment." 340 Under the peculiar facts of Kadair, the court's refusal to permit plaintiff any discovery may have been justified because the
likelihood that plaintiff would turn up evidence of wrongdoing was so
slight. In general, however, the idea that plaintiffs should be required
to make an evidentiary showing to justify access to discovery raises
using pleadings practice to challenge
most of the same problems as
341
plaintiff's factual conclusions.
Precise or general rules for Rule 56(f) decisions cannot be fashioned; ultimately, courts will have to make sensible decisions on a caseby-case basis. In evaluating the scope of discovery that will be permitted, they are likely to consider many of the factors that have already
been rejected as justifications for heightened pleading standards. They
are also likely to encounter difficult problems in determining whether a
certain amount of discovery is enough. But confronting these difficulties is better, in an imperfect world, than pretending that the same issues can be resolved at the pleading stage. Some evidence is better
than none, and discretionary control of discovery (explicitly authorized
by the Rules) 34 2 is much less unsettling than discretion to dismiss. So

long as the basic focus is on whether the court can confidently conclude
that the defendant did not in fact violate the plaintiff's rights, sensible
judges should reach sensible results.
CONCLUSION

I fear that every age must learn its lesson that special pleading
cannot be made to do the service of trial and that live issues
between active litigants are not to be disposed of or evaded on
the paper pleadings ....
343
Charles E. Clark
This Article began by asking whether Clark's pessimism based on
340. Id. at 1030 (quoting Contemporary Mission, Inc. v. United States Postal Serv.,

648 F.2d 97, 107 (2d Cir. 1981)).
341. For a discussion of those problems, see supra notes 209-27 and accompanying

text. Where, after reasonable discovery, the plaintiff cannot persuasively challenge the
defendant's assertions, a court may comfortably decide against the plaintiff. See, e.g.,

Sames v. Gable, 732 F.2d 49 (3d Cir. 1984) (upholding summary judgment against
claims that plaintiffs were demoted for political reasons on basis of defendant's denials
of any such motivations in their depositions, in light of plaintiffs' failure to proffer any
other evidence).
Lest Kadairbe thought unique, see Wallace v. Brownell Pontiac-GMC Co., 703 F.2d
525 (11 th Cir. 1983) (defendants granted summary judgment before plaintiff had opportunity for discovery); Willmar Poultry Co. v. Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 520 F.2d 289
(8th Cir. 1975) (same), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 915 (1976). But cf. Sonenshein, supra
note 299, at 785 (summary judgment inappropriate when party opposing motion has

not had opportunity to complete discovery).
342. Note that the wording of Rule 56(f) is discretionary, see supra note 310. See
also supra note 62 and accompanying text.

343. Clark, supra note 71, at 46.
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Gresham's Law has been vindicated by the judicial handling of his
pleading reforms. Certainly Rule 8(a)(2) has not received the brutal
treatment the New York judges inflicted on the Field Code. 3 44 Further-

more, Conley v. Gibson effectively scotched any serious efforts to revert
to code pleading formalism. It is equally clear, however, that the new
fact pleading is more restrictive than Clark would have wanted. The
courts' efforts to puncture factual conclusions are inconsistent with the
spirit of the Rules, and the present handling of legal conclusions would
probably offend a reformer who originally wanted to do away with
pleading motions altogether.3 45 So Gresham's Law seems at least
partly at work, but the courts are not the only ones who have been its
instruments. Clark probably would have opposed some of the 1980
34 6
and 1983 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure;
whether as a result of Gresham's Law or other developments, time
seems to have tarnished his vision of the litigation system.
The obvious stimulus for the new fact pleading is the litigation
boom, and the fact pleading cases are therefore concentrated in the
areas that have experienced the greatest growth. The prospect that liberal pleading affords broad discovery to abusive litigants or lawyers is
undeniably distressing. But the circumstances do not actually seem so
urgent as portrayed by many. Rapid growth in the level of civil litigation is not unknown in English and American experience.3 4 7 Although
the public perception of the problem has been concentrated in the last
decade or two, judicial lobbying about protracted litigation goes back
nearly four decades. 3 48 Moreover, the frequency of abusive practices
by plaintiffs has not been shown to be high.A49 Indeed, some have gone

so far as to label the current preoccupation with the litigation boom
"an item of elite folklore."3 5 0 Under these circumstances, there seems
to be little reason for radical retrenching on the handling of pleadings,
even if that were a promising solution.
The real question is whether pleading practice can yield reliable
merits decisions. The prevalence of notice pleading jargon has obscured this question by forcing courts interested in disposing of cases
on the merits to couch their decisions in terms of demanding notice of
the basis of the claim. The pressures of the litigation boom could have
the desirable effect of ending this camouflage effort. This Article has
therefore suggested that the notice pleading rationale be abandoned.
Unless there is some prospect that it will lead to a merits decision of
344. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
345. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
346. Cf. F. James & G. Hazard, supra note 11, § 3.11, at 154-55 (characterizing
requirement under amended Rule I1 of statement of factual grounds for a claim as "a
move in the direction of code pleading").
347. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
348. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
349. Cf. supra note 140 and accompanying text (relating to class actions).
350. Galanter, supra note 46, at 64.

HeinOnline -- 86 Colum. L. Rev. 492 1986

1986]

FACT PLEADING

493

pleading practice is little better
some or all of the claims or defenses,
35
than an expensive waste of time. '
Once the notice pleading chimera is banished, very difficult
problems remain. Under the Federal Rules, there is a systemic tendency to react to the risk of inaccurate decisions by adding procedural
layers intended to improve accuracy. Laudable in theory, this tendency
can deprive litigants of any decision on the merits;3 52 failure to dismiss
a weak case or grant summary judgment may be something of a default
in the judicial function. Sometimes a decision, even with some risk of
error, may be preferable to the drain of continued litigation. If the litigation boom causes the courts to come to grips with this responsibility,
that is also desirable.
The circumstances in which such merits decisions are possible on
the pleadings, however, are distressingly limited. This Article has
found that such situations fall generally into two categories, those in
which more detail will reveal a fatal defect and those in which sufficient
detail will show that the defendant has not violated the plaintiff's
rights. 3 53 As the recent experience under RICO demonstrates,3 5 4 it is
often difficult to identify elements of a claim that plaintiffs should be
forced to establish. Even more troubling is the risk that courts will indulge in weighing of evidence in the process of trying to decide on the
basis of the pleadings whether the defendant's conduct violated the
plaintiff's rights. Outside these limited areas, more stringent pleading
3 55
or
practices cannot be justified as appropriate for "suspicious" cases
6

35
as part of the trial court's discretion in handling litigation.
Instead, more flexible use of summary judgment, in tandem with
case management, seems the more promising course. 3 57 This approach reduces the disquieting possibility that a plaintiff will be unable
to satisfy the court's demand for proof of the defendant's misconduct
because he has been denied discovery. It is also comforting to have
merits decisions based on evidence rather than allegations. Moreover,
selective cost-shifting, coupled with active case management, should di-

351. See supra notes 113-21 and accompanying text.

352. Justice Rehnquist, for example, has remarked on the effect of the "seeming
compulsion to make sure that the final result reached in any case is the correct one."
Rehnquist, Speech at University of Florida Law School (Sept. 15, 1984) at 16 (unpublished) (on file at the offices of the Columbia Law Review). This compulsion has had an
effect on the design of the litigation system: "It is very much as if the government were
to announce a governmental monopoly on the production of cars, and then proceed to
produce only Cadillac limousines with jump seats." Id. at 14; see also Leubsdorf, Constitutional Civil Procedure, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 579, 589 (1984) ("Those who are not rich
often cannot afford litigation on the scale for which the system is designed.").

353. See supra notes 149-95 and accompanying text.
354. See supra notes 154-71 and accompanying text.
355. See supra notes 228-77 and accompanying text.
356. See supra notes 278-96 and accompanying text.

357. See supra notes 297-342 and accompanying text.
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minish some concerns about litigation abuse.3 5 8 This course is neither
easy nor foolproof, however. Case management is time-consuming and
vexing, and Rule 56(f) requests for postponements will often require
particularly difficult determinations about the utility of further discovery. Evaluating evidence in the summary judgment context is not easy,
but it should be more reliable than scrutinizing factual conclusions in
the pleadings. Thus, the suggestion is simply a better course, not a
panacea.
In the end, Clark's pessimism seems to reflect the cyclical nature of
procedural reform. For more than a century reform efforts in England
and America have followed a similar course, with simplifications breeding new complexities.3 5 9 To a large extent, these difficulties result
from shifting uncertainties about substantive law. They also result
from the fact that we have an adversarial system in which litigants and
lawyers try to use the procedures that exist to the advantage of their
clients. In the face of these pressures, the reality is that manipulation of
procedural mechanisms for settlement leverage will never be eliminated.3 60 As tinkerers, we will have to repeat the cycle of revision and
relapse again and again.
358. See supra notes 66, 143 and accompanying text.

359. The English Judicature Acts of 1875 represented a watershed similar to the
adoption of the Federal Rules. Like the Federal Rules, the Act was designed to simplify
litigation, shelve formalism, expand discovery, and assure decisions on the merits.
Within 10 years, excessive litigation, particularly excessive discovery, had run up the
cost of litigation so much that it was said the reforms seemed to be defeating their own
ends. See Rosenbaum, Studies in English Procedure, 63 U. Pa. L. Rev. 273, 289-91
(1915). Among the remedies proposed for this situation were elimination of pleadings,
id. at 295, 382, and requiring closer supervision of discovery by masters, id. at 386.
360. Cf. Weinstein, Some Reflections on the "Abusiveness" of Class Actions, 58
F.R.D. 299, 302 (1973) ("As in any litigation, the pressure on the defendant to buy his

peace through settlement cannot be totally eliminated.").
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